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Abstract
The dissertation studies the primary sources of business-cycle fluctuations and
their interaction with uncertainty and financial frictions. In my work, I examine
the degree to which changes in uncertainty and financial conditions can be inde-
pendent drivers of economic fluctuations; I study the sources of boom-bust cycles
and whether they are linked to credit market sentiments; and I ask how financial
frictions affect economic fluctuations in terms of prices and quantities.
In “Financial and Uncertainty Shocks”, I separately identify financial and uncer-
tainty shocks using a novel SVAR procedure and discusses their distinct monetary
policy implications. The procedure relies on the qualitatively different responses
of corporate cash holdings: after a financial shock, firms draw down their cash re-
serves as they lose access to external finance, while uncertainty shocks drive up cash
holdings for precautionary reasons. Although both financial and uncertainty shocks
are contractionary, my results show that the former are inflationary while the latter
generate deflation. I rationalize this pattern in a New-Keynesian model: after a
financial shock, firms increase prices to raise current liquidity; after an uncertainty
shock, firms cut prices in response to falling demand. These distinct channels have
stark monetary policy implications: conditional on uncertainty shocks the divine
coincidence applies, while in case of financial shocks the central bank can stabilize
inflation only at the cost of more unstable output fluctuations.
In “What are the Sources of Boom-Bust Cycles?”, joint with Vito Cormun, we pro-
vide a synthesis of two major views on economic fluctuations. One view maintains
that expansions and recessions arise from the interchange of positive and negative
persistent exogenous shocks to fundamentals. This is the conventional view that
gave rise to the profusion of shocks used in modern dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models. In contrast, a second view, which we call the endogenous cy-
cles view, holds that business cycle fluctuations are due to forces that are internal to
the economy and that endogenously favor recurrent periods of boom followed by
a bust. In this environment, cycles can occur after small perturbations of the long
run equilibrium. We find empirical evidence pointing at the coexistence of both
views. In particular, we find that the cyclical behaviour of economic aggregates is
due in part to strong internal mechanisms that generate boom-bust phenomena in
response to small changes in expectations, and in part to the interchange of positive
and negative persistent fundamental shocks. Motivated by our findings, we build a
theory that unifies the dominant paradigm with the endogenous cycles approach.
Our theory suggests that recessions and expansions are intimately related phenom-
ena, and that understanding the nature of an expansion, whether it is driven by
fundamentals or by beliefs, is a first order issue for policy makers whose mandate
is to limit the occurrance of inefficient economic fluctuations.
In “COVID-19 and Credit Constraints”, joint with Pierluigi Balduzzi, Emanuele
Brancati, and Fabio Schiantarelli, we investigate the economic effects of the COVID-
19 pandemic and the role played by credit constraints in the transmission mecha-
nism, using a novel survey of expectations and plans of Italian firms, taken just
before and after the outbreak. Most firms revise downward their expectations for
sales, orders, employment, and investment, while prices are expected to increase at
a faster rate, with geographical and sectoral heterogeneity in the size of the effects.
Credit constraints amplify the effects on factor demand and sales of the COVID-19
generated shocks. Credit-constrained firms also expect to charge higher prices, rel-
ative to unconstrained firms. The search for and availability of liquidity is a key
determinant of firms’ plans. Finally, both supply and demand shocks play a role
in shaping firms’ expectations and plans, with supply shocks being slightly more
important in the aggregate.
Alla carta igienica
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Chapter 1
Financial and Uncertainty Shocks
1.1 Introduction
This paper shows how to separately identify two major sources of business-cycle
fluctuations — financial shocks and uncertainty shocks — and what different mon-
etary policy intervention they require. Although both financial and uncertainty
shocks have contractionary effects on output, consumption, investment, and em-
ployment, my results reveal that financial shocks are associated with inflationary
forces while uncertainty shocks trigger deflationary patterns. The monetary author-
ity faces very different trade-offs: in case of uncertainty shocks, the divine coin-
cidence applies; while, in case of financial shocks, the central bank can close the
output gap only at the cost of more unstable inflation.
This paper provides three main contributions. First, I propose a novel struc-
tural VAR strategy that relies on the qualitatively different responses of corporate
cash holdings to separately identify financial and uncertainty shocks on aggregate
1
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data. In support of the identifying assumption on corporate cash, I analyze a par-
tial equilibrium model and provide a set of supportive evidence. Second, I identify
the distinct empirical patterns associated with financial and uncertainty shocks on
aggregate U.S. data. Empirical results reveal that, although both shocks have con-
tractionary effects on key macroeconomic variables, financial shocks are associated
with inflationary forces, while uncertainty shocks are related to deflationary pat-
terns. Third, I integrate the partial equilibrium model presented above in a general
equilibrium New Keynesian framework to rationalize the qualitatively different re-
sponses of inflation and conclude that the monetary authority deals with different
challenges in face of the two shocks.
To support the identifying assumption that corporate cash displays a qualitatively
different response to financial and uncertainty shocks, the first part of the paper
analyzes a partial equilibrium model. In this infinite-horizon model, a continuum
of firms maximize the expected present value of the dividend flow by choosing cash
holdings after observing aggregate shocks but before observing the idiosyncratic
productivity level. In the spirit of Riddick and Whited (2009), the model features
financial frictions in the form of a dilution cost that firms have to pay if they have
to issue negative dividends due to low idiosyncratic productivity. In case of a finan-
cial shock, captured by a current increase in the dilution cost of issuing negative
dividends, firms prefer to draw down the stock of cash in order to avoid access-
ing external funds. In case of an uncertainty shock, captured by an increase in the
variance of future technology shocks, firms prefer to invest current resources in the
stock of cash for a precautionary motive. In other words, cash holdings can be seen
1.1. INTRODUCTION 3
as an insurance that firms implicitly purchase as a protection against the risk of fu-
ture cash flow shortages. After a financial shock, the implicit cost of this insurance
rises and firms opt to hold less of it; after an uncertainty shock, firms attribute more
value to this insurance and opt to hold more of it.
The second part of the paper proposes a novel econometric strategy in a structural
VAR context that uses the qualitatively different responses of corporate cash as an
internal instrument to uniquely identify financial and uncertainty shocks without re-
lying on any ordering assumption. The econometric procedure can be summarized
in two steps. In the first step, the econometrician identifies financial and uncertainty
shocks by maximizing two objective functions simultaneously. The objective func-
tion associated with the identification of financial shocks is increasing in the impact
response of a proxy for financial conditions (i.e., the credit spread) and decreasing
in the impact response of corporate cash. Importantly, the parameter δ governs the
relative importance that this function gives to the response of financial conditions
and of corporate cash holdings. At the same time, the objective function associated
with the identification of uncertainty shocks is increasing in the impact response of
a proxy for uncertainty (i.e., the expected volatility) and increasing in the impact
response of corporate cash. Importantly, the same parameter δ governs the relative
importance that this function gives to the response of measured uncertainty and of
corporate cash holdings. In the second step, the econometrician selects δ∗ such that
the two types of shocks identified with the maximization problems described above
are orthogonal to each other. Given δ∗ — which I show exists and is unique under
mild assumptions — financial and uncertainty shocks are uniquely identified. Thus,
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with this econometric procedure the econometrician can now rely on a point esti-
mate rather than on a set of feasible solutions (as in the case of sign restrictions).
In addition, this procedure does not rely on any ordering assumptions (as in the
case of Cholesky identification) since neither type of shocks is identified before the
other.
In the third part, I employ the econometric strategy presented above on aggregate
U.S. data in order to quantify the effect of the two shocks on the real economy. The
baseline specification is a ten-variable VAR with the excess bond premium (Gilchrist
et al., 2017), measured macroeconomic uncertainty (Jurado et al., 2015), corporate
cash holdings over total assets, GDP, consumption, investment, total hours, GDP
deflator, the real stock of money (M2 over GDP deflator), and the federal funds rate.
The impulse responses implied by my procedure show that financial and uncertainty
shocks have contractionary effects on output, consumption, investment, and total
hours. Meanwhile, financial shocks have a positive impact effect on GDP deflator,
while uncertainty shocks have a negative and persistent effect on inflation. Finally,
the federal funds rate displays a pronounced and persistent fall after an uncertainty
shock and only a mild and marginally significant decrease after a financial shock.
Quantitatively, uncertainty shocks explain almost 20% of the variations in real
GDP over a business-cycle frequency, while financial shocks explain about 40%.
Although financial shocks appear to be a more important driver of business-cycle
fluctuations, uncertainty shocks trigger a much larger effect on total hours: financial
shocks explain roughly 20% of the forecast error variance of total hours, while
uncertainty shocks explain almost 40%. In addition, financial shocks explain a large
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size of the forecast error variance of corporate cash and little of the one of GDP
deflator over a business-cycle frequency. By contrast, uncertainty shocks explain
less than a fifth in the case of corporate cash but more than 20% in the case of GDP
deflator.
In the last part of the paper, I integrate the partial equilibrium model presented
above in a New Keynesian framework with the aim to: (i) confirm that the eco-
nomic intuition on cash is robust to general equilibrium forces, (ii) rationalize the
differential empirical response of inflation to financial and uncertainty shocks, and
(iii) derive monetary policy implications. The model is a standard New Keynesian
model (see Gilchrist et al., 2017) augmented with good-specific habits, costly exter-
nal finance, and a market for cash and liquid assets. In line with Ravn et al. (2006),
the household good-specific demand depends also on an external habit stock deter-
mined by previous levels of the good-specific consumption. Firms can influence the
future value of the good-specific habit stock, which operates as a customer base,
by changing prices. Moreover, following the partial equilibrium model described
above, all external finance takes the form of equity and financial frictions are fea-
tured by a dilution cost that firms have to pay when issuing negative dividends.
Finally, the model features a market for cash and liquid assets where households
receive utility from holding cash, while firms hold cash as a device to have more
financial flexibility.
The general equilibrium forces magnify the qualitatively different effects that fi-
nancial and uncertainty shocks have on corporate cash holdings. In case of financial
shocks, the stochastic discount factor decreases because households expect the ef-
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fects of the contraction to die out in the near future; viceversa, in case of uncertainty
shocks, the same variable increases because households expect larger consumption
variance in the future. As a result, after a financial shock, households are more
impatient and push firms to cut corporate cash holdings in order to distribute more
dividends today. Conversely, after an uncertainty shock, households are more pa-
tient and, due to a precautionary motive, put pressure on firms to increase current
savings in order to receive more dividends in future. Moreover, if we consider the
effect of inflation, it turns out that inflationary (deflationary) forces create an incen-
tive to draw down (build up) the stock of cash because, for a given nominal interest
rate, the benefit of holding cash and liquid assets decreases (increases). Thus, as
long as the model is consistent with the empirical results of inflationary financial
shocks and deflationary uncertainty shocks, inflation is also pushing corporate cash
holdings in the expected direction.
Regarding the effect of financial and uncertainty shocks on inflation, the differ-
ent response works through the good-specific habit — that results in a customer
base — and the costly external finance. Specifically, the existence of a customer
base with low demand elasticity gives firms the incentive to raise prices when they
need to generate internal sources of finance. As a result, the response of inflation
depends on two forces that move prices in two different directions. First, the need
to generate internal sources of finance that is associated with inflationary forces
and, second, the overall fall in demand that, in line with textbook demand shocks,
is related to deflationary patterns. In the case of a financial shock, firms increase
prices because they want to generate additional internal resources in order to avoid
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the costlier external finance. Conversely, after an uncertainty shock, the need to
generate current internal finance is not largely affected, while the fall in the overall
demand (for a precautionary motive) encourages firms to cut prices. Using a large
set of reasonable calibrations, simulations robustly confirm this intuition.
I conclude by studying the monetary policy implications of my model for finan-
cial and uncertainty shocks. Conditional to the latter, the positive comovement
between output and inflation suggests that the divine coincidence is in place and
the monetary authority can simultaneously close the output gap and the inflation
gap. Conversely, the negative comovement between output and inflation after a
financial shock suggests that the central bank has to deal with a non-trivial trade-
off between the output gap and the inflation gap. I formally analyze this intuition
by running a counter-factual policy experiment where the monetary authority pays
more attention to the output gap relative to the inflation gap. In the case of un-
certainty shocks, the further attempt to stabilize the output gap implies an even
further stabilization of the inflation gap; while, in the case of financial shocks, the
monetary authority stabilizes the output gap only at the cost of higher inflation.
Related literature. This paper contributes to different strands of the literature. The
econometric procedure presented here relates to other papers proposing the use of
internal instruments to identify structural shocks in a VAR context.1 First, this pa-
per is related to Faust (1998) and Uhlig (2005) that introduce the penalty function
1 See Stock and Watson (2018) on a comparison and discussion between external and internal instru-
ments on structural VARs.
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approach. I contribute to this literature by proposing an econometric strategy that
uses a specific type of penalty function to disentangle two shocks that have a qual-
itatively different effect on a observable variable. In addition, this project is also
related to a series of papers that introduce and develop sign-restriction set identifi-
cation procedures such as Faust (1998); Canova and De Nicoló (2002); Peersman
(2005); Uhlig (2005); Fry and Pagan (2011); and Rubio-Ramírez et al. (2010).
I contribute to this literature by providing a methodology that uses qualitative as-
sumptions to provide a unique solution to the structural VAR system without relying
on any ordering assumptions.
Regarding the empirical identification of either financial or uncertainty shocks or
both, this project relates to those papers, such as Bloom (2009), Basu and Bundick
(2017), and Leduc and Liu (2016), that use a recursive ordering to identify the
effects of uncertainty shocks on real variables. I contribute to this literature by pro-
viding empirical evidence that does not rely on recursive ordering assumptions.
Moreover, this project is also related to Jurado et al. (2015) who also use the
Cholesky identification but provide a more refined proxy for economic uncertainty.
I contribute to this paper by disentangling from their proxy the part explained by
financial shocks. Moreover, this project is related to Berger et al. (2017), who iden-
tify uncertainty shocks as second-moment news shocks on realized volatility and
find that uncertainty shocks have negligible effects on real variables. I contribute to
this paper by providing an alternative method, which does not rely on any zero im-
pact restrictions, to identify uncertainty shocks. Finally, this project is also related
to Ludvigson et al. (2020) who use a novel identification strategy based on a set of
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assumptions on the features of the estimated shock series to identify financial uncer-
tainty shocks together with economic uncertainty shocks. They find that financial
uncertainty shocks have large and adverse effects on the economy while adverse
economic uncertainty shocks have positive and significant effects on the same vari-
ables. I differ in terms of the objective since my aim is to identify financial shocks,
which can possibly include second moment financial shocks (see Section 1.4.2),
from macroeconomic uncertainty shocks. In addition, I use a different economet-
ric strategy which relies on a single identifying assumption and provides a unique
solution.2
Moreover, I am also related to those papers that show the empirical effect of
financial shocks on the economy. First, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) provide
two novel variables, the GZ credit spread and the excess bond premium, to proxy
for time-varying financial conditions. They show that those variables have a large
predictive power on real variables and explain a large portion of economic activ-
ity. I contribute to this paper by disentangling from the innovations in the excess
bond premium the part explained by uncertainty shocks.3 Moreover, Gilchrist et al.
(2017) use firm-level data to show that credit-constrained firms increased prices
during the Financial Crisis to boost their internal sources of finance, while their
unconstrained counterparts cut prices.4 Although my analysis uses aggregated data
2 See also Carriero et al. (2018), Angelini et al. (2019), Caggiano et al. (2020), and Colombo and
Paccagnini (2020a) for other econometric strategies and evidence regarding the economic effects
of financial uncertainty shocks and/or macroeconomic uncertainty shocks. See also Cascaldi-Garcia
et al. (2020) for a survey.
3 Related to Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), see also Gambetti and Musso (2017) and Colombo and
Paccagnini (2020b) for other empirical evidence on the effects of financial shocks.
4 See also Asplund et al. (2005), de Almeida (2015), Kimura (2013), Lundin et al. (2009), and Mon-
tero and Urtasun (2014) for additional evidence supporting this mechanism. Kim (2020), instead,
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and controls for the presence of uncertainty shocks, I obtain analogous inflationary
patterns in response to financial shocks.5 Moreover, this project is closely related to
the empirical contribution by Furlanetto et al. (2019) who identify different types of
financial shocks in the same VAR system. In the second part of the paper, they also
disentangle credit shocks from uncertainty shocks and find that the latter ones have
negligible effects on real variables. My empirical evidence differs from this last ex-
ercise for two main reasons. First, my focus is specifically on economic uncertainty
shocks while their estimated uncertainty shocks are mostly associated with finan-
cial uncertainty because they use the VIX as a proxy for uncertainty.6 Second, my
exercise aims to show the qualitative difference between financial and uncertainty
shocks, while their focus is on their quantitative importance. A closely related paper
that also inspired my analysis is Caldara et al. (2016). They show lower and upper
bounds of the effects of financial and uncertainty shocks using the penalty function
approach together with ordering assumptions. They find that both shocks explain
a sizable fraction of output over a business-cycle frequency. My project contributes
to this paper in two ways. First, my identification strategy provides point estimates
within their bounds to specifically quantify the respective effects of the two shocks
on real variables. In addition, I empirically find qualitatively different effects of
provides evidence that firms facing an adverse financial shock reduce prices in the short run to
liquidate inventories and generate cash flow, followed by a price increase in the medium run.
5 See Abbate et al. (2016) for an analogous empirical result on U.S. aggregate data using a structural
VAR with sign restrictions.
6 The VIX, as shown by Ludvigson et al. (2020) and as argued at the end of Section 1.4.2 later on, is
much more related to first- and second-moment financial shocks rather than to economic uncertainty
shocks.
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financial and uncertainty shocks on inflation and derive the associated monetary
policy implications.
Finally, the model presented in this project is related to those theoretical con-
tributions that analyze the effects of either financial shocks or uncertainty shocks
or both. Regarding the effects of financial shocks the model presented here shares
many elements with the one by Gilchrist et al. (2017) that also rationalizes the
inflationary patterns associated with financial shocks. I contribute to their model
by adding a market for cash and liquid assets and by showing that, together with
corporate cash holdings, inflation also displays qualitatively different patterns in
response to financial and uncertainty shocks.7 Regarding the theoretical effects of
uncertainty shocks, this project is related to the early contribution of Bloom (2009)
that proposes a model with capital partial irreversibilities to rationalize the large
drop in investment after an uncertainty shock. Moreover, the model presented here
is also related to Leduc and Liu (2016) and Basu and Bundick (2017) who show that
in New Keynesian general equilibrium models uncertainty shocks have the same
flavor as demand shocks and generate business-cycle comovements among hours,
consumption and investment.8 I contribute to this literature by providing an anal-
ysis of the deflationary effects of uncertainty shocks together with the inflationary
effects of financial shocks, and by deriving associated monetary policy implications.
7 On models that analyze the effects of financial shocks see Jermann and Quadrini (2012) for an early
contribution. Moreover, see also Bacchetta et al. (2019) for a model in which corporate liquidity can
be used to distinguish between credit shocks and liquidity shocks. Among other contributions, see
also Christiano et al. (2010) and Khan and Thomas (2013).
8 For theoretical models that analyze the effects of different types of uncertainty shocks see also
Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011), Christiano et al. (2014),
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), and Bloom et al. (2018). See Fernández-Villaverde and Guerrón-
Quintana (forthcoming) for a survey.
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Regarding theoretical contributions with both financial and uncertainty shocks, the
model presented in this project is closely related to Gilchrist et al. (2014) and Alfaro
et al. (2018). Both models feature financial frictions and partial irreversibilities of
capital together with financial and uncertainty shocks. I contribute to this literature
emphasizing the qualitative different effect of the two shocks.
1.2 Identifying assumption on corporate cash hold-
ings
This section argues that financial and uncertainty shocks have a qualitatively differ-
ent impact effect on aggregate corporate cash holdings. Intuitively, corporate cash
is expected to fall after a financial shock since firms use those reserves as a substi-
tute for the costly external finance, while the stock of corporate cash is expected
to rise after an uncertainty shock for a precautionary motive. Section 1.2.1 for-
malizes this argument with a partial equilibrium model, while Section 1.2.2 shows
some reduced-form suggestive evidence that confirms the empirical relevance of my
identifying assumption.
1.2.1 Firm model
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where β ∈ (0, 1) represents the deterministic discount factor and di,t represents the
dividend flow defined by the flow-of-funds constraint





i,t + ϕt min{0, di,t}.
Variable ai,t is the realized level of idiosyncratic productivity which is i.i.d. across
firms and over time, and has cumulative distribution function F (·); and At is the
realized level of aggregate productivity which is i.i.d. over time. Variable xfi,t repre-
sents end-of-period corporate cash holdings, Rx < 1/β is the interest paid on cash
saved in the previous period, and g(·) is a positive, increasing, and concave func-
tion which captures the benefit of the financial flexibility given by the availability
of cash holdings.9 Moreover, all external finance takes the form of equity and ϕt is
a dilution cost which implies that when firms issue negative dividends di,t < 0, the
actual flow from the issuance is reduced by ϕtdi,t. As argued by Riddick and Whited
(2009), this simplification allows to emphasize the interaction between technology,
financial frictions, and cash holdings.10
Firm i chooses optimal cash xi,t after observing productivity At and the aggregate
shocks, but before knowing the realized idiosyncratic productivity ai,t. Following
Kiley and Sim (2014) and Gilchrist et al. (2017), this timing assumption implies
that firms are identical ex ante and the subscript i can be suppressed. There are
9 As discussed in the survey by Strebulaev and Whited (2012), corporate cash holdings provide finan-
cial flexibility for near-term obligations such as payment of salaries and wages, taxes, bills for goods
and services rendered by suppliers, rent, utilities, and debt services.
10 The simplest formulation of this type of financial frictions comes from Gomes (2001). See also
Bolton et al. (2011) for a model with analogous financial frictions and corporate cash in continuous
time. In addition, see the survey by Strebulaev and Whited (2012) Sections 3.2 and 3.3 for a detailed
description.
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two possible aggregate shocks: financial shocks εFt which affect the dilution cost ϕt
(Gilchrist et al., 2017) such that ϕt = ϕss + εFt ; and uncertainty shocks ε
U
t which
affect the variance σAt of future aggregate technology At+1 (Leduc and Liu, 2016)




t . For simplicity I assume that there is no persistence in the
exogenous processes for σAt and ϕt.













where ξt = 1 + ϕt/(1 − ϕt) × F (āt) is the multiplier of the flow-of-funds constraint
and Rxt + g









is the threshold for idiosyncratic productivity such that
dt = 0 and F (āt) is the probability of issuing negative dividends.
Proposition 1 provides the main motivation for my empirical approach to sepa-
rately identify financial and uncertainty shocks on aggregate data.
Proposition 1 Financial shocks decrease corporate cash xft , while uncertainty shocks
increase corporate cash xft .
Proof. The right-hand side of Equation 1.1 is monotonically decreasing in a finan-
cial shock εFt . The right-hand side of Equation 1.1 is monotonically increasing in
an uncertainty shock εUt . The latter statement is true because 1/At+1 is a convex
function and, due to the Jensen’s inequality, the expectation of a convex function
increases after a mean-preserving spread. Since the right-hand side of Equation 1.1
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is monotonically decreasing in end-of-period cash holdings xft , it must be the case
that in order to satisfy the equality of Equation 1.1, xft decreases after a financial
shock εFt and increases after an uncertainty shock ε
U
t .
The intuition of Proposition 1 comes directly from the first order condition for
corporate cash (Equation 1.1). Note that the multiplier ξt disciplines the current
need of internal resources and, the larger its value, the greater the incentive to
generate current internal liquidity. In case of financial shocks, ξt rises because of
the higher cost of external finance and firms prefer to draw down the stock of
cash in order to avoid or limit accessing external funds. In case of uncertainty
shocks, the expected value of ξt+1 rises because of the additional risk of a future cash
flow shortfall (due to the mean-preserving spread in future aggregate technology),
and firms prefer to invest current resources in end-of-period cash holdings for a
precautionary motive. In other words, cash holdings xft can be interpreted as an
insurance that firms implicitly purchase today as a protection against the risk of cash
flow shortages tomorrow. After a financial shock, the implicit cost of this insurance
rises and firms opt to hold less of it; after an uncertainty shock, firms attribute more
value to this insurance and opt to hold more of it.
1.2.2 Supportive Evidence
The objective of this section is to show some supportive evidence to confirm the
empirical relevance of the identifying assumption on corporate cash.
Table 1.1 shows the correlations among aggregate corporate cash, a proxy for
financial conditions, and a proxy for uncertainty across different data treatments.
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Following Bacchetta et al. (2019), corporate cash holdings (xft ) is defined as the
sum of private foreign deposits, checkable deposits and currency, total time and
saving deposits, and money market mutual fund shares over total assets for the
non-financial corporate sector. As a proxy for financial conditions, I decide to use
the excess bond premium (ft) by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) because is an ag-
gregate measure of credit spread that controls for the expected default risk of the
borrowers. Among all available proxies of uncertainty, I prefer to use the macroeco-
nomic uncertainty (ut) by Jurado et al. (2015) for two reasons. First, it is estimated
with a stochastic volatility model which provides series orthogonal to current eco-
nomic innovations. This characteristic is particularly useful to make sure that my
analysis is not confounding the effect of other first-moment shocks. Second, since
my identifying assumption builds on a theoretical prediction, this variable is partic-
ularly convenient because it refers to a type of uncertainty shocks on which there is
large consensus on how should be featured in a model.11
The first column displays the correlation of the excess bond premium ft with
macroeconomic uncertainty ut. Across different data treatments, the correlation re-
main positive, large, and highly significant. This result is not surprising as it repre-
sents the econometric challenge of separately identifying financial and uncertainty
shocks. As the exogenous processes for financial and uncertainty shocks cannot
be observed, the econometrician needs to rely on the endogenous counterparts –
ft and ut, respectively – which display an analogous contemporaneous response in
11 I will consider different types of uncertainty – using an a-theoretical approach – on Section 1.4.2.
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1. Series, no trend
0.66773∗∗∗ -0.11982 0.22208∗∗∗
(3.7333e-19) (0.16157) (0.0088478)
2. Residuals, no trend
0.52594∗∗∗ -0.12205 0.4378∗∗∗
(4.1193e-11) (0.15538) (8.8008e-08)
3. Series, quadratic trend
0.70225∗∗∗ -0.18503∗∗ 0.10557
(8.2501e-22) (0.029806) (0.21785)
4. Residuals, quadratic trend
0.51463∗∗∗ -0.14637∗ 0.42118∗∗∗
(1.2491e-10) (0.087883) (2.9749e-07)
5. Series, BP filter
0.70172∗∗∗ -0.37708∗∗∗ 0.082759
(9.1098e-22) (5.1445e-06) (0.33454)
6. Residuals, BP filter
0.58332∗∗∗ -0.25699∗∗∗ 0.14891∗∗
(7.4378e-14) (0.0024334) (0.08244)
7. Series, HP filter
0.73708∗∗∗ -0.26109∗∗∗ 0.086978
(6.6106e-25) (0.0019811) (0.3104)
8. Residuals, HP filter
0.49685∗∗∗ -0.16101∗ 0.42697∗∗∗
(6.6044e-10) (0.060162) (1.9602e-07)
Notes. ft is the excess bond premium by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), ut is macroeconomic
uncertainty by Jurado et al. (2015), and xft is corporate cash holdings over total assets of from
the Flow of Funds. Residuals are from a three variables VAR(1) with ft, ut, and xt. P-values in
parenthesis and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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face of the two shocks. This implies that, without any further assumption, it is not
possible to separately identify financial shocks and uncertainty shocks.
The second and third columns display the correlations of the corporate cash xft
respectively with the excess bond premium ft and the macroeconomic uncertainty
ut across different data treatments. The key result of this table is that although
ft and ut are highly positively correlated with each other, corporate cash x
f
t cap-
tures a source of the heterogeneous variation between the two variables as it is
correlated with opposite signs to ft and ut. In particular, as predicted by the model
presented in Section 1.2.1, changes in the excess bond premium ft are always neg-
atively correlated with variations in corporate cash xft , and, in most of the cases,
this correlation is significant. At the same time, consistent with the model, changes
in macroeconomic uncertainty ut are always positively correlated with variations in
corporate cash xft , and, in most of the cases, this correlation is significant.
Figure 1.1 shows the aggregate corporate cash with the aim of building a narra-
tive on the behavior of this variable during the latest recessions. First, if we focus on
the 2001 Recession we observe a pronounced fall of corporate cash. This result is in
line with the theoretical prediction presented above because this recession is asso-
ciated with a huge financial market disruption and should be intimately related to
the present of adverse financial shocks. In addition, focusing on the recent Covid-19
Recession, we observe a huge increase in the share of cash held by the non-financial
corporate sector. Also in this case, the empirical pattern supports the identifying as-
sumption because during the crisis there has be a spike in the uncertainty without
a proportional financial market disruption thanks to the prompt interventions of
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Figure 1.1: Aggregate corporate cash holdings and NBER recessions
Notes. Corporate cash is defined as corporate cash over total assets of non-financial corporate firms
from the Flow of Funds. Variable is de-trended with the HP filter.
the Federal Reserve. Thus, the Covid-19 Recession is related to adverse uncertainty
shocks without a large financial market disruption, which implies that firms are ac-
tually using their external finance to build a larger stock of cash as a buffer against
the uncertain evolution of the crisis. Finally, focusing on the Great Recession, we
do not observe a clear pattern for the behavior of corporate cash since it is quite
stable during the onset of the crisis with a moderate spike during the final part.
As I will describe later on, this result will be fully consistent with the empirical re-
sults because during the Great Recession, the US economy experiences the peculiar
case where adverse financial and uncertainty shocks are simultaneously hitting the
economy.
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1.3 Econometric strategy
After motivating the identifying assumption, this section presents the econometric
strategy and discuss its performance on simulated data from the model in Section
2.3.
1.3.1 Procedure
Consider a dynamic system Yt = [ ft, ut, x
f
t , . . . ] where ft is a proxy for finan-
cial conditions such as the credit spread; ut is a proxy for economic uncertainty
such as the expected forecast error variance on macroeconomic variables; and xft is
corporate cash holdings. Other variables can be embedded in the system without
affecting the econometric procedure. The reduced form VAR is,
Yt = B(L)Yt−1 + it (1.2)
where iti′t = Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form innovations






t , · · · ]. The objective is to identify the structural shocks of interest
(financial shocks εFt and uncertainty shocks ε
U
t ) from the reduced-form innovations
it with the structural impact matrix A∗, such that A∗εt = it, εtε′t = I and εt =
[ εFt , ε
U
t , · · · ].
Assume that econometricians have the following three pieces of information:
1. Adverse financial shocks εFt has a positive impact effect on variable ft, and a
negative impact effect on the corporate cash xft .
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2. Adverse uncertainty shocks εUt has a positive impact effect on variable ut and
xft .
3. Other shocks have a negligible impact effect on ft and ut.
The first two assumptions are justified by the theoretical model and reduced-form
evidence presented in Section 1.2. The last assumption, instead, is justified by the
empirical observation that the residuals of the excess bond premium by Gilchrist
and Zakrajšek (2012) and of the macroeconomic uncertainty by Jurado et al. (2015)
are orthogonal to a large series of structural shocks previously identified by the
literature. With this last empirical observation, financial shocks εFt and uncertainty
shocks εUt can be directly identified without controlling for any other structural
shocks in the economy. In addition, in Section 1.4.2 I show that the estimated
shock series are orthogonal to other structural shocks previously identified by the
literature implying that any ex ante control would be unnecessary. As a result,
other shocks affecting the economy can be treated as residuals which can have a
contemporaneous effect only on cash. Notice that although is reasonable to assume
that an uncertainty shock has a positive impact effect on ft and a financial shock
has a positive effect on ut, I do not need to explicitly make this assumption but I
will leave the two responses unconstrained.
With these elements in hand, I am ready to define the econometric procedure.
Definition 1 Decompose A∗ = CD∗ where C is the Cholesky decomposition of Σ and
D∗ = [ d∗1, d
∗
2, · · · ] is an orthogonal matrix where:
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1. Column vector d∗1 is the solution of the following problem,
d∗1 = argmaxd1
{





2. Column vector d∗2 is the solution of the following problem,
d∗2 = argmaxd2
{





3. δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) is such that d∗′1 d∗2 = 0.
Notice that ei is a raw vector with one in the i-th position and zeros elsewhere;
Cd1 and Cd2 represent the impact of a one percent financial shock εFt and a one
percent uncertainty shock εUt , respectively; and δ
∗ is a scalar that takes a real value
strictly between zero and one.
Intuitively, in Problem 1.3, the impact effect of a financial shock is identified by
maximizing a function that is increasing in the impact response of financial condi-
tions ft (e1Cd1) and decreasing in the impact response of cash x
f
t (e3Cd1); where
the parameter δ∗ governs the relative importance that this function gives to the two
impact responses. Similarly, in Problem 1.4, the impact effect of an uncertainty
shock is identified by maximizing a function that is increasing in the impact re-
sponse of measured uncertainty ut (e2Cd2) and increasing in the impact response of
cash xft (e3Cd2); where the same parameter δ∗ governs the relative importance that
this function gives to the two impact responses. In addition, note that the two con-
ditions above are subject to the normalization d′idi = 1 since both column vectors
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are part of the orthogonal matrix D∗. Thus, for a given δ∗, Condition 1.3 imposes
that εFt must have a positive impact effect on ft and a negative impact effect on x
f
t .
Alternatively, for a given δ∗, the second item imposes that εUt must have a positive
effect on its endogenous counterpart ut and on corporate cash x
f
t . Condition 3 se-
lects a δ∗ such that the two vectors d∗1 and d
∗
2 are orthogonal to each other as they
are part of the orthogonal matrix D∗.
Together with Definition 1, I can now state the main technical result of the econo-
metric strategy. Its formal proof is in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2 If corr(ift , iut ) > 0, solution δ
∗, d∗1, and d
∗
2 exists.
The proof can be explained intuitively. Consider Problems 1.3 and 1.4 as a func-
tion of a value of δ∗ – say δ – that does not necessarily satisfy Condition 3. When δ
is equal to zero then d∗1(δ = 0) and d
∗
2(δ = 0) maximize the impact effect on ft and
ut, respectively. In other words, d∗1(δ = 0) and d
∗
2(δ = 0) solve a Cholesky identifica-




t ) > 0,
then d∗1(δ = 0)
′d∗2(δ = 0) > 0. Alternatively, when δ is equal to one, then d
∗
1(δ = 1)




t , respectively. In other
words, d∗1(δ = 1) and d
∗
2(δ = 1) solve a Cholesky identification problem where
−xft and x
f
t are placed on top, respectively. This implies, by construction, that
d∗1(δ = 1)
′d∗2(δ = 1) = −1. Invoking the continuity of solutions d∗1(δ) and d∗2(δ) in
function of δ, it follows that also d∗1(δ)
′d∗2(δ) is a continuous function of δ. As a
result, it must be the case that, moving from δ = 0 to δ = 1, function d∗1(δ)
′d∗2(δ)
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crosses the zero line at least once confirming that δ∗ such that d∗1(δ
∗)′d∗2(δ
∗) = 0 does
exist.
Proving uniqueness is more challenging. In Appendix A.3 I show that under the
assumption that financial conditions ft and measure uncertainty ut are perfectly
correlated then a solution always exists and is unique. In addition, both on actual
data and simulated data I have never met a single case where two δ∗ exist in the
same system.
Finally, in order to test the reliability of the econometric procedure, I simulate
data from the model described in Section 2.3 and use this econometric strategy
to identify financial and uncertainty shocks only using variables of which empir-
ical counterpart can be observed in the data. Using small samples generated by
a realistic calibrated version of the model, it appears that the procedure is able
to recover more than 96% of the two unobservable shocks on average. Moreover,
using the same simulated data I test the effectiveness of my econometric strategy
against sign restrictions. Estimated responses point out that my econometric strat-
egy outperforms sign restrictions to recover the model-implied impulse responses.
See Appendices A.4 and A.5 for details and results.
1.3.2 Comparison with other methodologies
Since Sims (1980) the Cholesky identification has been used to identify a plethora
of shocks in the literature. For example, Christiano et al. (2005) estimate monetary
policy shocks as innovations to the federal funds rate which do not have a contem-
poraneous effect on macroeconomic variables but they have an impact effect on
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fast-moving variables such as the growth rate of money. Although appealing for its
simplicity, no plausible recursive assumptions can be used when aiming to identify
financial and uncertainty shocks. As already argued by Caldara et al. (2016), this
is the case because both proxies for financial conditions and uncertainty are fast-
moving variables and simultaneously respond to financial and uncertainty shocks.
A similar problem appears with the penalty function approach (Faust, 1998;
Uhlig, 2005). For example Caldara et al. (2016) identify financial and uncer-
tainty shocks maximizing a penalty function with measured uncertainty and credit
spreads. Although more general than a Cholesky identification, their identification
scheme still needs an ordering assumption. As a result, Caldara et al. (2016) pro-
vides upper and lower bounds of the quantitative effects of financial and uncertainty
shocks conditionally on the ordering assumption.
Moreover, my identification strategy is conceptually close to sign restrictions
(Faust, 1998; Canova and De Nicoló, 2002; Peersman, 2005; Uhlig, 2005; Rubio-
Ramírez et al., 2010; Fry and Pagan, 2011). Although sign restrictions on the same
impact responses provide useful insights of the effects of financial and uncertainty
shocks, my identification strategy is more convenient mainly for two reasons. First,
this novel approach identifies financial shocks (uncertainty shocks) as the ones that
maximize the response of financial conditions (measured uncertainty) conditional
on controlling for uncertainty shocks (financial shocks). In other words, this proce-
dure emphasizes the idea that the two shocks should have the maximum effect on
their endogenous counterpart using corporate cash as a control to avoid any con-
founding effect. This feature is particularly appealing because the econometrician
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does not have to take a stand on the degree of endogeneity of the variables she is
using. For example, if the endogenous proxies for financial conditions and macroe-
conomic uncertainty were fully exogenous, this strategy would be able to perfectly
recover the two shocks by automatically imposing δ equal to zero. Second, this pro-
cedure does not impose any sign restrictions on the responses, but it imposes that
the response of corporate cash after a financial shock should be relatively lower
than the response of corporate cash after an uncertainty shock. Specifically, with
this strategy the econometrician can identify the two shocks even if the response
of corporate cash would be negative in face of the two shocks but relatively more
negative in case of financial shocks. This feature allows for an additional degree
of flexibility which makes the identifying assumption less restrictive. Besides, I also
compare the effectiveness of my identification strategy to recover the actual impulse
responses with the effectiveness of sign restrictions using simulated data from the
model presented in Section 2.3. As hinted above, results suggest that – at least in
this case – my identification strategy outperforms sign restrictions to recover the
true responses implied by the model. See Appendix A.5 for details and results.
In addition, following Stock et al. (2012), a potential avenue to identify financial
and uncertainty shocks is by using external instruments. As discussed by Stock and
Watson (2018), with a valid instrument in hand, it is possible to obtain a consistent
analysis of the shock of interest. However, as emphasized by Stock et al. (2012)
and Caldara et al. (2016), finding an instrument correlated only with financial or
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uncertainty shocks is not an easy task and no valid candidates have been proposed
so far.12
Finally, Ludvigson et al. (2020) propose a strategy, known as “shock-based restric-
tions", that imposes quantitative and qualitative restrictions directly on the series
of the estimated shocks rather than on the impulse response functions. This pro-
cedure can be an alternative tool to disentangle financial shocks and uncertainty
shocks given the specific assumptions on the sign and timing of the shocks. In ad-
dition, Caggiano et al. (2020) use a similar approach where they impose (among
other conditions) that around specific dates financial shocks (uncertainty shocks)
explain the most of their endogenous counterpart. Although both approaches can
be suitable and can be seen as complements to my procedure, the main benefit of
my strategy is of being free from a set of narrative-based restrictions.
1.4 Financial and uncertainty shocks on U.S. aggre-
gate data
In this section, I simultaneously identify financial and uncertainty shocks on U.S.
aggregate data using the identifying assumption on aggregate cash holdings pre-
sented in Section 1.2 together with the econometric strategy presented in Section
1.3.
12 Note that Forni et al. (2017), using the intuition that news on future outcomes have both first and
second moment effects, use the square of identified news shocks as a proxy for uncertainty shocks
in a VARX context. Their measure for uncertainty shocks can be interpreted as an instrument (or
a proxy) which is possibly uncorrelated with financial shocks. In addition, Piffer and Podstawski
(2018) identify uncertainty shocks using as an instrument the variations of gold around specific
dates.
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1.4.1 Baseline specification and main results
In the baseline specification I estimate a reduced-form VAR with (i) credit spread
as the level of the excess bond premium (EBP) by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012);
(ii) measured uncertainty as macroeconomic uncertainty at a three-month horizon
by Jurado et al. (2015); (iii) corporate cash holdings as the level of corporate cash
over total assets from the Flow of Funds; (iv) the log-transformation of real GDP; (v)
the log-transformation of real consumption defined as consumption of non-durables
plus consumption of services; (vi) the log-transformation of real investment defined
as consumption of durables plus domestic investment; (vii) the log-transformation
of total hours as hours of all persons in the non-farm business sector; (viii) the
log-transformation of the GDP deflator; (ix) the log-transformation of the stock of
money M2 over the GDP deflator; and (x) the shadow federal funds rate (FFR) by
Wu and Xia (2016). In order to focus on the post-Volcker era, data range from
the first quarter of 1982 to the second quarter of 2019 and, following the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC), reduced-form innovations are obtained controlling for
one lag of all the variables in the system.13
13 The excess bond premium by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) is a measure of credit spread after con-
trolling for firm-level characteristics. With this procedure they aim to provide a proxy for financial
conditions orthogonal to economic fundamentals. In addition, Jurado et al. (2015) define macroe-
conomic uncertainty as the expected forecast error variance of more than 100 economic variables.
To estimate these expected forecast error variances they use a stochastic volatility model which pro-
vides series orthogonal to current economic fundamentals. With these series they then build an
index for uncertainty at different horizons. Finally, following Bacchetta et al. (2019), corporate cash
holdings is defined as the sum of the level of: (i) private foreign deposits, (ii) checkable deposits
and currency, (iii) total time and saving deposits and (iv) money market mutual fund shares. These
variables refer to the nonfinancial corporate business sector. See Appendix B.9 for more details on
data sources.
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Figure 1.2a shows responses to a one percent financial shock. First, both the
excess bond premium and the macroeconomic uncertainty display a positive and
significant impact response. Following the identification assumption, corporate cash
falls on impact and, in about two years, returns to its steady state value. Output,
consumption, investment, and hours fall in the short run returning to their steady
state values in two-three years. In line with the evidence and model by Gilchrist
et al. (2017), the GDP deflator significantly jumps suggesting that financial shocks
are associated with inflationary forces. Finally, in line with the response of prices,
financial shocks trigger only a mild decrease in the federal fund rate that falls for
only a few quarters after one year and half.
Figure 1.2b shows impulse responses to a one percent uncertainty shock. Also in
this case, both the excess bond premium and measured macroeconomic uncertainty
display a positive and significant impact response to an uncertainty shock, confirm-
ing the simultaneous response of those two variables to financial and uncertainty
shocks. Corporate cash responds significantly on impact and displays a delayed
build-up response which lasts almost five years. Analogously to financial shocks,
uncertainty shocks trigger a contraction in output, consumption, investment, and
hours; in case of output, consumption, and investment the effect lasts for about
three years and a half, while in the case of total hours, the effect remains significant
for almost five years. In addition, uncertainty shocks are robustly associated with
deflationary forces – as shown by the fall in the GDP deflator – together with an
increase in the real stock of money and a pronounced response of the monetary
authority. The deflationary effect of uncertainty shocks is in line with the empirical
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evidence and theoretical arguments of Leduc and Liu (2016) and Basu and Bundick
(2017).
Importantly, the different response of nominal variables provides important in-
sights on the nature of business cycle fluctuations. First, the fact that those two
identified shocks display an ex post different effect on other variables confirms my
hypothesis that, besides the labeling of financial and uncertainty shocks, there are
two distinct structural forces associated with the simultaneous innovations in mea-
sured uncertainty and credit spreads. Second, this different response of inflation
suggests that disentangling financial and uncertainty shocks may have important
monetary policy implications. In Section 2.3 I will rationalize the different response
of prices to the two shocks and discuss potential trade-offs faced by the monetary
authority.
Figure 1.3 shows the forecast error variance of the endogenous variables in the
system explained by financial shocks (blue solid lines) and uncertainty shocks (red
solid lines). Financial shocks trigger about 25% of the unexpected fluctuations
in the excess bond premium over business-cycle frequencies, and explain little of
macroeconomic uncertainty. In line with the argument of the financial flexibility
(see Strebulaev and Whited, 2012), corporate cash holdings seem to be mostly af-
fected by financial shocks (about 90%) in the short run, and this effect slowly dies
out over time. Financial shocks explain about 40% of real GDP over the six-quarter
horizon and roughly 20%, 40%, and 20% of consumption, investment, and total
hours over the same period. Finally, these shocks explain little of the GDP deflator,
the real stock of money, and the shadow federal funds rate rate. In contrast, un-
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Figure 1.2: Estimated impulse responses on U.S. aggregate data
(a) Financial shocks
(b) Uncertainty shocks
Notes. Data range: 1982:q2-2019:q2. VAR has one lag (BIC). Confidence intervals are obtained us-
ing standard Bayesian techniques (Sims and Zha, 1999). See Appendix B.9 for variable descriptions.
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certainty shocks (red solid lines) trigger about 20% of the unexpected fluctuations
in the excess bond premium over short-run horizons, and this effect dies out in the
medium run. Macro uncertainty seems to be mostly affected by uncertainty shocks
on impact (about 90%) even if this large effect dies out over time. In the short run
uncertainty shocks do not have a remarkable quantitative effect on corporate cash,
but this effect builds up over time reaching up to 20% in the five-year horizon. In
addition, those shocks explain almost 20% of real GDP between the first and fourth
year and roughly 15% of consumption and investment over the medium run. In-
terestingly, uncertainty shocks have a large quantitative effect (more than 40%) on
total hours at business cycle frequencies. Finally, these shocks explain more than
20% of the GDP deflator and the real stock of money over business-cycle frequency,
and about 15% of the shadow rate over a five-year horizon.
In summary, this analysis suggests three main conclusions. First, both shocks
have sizable contractionary effects on macroeconomic variables and, although fi-
nancial shocks seem to be a stronger driver of business cycle fluctuations, uncer-
tainty shocks trigger a much larger effect on total hours. Second, prices (together
with the real stock of money) display qualitatively different responses to financial
and uncertainty shocks making the case relevant for monetary policy implications.
Third, macroeconomic uncertainty measured by Jurado et al. (2015) seems to be
more exogenous than the excess bond premium by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012)
as shown by the forecast error variance decomposition.
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Figure 1.3: Estimated forecast error variance on U.S. aggregate data
Notes. Forecast error variance estimated from baseline estimation. See Appendix B.9 for variable
descriptions.
1.4.2 Shocks series, robustness, and financial uncertainty shocks
This section has three main objectives: (i) it shows the estimated shocks series to
discuss their respective roles played during major U.S. economic contractions; (ii) it
presents evidence that the two identified shocks are exogenous to a set of structural
shocks previously identified by the literature; (iii) it provides a set of extensions to
the baseline specification useful to inform on the robustness of the results and on
the role played by financial uncertainty shocks in the U.S. economy.
Figure 1.4 shows the estimated shocks series on US aggregate data. There are
two relevant adverse financial shocks in 1994 and 2003 as showed by the blue
solid line. In addition, there are two large expansionary financial shocks before the
early 2000s recession which are possibly associated with the formation of the dot-
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Figure 1.4: Financial and uncertainty shocks series
com bubble. Interestingly, in 1998 the level of inflation was slightly below the 2%
confirming that a non-inflationary financial expansion was playing a relevant role
during that period. Finally, at the end of 2009 and 2010, there are two large con-
tractionary financial shocks associated with the credit crunch of the Financial Crisis.
On the other hand, uncertainty shocks (red solid line) do not display remarkable
peaks over time except for two huge spikes during the Financial Crisis. Thus, in line
with Stock et al. (2012), both financial and uncertainty shocks played an important
role during the Financial Crisis, and my estimation suggests that financial shocks
and uncertainty shocks contributed to 45% and 55% of the contraction in output
experienced during the Great Recession, respectively.
Table 1.2 displays the correlation between financial and uncertainty shocks iden-
tified from the baseline specification presented in Section 1.4.1 with other structural
shocks. The main takeaway is that no correlations are significant at a 10% level.
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Table 1.2: Correlation with other structural shocks















Basu et al. (2006)
(0.195) (0.891)
Notes. All the shocks, with the exception of technology surprises, are available on Valerie Ramey’s
website. Technology surprises are estimated as residuals from an AR(1) process using utilization-
adjusted total factor productivity (Basu et al., 2006) available on the San Francisco Fed website.
P-values in parenthesis and *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
Nevertheless, monetary policy shocks (Romer and Romer, 1989) are correlated with
financial shocks at the very border of the 10% significance level. To make sure that
monetary policy shocks are not playing any role in the identification of financial
shocks, as a robustness check I re-estimated the VAR system with those shocks or-
dered first. All the results presented so far are robust to this additional control (see
Table 1.3) confirming that any ex ante control would be unnecessarily and confirms
the empirical fact, discussed in Section 1.3, that innovations in the excess bond
premium by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) and innovations in measured uncer-
tainty by Jurado et al. (2015) are orthogonal to other structural forces previously
identified.
In Table 1.3 I show the correlation between the shocks identified from the base-
line specification with financial and uncertainty shocks identified from a set of ro-
bustness checks and extensions. Baseline results appear to be quite robust to a
series of perturbations. Specification (1) allows the number of lags to vary ac-
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cordingly to the Hannan-Quinn information criterion.14 Specifications (3) and (4)
estimate three-dimensional and seven-dimensional VARs, respectively. Specification
(4), (5), (6), and (7) use different proxies for financial conditions. Specifications
(8), (9), (10), (11) and (12) use different proxies for measured uncertainty. More-
over, Specification (13) uses an alternative definition of cash holdings, Specification
(14) uses variables per capita, Specification (15) starts in the first quarter of 1990,
and Specification (16) controls for monetary policy shocks. Finally, Specification
(17) models the stance of the monetary policy using the shadow federal funds rate
by Wu and Xia (2016). See notes in Table 1.3 for additional details.
In most cases there is little to learn except the fact that results are not particularly
affected by the perturbations listed above. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight
results in Specification (7) and Specification (12). Following Bloom (2009), Spec-
ification (12) uses the VIX as a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. In this case,
uncertainty shocks remain correlated with their baseline counterpart only at 38%
while financial shocks barely change. Even if not shown, those estimated uncer-
tainty shocks trigger no significant effects on real variables and, consequently, do
not explain any of the variations in output, consumption, investment and hours. On
the other hand, in Specification (7) I use the VIX as a proxy for financial conditions
instead of the credit spread. In this case, both estimated shocks remain highly cor-
related with their baseline counterpart. In particular, in the case of financial shocks
the correlation with its baseline counterpart is 84%.
14 I exclude the Akaike Informartion Criterion (AIC) since it requires 8 lags: definitely to large for the
number of observations and the number of endogenous variables.
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Table 1.3: Correlation with robustness checks and extensions
Specification Robustness Financial Shocks Uncertainty Shocks
(1) HQ: 2 lags 0.88 0.82
(2) Dimension: 3 variables 0.91 0.91
(3) Dimension: 7 variables 0.98 0.98
(4) Credit spread: GZ 0.97 0.99
(5) Credit spread: BAA10Y 0.93 0.98
(6) Credit spread: FU3 0.81 0.95
(7) Credit spread: VIX 0.84 0.95
(8) Uncertainty: MU1 1 0.99
(9) Uncertainty: MU12 0.99 0.96
(10) Uncertainty: RU3 1 0.84
(11) Uncertainty: FU3 0.95 0.53
(12) Uncertainty: VIX 0.86 0.38
(13) Cash: plus Treasury 0.83 0.97
(14) Per Capita 1 1
(15) Start: 1990Q1 0.92 0.97
(16) MP shocks control 0.98 1
(17) FFR: shadow rate 0.99 1
Notes. Specifications (1) uses two lags to estimate reduced-form innovations following the HQ
criterion. Specification (2) is a three-dimensional system with measured uncertainty, excess bond
premium and corporate cash. Specification (3) is a seven-dimensional system with all the variables
of the baseline except the GDP deflator, Real M2, and FFR. Specification (4), (5), (6), and (7)
use the GZ spread (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012), the Moody’s Baa spread at 10 years, financial
uncertainty at three months (Jurado et al., 2015), and the VIX as a proxy for financial conditions,
respectively. Specifications (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12) use one-month macroeconomic uncertainty
(Jurado et al., 2015), 12-months macroeconomic uncertainty (Jurado et al., 2015), three-month
real uncertainty (Jurado et al., 2015), three-month financial uncertainty (Jurado et al., 2015), and
the VIX as a proxy for measured uncertainty, respectively. Specification (13) adds to the definition
of corporate cash holdings also the level of treasury securities for the nonfinancial corporate sector.
Specification (14) uses the log of GDP, consumption, investment and hours per capita. Specification
(15) starts in the first quarter of 1990. Specification (16) controls for monetary policy shocks.
Specification (17) models the stance of monetary policy with the shadow federal funds rate (Wu
and Xia, 2016).
This result suggests two conclusions. First, the VIX is not a proper substitute for
measured macroeconomic uncertainty because its innovations (see also Ludvigson
et al., 2020) are mostly related to uncertainty concerning financial conditions. Sec-
ond, the VIX is a legitimate substitute for the credit spread because also second
moment financial shocks have a negative effect on corporate cash holdings. As a
result financial shocks as estimated by my identification strategy are general finan-
cial shocks which capture a mix between first and second moment shocks which
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directly arise from the financial sector. This conclusion is also supported by Speci-
fications (6) and (11) where I use financial uncertainty by Ludvigson et al. (2020)
as a proxy for financial conditions and economic uncertainty, respectively. Finan-
cial uncertainty works much better as a proxy for financial conditions — financial
shocks are correlated up to 81% — rather than as a proxy for economic uncertainty
— uncertainty shocks are correlated only at 53%.
This result can be rationalized with a risk-averse financial intermediary that, ob-
serving a larger level of financial uncertainty, decreases the supply of loans and in-
creases the cost of borrowing. Although the model presented in Section 2.3 is way
too simple to capture this idea, micro-founding financial frictions with the pres-
ence of a risk-averse financial intermediary can rationalize the fact that financial
shocks and financial uncertainty shocks affect the economy through an analogous
mechanism. Thus, according to those empirical results, financial shocks can be in-
terpreted as a general object that embodies a family of first- and second-moment
shocks that specifically arise within the financial market. Although possibly inter-
esting, the objective of disentangling financial first-moment shocks from financial
second-moment shocks is beyond the aim of this project.
1.5 Theory
In this section I integrate the partial equilibrium model presented in Section 1.2.1
in a general equilibrium framework with nominal frictions (Rotemberg, 1982) and
households with good-specific habits (Ravn et al., 2006; Gilchrist et al., 2017). The
model presented in this section has three main objectives: (i) confirming that the
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economic intuition presented in Section 1.2.1 is robust to controlling for general
equilibrium forces; (ii) rationalizing the different empirical response of inflation to
financial and uncertainty shocks shown in Section 1.4; and (iii) deriving monetary
policy implications.
1.5.1 Model description
The economy is populated by (i) a continuum of utility-maximizing households
that choose the habit-adjusted consumption bundle qt, leisure 1 − nt, cash hold-
ings (and/or liquid assets) Xht , and risk-free bonds B
h
t ; (ii) a continuum of value-
maximizing firms i ∈ [0, 1] that make pricing and production decisions in order to
maximize the present discount value of dividends; (iii) and a monetary authority
that sets the nominal risk-free rate Rt and affects the nominal stock of cash in the
economy X̄t.
Households
The model contains a continuum of identical households that consumes a variety of
consumption goods indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The preferences of households are defined
over a habit-adjusted consumption bundle qt, leisure 1−nt, and beginning-of-period











+ χn log(1− nt+s) + χx log(xht−1)
]
; 0 < β < 1.
where Xht−1 is the nominal stock of cash hold at the beginning of the period and Pt is
the aggregate price index. Following Gilchrist et al. (2017), the habit consumption
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; θ < 0 and η > 0
where ci,t denotes the amount of a good of variety i consumed by the representative
household at time t and si,t is the external habit stock associated with good i. The
law of motion of external habit is si,t = ρssi,t−1 + (1 − ρ)ci,t with 0 < ρ < 1. Pa-
rameters θ and η govern the intensity of the good-specific habit and the elasticity of
substitution across differentiated goods, respectively. The cost-minimization prob-
lem solved by the household gives rise to a good-specific demand (see Appendix
A.7.1 for derivations) which is going to be relevant in the firms’ maximization prob-
lem presented in the following section.















Note that the budget constraint is expressed in real terms since p̃tqt is the cost of
the consumption bundle over the aggregate price index Pt. In addition, wt = Wt/Pt
is the real wage, Rt−1 is the nominal interest rate, set by the monetary authority, on
previous period risk-free bonds Bt−1, Rxt−1 is the nominal interest rate on previous
period cash and liquid assets Xht−1, and τt represents a series of real transfers that in
every period the central authority and the firms make to the households. Optimality
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conditions, formally derived in Appendix A.7.2, give rise to the inter-temporal Euler
equation for risk-free bonds, the labor supply, and the demand of real cash and
liquid assets xht . The two former optimality conditions are standard, while the latter





Intuitively, the demand for cash is increasing in χx and Rxt which represent the
taste for and the interest rate on cash and liquid assets, respectively. In addition,
xht is decreasing in Rt, interest on risk-free bonds, due to a substitution effect, and
decreasing in λt, the multiplier of the budget constraint, due to a wealth effect.
Firms
Firms’ problem coincides with the partial equilibrium model presented in Section
1.2.1 properly augmented with pricing and production decisions. Firms’ side is
characterized by a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms i ∈ [0, 1] pro-







− φ; 0 < α ≤ 1 and φ > 0. (1.5)
As before, At is aggregate productivity and ai,t is the idiosyncratic productivity level,
which follows the log-normal distribution log ai,t ∼ N(−0.5σ2a, σ2a). In addition,
parameter α governs the degree of decreasing returns of labor input ni,t and φ is a
common fixed cost of production.
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Following Kiley and Sim (2014) and Gilchrist et al. (2017), firms make pric-
ing pi,t = Pi,t/Pt, production yi,t, and saving (corporate cash and liquid assets)
xfi,t = X
f
i,t/Pt decisions after observing aggregate shocks but before observing id-
iosyncratic productivity ai,t. After committing to those decisions, idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity ai,t is revealed and firms hire labor ni,t to meet demand ci,t such that
yi,t = ci,t. Analogously to the model presented in Section 1.2.1, the value of ai,t can
be such that (real) dividends di,t are strictly less than zero and, in this case, firm
i faces the dilution cost ϕt which implies that the actual flow from the issuance is
reduced by ϕtdi,t. This timing convention –together with the assumption of ai,t to
be i.i.d. across firms and over time– implies that firms are always identical at the
beginning of the period and that dividends di,t and labor input ni,t are functions of
the idiosyncratic level ai,t.
Analogously to the definition of dividends in Section 1.2.1, the flow-of-funds con-
straint is

















i,t + ϕt min{0, di,t}.
(1.6)
Relatively to its partial equilibrium counterpart, Equation 1.6 is augmented with
pricing pi,t, production ci,t = yi,t, and input ni,t decisions, together with nominal
rigidities à la Rotemberg (1982). In addition, πt = Pt/Pt−1 is current inflation,
Rxt−1 is the nominal interest rate on previous period cash and liquid assets, and g(·)
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is a positive, increasing, and concave function which captures the benefits of the
financial flexibility associated with the stock of cash.










where mt+1 represents the stochastic discount factor set by the households, subject
to: (i) the production function presented in Equation 1.5; (ii) the flow-of-funds









and (iv) the law of motion of the habit stock si,t = ρsi,t−1 + (1−ρ)ci,t. See Appendix
A.7.3 for derivations and optimality conditions.
Closing the model









where x̄ss and Rxss represents the amount of and the interest rate on cash and liquid
assets in steady state, respectively. In addition, parameters ωx ∈ [0, 1] and ωr > 0
govern the degree of persistence of cash and liquid assets, and the elasticity of X̄t
to its interest rate Rxt , respectively. As a result, the real supply of cash and liquid
44 CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL AND UNCERTAINTY SHOCKS












Note that the real stock of cash has the consistent features to be a decreasing func-
tion of inflation πt and of the nominal interest rate Rxt . Moreover, if ωx = ωr = 0,
then the real stock of liquid assets is perfectly inelastic and always equal to x̄ss;
while if ωx = 0 and ωr approaches infinity, then the real stock of money is perfectly
inelastic and Rxt = R
x
ss. In Section 1.5.4 I show that all the results are robust to
any combinations of parameters ωx and ωr. Given the supply of cash, the market






where the left-hand side and the right-hand side represent the economy-wide sup-
ply and demand of cash and liquid assets, respectively.














where Rss, πss, and yss represent the steady state values of nominal interest rate
Rt, inflation πt, and output yt, respectively. In addition, parameters ρr, ψπ, and
ψy govern the degrees of the policy inertia, inflation gap response, and output gap
response, respectively.
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In addition, I assume that the frictional costs of negative equity issuance and price
adjustments, and all the benefits and costs associated with cash holdings are paid
back to the households together with dividends dt such that the resource constraint
boils down to
ct = yt.
Finally, analogously to the partial equilibrium model presented in Section 1.2.1,
an adverse financial shock is an unexpected increase in the dilution cost ϕt, and an
uncertainty shock is a second-moment shock to future aggregate productivity At+1.
The respective laws of motions of the exogenous processes are,
log(ϕt/ϕss) = ρF log(ϕt−1/ϕss) + σ
F εFt ,






A) = ρU log(σ
A
t−1/σ
A) + σUεUt ,
where εFt , ε
A
t , and ε
U
t are a financial shock, a technology shock, and an uncertainty
shock, respectively. In addition, ρF , ρA, and ρU govern the persistence of the three
processes, and σF , σA, and σU represent the variance of the three shocks.
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1.5.2 Dynamics of corporate cash and inflation
Analogously to the partial equilibrium model presented in Section 1.2.1, the first












where ξt is the multiplier associated with the flow-of-funds constraint, and Rxt +
g′(xft ) is the marginal benefit of holding cash at time t + 1. Equation 1.8 mirrors
Equation 1.1 with the only difference that the deterministic discount factor β is now
substituted by mt+1/πt+1 which is the stochastic discount factor divided by future
inflation. This implies that the partial equilibrium intuition of cash holdings xft as an
insurance against the future risk of cash flow shortages is still in place. In particular,
after a financial shock, the implicit cost of purchasing this insurance rises (↑ ξt) and
firms opt for holding less of it, while, after an uncertainty shock, firms appreciate
this insurance more (↑ ξt+1) and opt for holding more of it.
At this stage, it is more interesting to evaluate how general equilibrium forces
affect firms’ saving decisions after the two shocks. By replacing β with the stochas-
tic discount factor mt+1 at the numerator and πt+1 at the denominator, I need to
address how those two variables separately affect the right-hand side of Equation
1.8. In case of financial shocks, the stochastic discount factor decreases because
households expect the effects of the contraction to die out in the near future; vicev-
ersa, in case of uncertainty shocks, the same variable increases due to the Jensen’s
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inequality because households expect larger consumption variance in future. Thus,
after a financial shock, households are more impatient and push firms to decrease
savings, i.e. cutting corporate cash holdings, and distribute more dividends today.
Conversely, after an uncertainty shock, households are more patient and push firms
to increase savings in order to receive larger dividends in future for a precautionary
motive.
Moreover, given the empirical result presented in Section 1.4 on inflation, let’s
consider the case where financial shocks are inflationary and uncertainty shocks
are deflationary also in the model (I will explain why it is the case and confirm it
with numerical simulations later on in this section). In the case of a financial shock,
inflation is above its steady state level and the benefit of holding cash is now lower
because, for a given interest rate Rxt , the future purchasing power of cash is falling.
As a result, firms have an additional incentive to draw down the stock of cash hold-
ings. On the other hand, in the case of an uncertainty shock, inflation is below its
steady state level and the benefit of holding cash is now higher because, given Rxt ,
the purchasing power of cash is raising. Thus, uncertainty shocks push firms to in-
vest in corporate cash holdings over this additional channel.15 In addition, since the
real supply of cash x̄t is decreasing (increasing) after a financial (uncertainty) shock
(see Equation 1.7), the fact that also households want to decrease (increase) cash
holdings for an analogous reason does not particularly affect the analysis described
here.16
15 Note that this theoretical argument is in line with the empirical evidence by Curtis et al. (2017).
16 From the optimality condition presented in Appendix A.7.2, households have analogous incentives
on cash holdings when inflation is deviating from its steady state level. If the real stock of cash
x̄t would be constant, then the argument described in this paragraph would survive only if those
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To understand why inflation has a qualitatively different response to financial






















that, as a first order approximation, leads to




+ η̃(ξ̂t − ν̂t) (1.9)
where η̃ > 0, ξt is the multiplier associated with the flow-of-funds constraint, and
νt is the multiplier associated with the good-specific demand (see Appendices A.7.3
and A.7.4 for details). As already explained by Gilchrist et al. (2017), ξ̂t has an
inflationary effect because, given a larger need of internal resources (↑ ξt), firms’
best response is to increase prices to generate additional liquidity from the customer
base associated with the good-specific habit. In addition, ν̂t is an inverse function of
the output gap and the larger is a contraction (↓ yt), the lower is the good-specific
demand (↓ ci,t), and the larger the incentive to decrease prices (↑ νt).
As a result, given future inflation expectations Et[πt+1], the response of inflation
πt to financial and uncertainty shocks depends on the response of ξ̂t relative to ν̂t.
Intuitively, after a financial shock, the higher cost of external finance increases the
incentives were stronger for the firms than for the household. Nevertheless, since the real stock of
cash x̄t is moving in the desired direction (see Equation 1.7), this issue is not in place. In addition,
as shown in Section 1.5.4, even if the real stock of cash is constant and equal to x̄ss –which implies
that this channel is potentially neutralized– the direction of corporate cash holdings after financial
and uncertainty shocks is robustly preserved.
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need to generate current internal liquidity (↑ ξt) relatively more than the fall in
demand (↑ νt), and firms would rather increase prices to avoid costly external fi-
nance. On the other hand, after an uncertainty shock, the need to generate current
internal liquidity is not largely affected (since ϕt is unchanged, ξt is relatively sta-
ble), while the fall in demand (↑ νt) for a precautionary motive encourages firms
to cut prices. In addition, the fall in prices in response to an uncertainty shock has
an inter-temporal effect which is more concealed and related to a precautionary
motive. If firms decrease prices today, the good-specific demand and the stock of
good-specific habit are increasing more (or decreasing less), which implies a larger
increase (or smaller decrease) of the future customer base. Thus, after an uncer-
tainty shock, firms are encouraged to cut prices also to increase the future customer
base (which guarantees more future profits) for a precautionary motive against the
heightened uncertainty.
1.5.3 Calibration and model simulations
In this section, I numerically solve the model in order to see if the economic in-
tuitions described above hold for a set of reasonable parameterizations. Following
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) I solve the model to a third-order approximation
of the policy functions in order to estimate the independent effect of a second-
moment shock.17 Moreover, following Basu and Bundick (2017) I analyze tradi-
tional impulse response functions in percent deviation from the stochastic steady
state of the model. To obtain these responses, I set the exogenous shocks to zero
17 I use the Dynare software package developed by Adjemian et al. (2011) to solve and simulate the
baseline model.
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and iterate the third-order solution forward until the model converges to a fixed
point, i.e., the stochastic steady state.18 Then, I hit the economy with a one stan-
dard deviation financial shock εFt or uncertainty shock ε
U
t under the assumption that
the economy is hit by no other shocks. I compute the impulse response functions
as the percent deviation between the obtained responses and the stochastic steady
state.
I calibrate the model to a quarterly frequency using steady-state relation on U.S.
data or results from previous studies. In the baseline parameterization, I set β in
order to match a 3% annual interest yield on bonds. The inverse of households’
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution γq is equal to one, which implies log-utility
in consumption. The multiplicative parameter in leisure χn is such that percentage
of hours worked in steady state is equal to 0.3 while the multiplicative parameter in
household cash holdings χx is such that the interest rate on cash and liquid assetsRst
in steady state is equal to one. The good-specific habit parameter θ, the elasticity of
substitution across differentiated goods i η, and the persistence of the habit stock ρs
are−0.8 (Ravn et al., 2006; Gilchrist et al., 2017), 0.95 (Gilchrist et al., 2017), and 2
(Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Gilchrist et al., 2017), respectively. Following Gilchrist
et al. (2017), the decreasing return to scale parameter α, the fixed cost of produc-
tion φ, and the variance of the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity σ2a are equal
to 0.8, 0.3, and 0.05, respectively. The parameter that governs the cost of price ad-
18 Other contributions refer to the stochastic steady state as the mean of the endogenous variables
when simulating an infinity number of observations. The definition of stochastic steady state used
here is in line with the one provided in the Online Appendix by Basu and Bundick (2017). In
addition, the results presented here are robust to using the Generalized impulse responses around
the ergodic steady state as described by Koop et al. (1996).
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justment γp is equal to 10, which is in the range suggested by Ravn et al. (2006).
The parameters ζx of the financial flexibility function of cash g(x) = ζxx1−ιx/(1− ιx)
is calibrated to match the empirical average of corporate cash holdings over total
cash in the whole economy, while the parameter ιx ∈ (0, 1) is set equal to 0.5. The
total amount of cash in steady state x̄ss is calibrated to match the average empiri-
cal value of total cash over output. In the baseline calibration, persistence of total
cash ωx ∈ [0, 1] and its elasticity to the related interest rate ωr ≥ 0 are set equal to
0.5 and 1. In line with the standard New Keynesian literature, the monetary policy
inertia ρr, the Taylor rule parameter on the inflation gap ψπ, and the Taylor rule
parameter on the output gap ψy are respectively 0.75, 2, and zero. Following Leduc
and Liu (2016), persistence of technology shocks ρA is equal to 0.95; and, for a
comparison, the persistence of financial shocks ρF and uncertainty shocks is ρU is
equal to 0.9 in both cases. In addition, following Leduc and Liu (2016) variance of
aggregate technology shocks σA and of uncertainty shocks σU is equal to 0.01 and
0.392, respectively; following Gilchrist et al. (2017), variance of financial shocks σF
is equal to 0.075. Table 2.1 summarizes the baseline calibration.19
Figure 1.5 shows model-implied impulse responses to a financial shock and an
uncertainty shock. In particular, Figure 1.5a displays responses to a financial shock
that triggers a one percent decrease in output yt. A financial shock has a contrac-
tionary effect on output yt, consumption ct, and hours nt. Real wages wt also fall
due to a large decrease in the labor demand which is associated with a jump in
19 All the parameters target values of the deterministic steady state since those values from the stochas-
tic steady state are quantitatively analogous. In addition, values for ιx, ωx, and ωr are given on an
arbitrarily basis because results are robust to all the possible values that those parameters can take.
See Section 1.5.4.
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Table 1.4: Model’s parameter values
Param. Interpretation Value Objective
β Discount factor 0.9926 Rss = 3%
γq CRRA in qt 1 Log-utility
χn Utility from leisure 5.036 nss = 0.33
χx Utility from liquidity 0.0143 Rxss = 1
θ Habit parameter −0.8 Ravn et al. (2006)
ρs Habit stock persistence 0.95 Gilchrist et al. (2017)
η Elasticity of substitution 2 Broda and Weinstein (2006)
α DRS parameter 0.8 Gilchrist et al. (2017)
φ Fixed cost 0.3 Gilchrist et al. (2017)
σ2a Variance of ai,t 0.05 Gilchrist et al. (2017)
γp Price adj. cost 10 Ravn et al. (2006)
ζx Financial flexibility (1) 0.0013 xfss/x̄ss = 0.116
ιx Financial flexibility (2) 0.5 See robustness checks
x̄ss Total cash in s.s. 0.2451 x̄ss/yss = 2.176
ωx Persistence of x̄t 0.5 See robustness checks
ωr Elasticity of x̄t to Rxt 1 See robustness checks
ρr Monetary policy inertia 0.75 Standard NK literature
ψπ Taylor Rule on π gap 2 Standard NK literature
ψy Taylor Rule on y gap 0 See policy experiment
ρF Persistence of εFt 0.9 Comparison with ρU
ρA Persistence of εAt 0.95 Leduc and Liu (2016)
ρU Persistence of εUt 0.9 Comparison with ρF
σF Standard deviation of εFt 0.075 Gilchrist et al. (2017)
σA Standard deviation of εAt 0.01 Leduc and Liu (2016)
σU Standard deviation of εUt 0.392 Leduc and Liu (2016)
Notes. β is the deterministic discount factor; γq is the constant relative risk aversion parameter in
the consumption bundle γq; χn is the multiplicative parameter in household leisure; χx is the mul-
tiplicative parameter in household cash and liquid assets; θ governs the intensity of the external
good-specific habit; ρs governs the persistence of the good-specific habit stock; η is the elasticity
of substitution across differentiated goods i; α governs the decreasing return of labor input to total
output; φ is the fixed cost of production; ςa is the variance of the distribution of idiosyncratic produc-
tivity ai,t; γp governs the price adjustment-cost; ζx is the multiplicative parameter of the financial
flexibility function g(·); ιx is the elasticity of the financial flexibility function d(·) to the argument;
x̄ss is the nominal and real stock of total cash and liquid assets in steady state; ωx is the persistence
of the nominal stock of assets X̄t; ωr is the elasticity of the nominal stock of assets to its interest rate
Rxt ; ρr governs the degree of inertia in the monetary policy response to the output gap and inflation
gap; ψπ governs the degree of response of the monetary policy to the inflation gap; ψy governs the
degree of response of the monetary policy to the output gap; ρF and σ2F are the persistence and the
variance of financial shocks εFt ; ρA and σ
2
A are the persistence and the variance of technology shocks
εAt ; ρU and σ
2
U are the persistence and the variance of uncertainty shocks ε
U
t .
markup µt, defined as the inverse of the real marginal cost (see Figure 1.7 for the
response of the markup µt). As suggested by the qualitative analysis in Section
1.5.2, inflation πt jumps on impact because the shadow value of boosting internal
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resources ξt increases more than the shadow value of attracting new demand νi,t.
As suggested by the quantitative analysis in Section 1.2.1 and the qualitative anal-
ysis in Section 1.5.2, corporate cash holdings xft falls by a large amount in order
to substitute the costly external finance with internal resources. Both the rise in
inflation and the fall in consumption encourage the households to cut investment
in cash and liquid assets and, as a general equilibrium effect, the interest rate on
cash and liquid assets Rxt increases. Along those lines, the real supply of cash and
liquid assets x̄t increases consistently with the empirical results presented in Figure
1.2 in Section 1.4. Finally, the policy rate set by the monetary authority Rt rises,
rather than decreasing, because the output gap parameter ψy is currently equal to
zero. This result is fairly in line with the empirical results where the federal funds
rate is mostly not significant or mildly decreasing in face of a financial shock.
Figure 1.5b displays responses to an uncertainty shock that triggers a one percent
decrease in output yt. Analogously to a financial shock, also uncertainty shocks have
a contractionary effect on output yt, consumption ct, hours nt, and real wage wt due
to the decrease in labor demand associated with an increase in markup µt (see, also
in this case, Figure 1.7 for the response of markup µt). Contrary to a financial
shock, uncertainty shocks are associated with deflationary forces since in this case
the shadow value of generating internal resources ξt increases less than the shadow
value of attracting new demand νi,t. Moreover, in line with the arguments and
results provided in previous sections, corporate cash holdings xft increases in order
to cushion the larger future risk associated with the heighten uncertainty. The fall
in inflation and a precautionary motive encourage the households to investment
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more in cash and liquid assets with the result that the interest rate Rxt decreases.
As a result, the real supply of cash and liquid assets x̄t increases consistently with
the empirical results presented in Figure 1.2b. In addition, in face of an uncertainty
shock, the policy rate Rt falls as a device to close the inflation gap qualitatively
matching the empirical results presented in the Section 1.4.
1.5.4 Robustness
In this section, I show a series of robustness checks to confirm that the qualitative
implications presented in Figure 1.5 are robust to different parameterizations. Fig-
ure 1.6 presents various responses to inflation πt and corporate cash holdings x
f
t to
a financial and an uncertainty shock that trigger a one percent contraction in output
yt. Each subplot displays the response for the baseline calibration (solid line), for
a calibration that decreases the value of one (or two) parameter(s) (dashed line),
and for a calibration that increases the value of the same parameter(s) (dotted line)
relatively to the baseline calibration. I show five robustness checks. The subplots
presented in the first column show responses to different values of the inverse of
households’ inter-temporal elasticity of substitution γq. The values are one third,
one, and two for the lower value, the baseline, and the higher value, respectively.
The second column is associated to changes in the good-specific habit parameter
θ; values are −0.5, −0.8, and −1.5 for the lower absolute value, the baseline, and
the higher absolute value. The third column is related to changes in the parame-
ters that govern the price adjustment costs; values are one, 10, and 50 for the three
cases. The fourth column show responses associated with calibrations that affect
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Figure 1.5: Model-implied impulse responses
(a) Financial shocks
(b) Uncertainty shocks
Notes. Model-implied responses to a financial shock and an uncertainty shock whose size trigger a
one-percent contraction in output. Model’s parameter values are presented in Table 2.1.
the supply of cash and liquid assets x̄t as presented in Equation 1.7. The lower
value means ωx = ωr = 0 which implies a perfectly inelastic real cash supply, such
that x̄t = x̄ss in every period; while, the higher value means ωx = 0 and ωr ap-
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proaching infinity which implies a perfectly elastic cash supply, such that Rxt = R
x
ss
in every period. Finally, the last column is associated with different values of the pa-
rameters ιx ∈ (0, 1), that governs the elasticity of financial flexibility g(·) to changes
in corporate cash xft . Values are 0.01, 0.5, and 0.99 for the lower case, the baseline,
and the higher case, respectively.
The qualitative result on output yt, consumption ct, hours worked nt, and real
wage wt are implicitly confirmed since the the responses displayed in Figure 1.6
are associated with a one percent contraction in output.20 Moreover, in all cases,
the qualitatively different responses of both inflation πt and corporate cash x
f
t to
financial and uncertainty shocks are preserved across all the robustness checks.
This suggests that the results presented in the baseline are not implied by a specific
combination of parameter values but are mostly implied by the structure of the
model as discussed in Section 1.5.2.
1.5.5 Monetary policy implications
According to the empirical and model-implied responses, financial shocks move in-
flation πt and output yt in two different directions, while uncertainty shocks move
these two variables in the same direction. This difference is the key reason why
being able to disentangle financial shocks from uncertainty shocks is of primary
importance for monetary policy. In case of uncertainty shocks, the positive comove-
ment between output and inflation suggests that the divine coincidence is in place
20 If output yt decreases then also ct (equal to yt) and nt (proportional to yt) have to fall. The decrease
in real wage wt, instead, depends on the fact that the labor supply increases (due to a wealth effect)
and the labor demand decreases (due to the counter-cyclical markup) implying necesserely a fall in
the real wage.
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Figure 1.6: Robustness checks on model-implied impulse responses
(a) Financial shocks
(b) Uncertainty shocks
Notes. Model-implied responses to a financial shock and an uncertainty shock whose size trigger a
one-percent contraction in output in the baseline calibration. Responses are obtained from different
calibrations.
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Figure 1.7: Monetary policy experiment on Taylor rule parameter ψy
Notes. Model-implied responses to a financial shock and an uncertainty shock whose size trigger a
one-percent contraction in output in the baseline calibration. Responses are obtained using different
values of the output gap coefficient ψy.
and the monetary policy can simultaneously close the output gap and the inflation
gap. Conversely, the negative comovement between output and inflation after a
financial shock suggests the existence of a non-trivial trade-off between output and
inflation for the monetary policy.
In order to formally explore those implications, I examine the two contractions
presented in Figure 1.5 by allowing monetary policy also to respond to the output
gap, i.e., ψy > 0. Figure 1.7 shows responses of output yt, inflation πt, markup µt,
and policy rate Rt to a financial shock (top row) and uncertainty shock (bottom
row). Each subplot presents two responses: the dashed line refers to the baseline
presented in Figure 1.5 (ψ = 0) and the solid line is obtained from a new calibration
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where, as a policy experiment, the monetary authority also responds to the output
gap (ψ = 0.125).
As shown by the differences in the responses, increasing the coefficient associated
with the output gap ψy successfully stabilize output yt both in the case of financial
shocks and uncertainty shocks. Nevertheless, in the case of uncertainty shocks,
the stabilization of the output gap is followed by an even further stabilization of
the inflation gap; while, in the case of financial shocks, the monetary authority
can stabilize the output gap only at the cost of higher inflation. In my model,
therefore, the divine coincidence holds only for uncertainty shocks, and, after a
financial shock, the monetary authority has to balance its intervention between the
output gap and the inflation gap.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper shows that there exist two distinct sources of business cycle fluctuations
that both associated with higher uncertainty and wider credit spreads. Beyond the
labeling of financial and uncertainty shocks, corporate cash holdings can be useful
to understand how much an economic contraction is inherent to the financial sector
or to the uncertainty associated with the real economy. With the help of a new
econometric strategy, empirical results suggest that financial shocks explain almost
40% of output fluctuations over a business cycle frequency, while uncertainty shocks
explain roughly 15%. In addition, two thirds of the Financial Crisis can be attributed
to uncertainty shocks, while only a third of it can be attributed to financial shocks.
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Finally, financial shocks are associated with inflationary forces, while uncertainty
shocks are related to deflationary patterns.
I rationalize previous results in a tractable New Keynesian model with financial
frictions, good-specific habits, and a market for cash and liquid assets. Counter-
factual experiments show that the monetary authority deals with different chal-
lenges in face of the two shocks making the case undoubtedly interesting for policy
implications. I find that in case of uncertainty shocks, the divine coincidence is in
place and the monetary authority can simultaneously close the output gap and the
inflation gap without any trade-offs. Conversely, in case of adverse financial shocks,
the central bank can close the output gap only at the cost of higher inflation.
Chapter 2
What are the Sources of Boom-Bust
Cycles?
2.1 Introduction
This paper provides a synthesis of two major views on economic fluctuations. One
view maintains that expansions and recessions arise from the interchange of pos-
itive and negative persistent exogenous shocks to fundamentals. This is the con-
ventional view that gave rise to the proliferation of shocks embedded in modern
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. A second view, which we
call the endogenous cycles view, holds that business cycle fluctuations are due to
forces that are internal to the economy and that favor recurrent periods of boom
followed by an endogenous bust. In this environment, cycles can occur even in ab-
sence of shocks to fundamentals. Conclusive evidence in favor of either view is hard
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to find. One reason may be that a complete representation of the economy is one
in which both views coexist.
We make three contributions. First, we document a data conundrum that stems
from contrasting unconditional and conditional evidence on the presence of en-
dogenous cycles. We build on Beaudry et al. (2019, BGP henceforth) who provide
compelling evidence that U.S. macroeconomic aggregates tend to move in regu-
lar cycles. We ask whether fundamental sources of fluctuations, such as technol-
ogy shocks, can explain the regular cyclicality present in the data. We find that
fundamental-driven expansions do not feature predictable future recessions and
therefore fundamental shocks cannot account for the unconditional moments doc-
umented by BGP. Second, we build a theory that rationalizes the conundrum and
proposes shocks to expectations as the key source of boom-bust cycles. According
to our theory, positive shocks to expectations, such as waves of optimism, generate
periods of boom that are endogenously followed by a recession. In contrast, expan-
sionary fundamental shocks do not generate predictable busts. Thus, our theory
provides new discipline for both the conventional view of exogenous cycles and
the more heterodox view of endogenous cycles, by restricting their domain of ap-
plication to fundamental shocks or to expectation shocks, respectively. Third, we
identify expectation shocks using survey data from the U.S. and verify that, indeed,
expectations shocks (i) generate predictable boom-bust episodes, (ii) bring about
economic dynamics quantitatively consistent with our model, and (iii) account for
a sizeable fraction of business cycle fluctuations.
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In the first part of the paper, we begin by documenting the presence of a sys-
temic cyclical behaviour in economic aggregates. We do so in two ways. First, we
show that the spectral densities of a number of U.S. macroeconomic and financial
variables display a peak at periodicities of around 8 to 10 years. A hump-shaped
spectral density signals the presence of periodic motions that repeat themselves in
a regular cycle. Second, we show that the probability of a recession peaks about
two years after an expansion – findings that are inconsistent with the predictions
of standard DSGE models. Next, we argue that the responses to identified funda-
mental shocks almost always deliver mean-reverting responses more aligned with
the conventional view. We take a temporary shock to utilization-adjusted TFP as
the leading case. A positive TFP shock leads to a temporary expansion that is not
systematically followed by a recession. By comparing the conditional spectral den-
sities implied by a TFP shock with their unconditional counterparts, we show that
these shocks cannot be responsible for the cyclical properties of the data.
The presence of systemic cyclicality that is not due to fundamental shocks poses
a conundrum. In the second part of the paper, we propose a general equilibrium
model that rationalizes such conundrum. Given the particularly pronounced evi-
dence of cyclical behaviour among financial variables, we place financial frictions at
the hearth of our theory. The structure of the model echoes Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) in that there are firms who borrow from households by issuing short- and
long-term debt. Short-term debt is in the form of an intra-period working capital
loan and therefore it is used to finance production inputs. For simplicity, we as-
sume that the long-term debt is in the form of a one period bond that firms issue
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to smooth out dividends. The central innovation of the model is a default-deterring
borrowing constraint that depends positively on firms’ market value.
The endogenous borrowing limit has two important features. First, it introduces
a pecuniary externality as firm’s market value, defined as the discounted cumsum
of its future cash flows, depends upon two components: firm’s future profits which
are under the direct control of the firm, and households’ stochastic discount factor
which the single firm takes as given. Second, it generates strong financial amplifi-
cation due to a positive feedback loop between firms’ market value and households’
income. These two features combined make the model economy display boom-bust
episodes. Crucially, busts arise endogenously after expansions led by positive shifts
in agents’ expectations, but not after expansions due to positive shocks to technol-
ogy.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose that households become more optimistic re-
garding firms’ future value so that equity prices increase. Increased equity prices
relax borrowing constraints and allow firms to issue more short- and long-term debt.
Since short-term debt is useful to finance production, looser borrowing constraints
raise firms’ demand for labor. The resulting higher wages increase households’ la-
bor income, their willingness to save, thereby leading to a further increase equity
prices, and a relaxation of borrowing constraints. Therefore, an expectation-driven
expansion features increasing equity prices, wages, debt, and output, due to a pos-
itive feedback loop between firms’ market value and households’ income. Crucially,
the increase in equity prices is due to higher households’ stochastic discount factor,
and not to a change in firms’ future profits. In fact, increased borrowing capacity
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increase wages which reduce firms’ marginal profits and may lead to a profits de-
cline over the expectation-driven expansion. As the economy evolves, lower firms’
profitability distorts firms’ incentives in such a way to trigger a recession. From
the perspective of a single firm, lower profitability reduces its incentives to allocate
borrowing capacity into working capital. However, firms fail to internalize that by
hiring less input, households will receive less labor income, commanding a fall in
equity prices and tighter borrowing constraints.
Intuitively, the amplification channel should deliver similar boom-bust responses
after shocks to technology, but it does not. The reason is that equity prices increase
primarily because of the increase in firms’ profits thanks to higher productivity.
Because of the increased profitability, firms will allocate funds predominantly to
hire more inputs until the shock is absorbed, and, as a consequence, the distortion
coming from the pecuniary externality will be less important.
We argue that changes in expectations distinct from changes of technology can
rationalize the boom-bust features of the data, but what triggers such changes? The
model’s answer is that equilibrium outcomes are the product of self-fulfilling shifts
in agents’ expectations, and when these changes are unrelated to fundamentals
they generate boom-bust dynamics. The intuition is that boom-bust dynamics ob-
tain when the internal financial amplification channel is sufficiently strong, but this
happens only in the case in which the dynamic equilibrium is indeterminate, that
is, the economy is subject to self-fulfilling shifts in expectations (a.k.a. sunspots).
In the third part of the paper, we empirically identify expectation shocks and test
the predictions of the model. Specifically, we construct an indicator that summa-
66 CHAPTER 2. WHAT ARE THE SOURCES OF BOOM-BUST CYCLES?
rizes the revisions of expectations on the future economic outlook using quarterly
data on expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Survey of
Consumers. We use the indicator to identify exogenous shifts in expectations that
are uncorrelated with past, present and future realizations of TFP. In addition, we
control for a number of leads and lags of shocks to expectations of TFP in order to
isolate shifts in expectations that are pure sentiments from those originating from
beliefs on future TFP. Using local projections, we find that expectation shocks gener-
ate significant boom-bust dynamics in all the aggregate variables that we examine,
and explain up to 40% of real GDP at business cycle frequencies, consistent with
the findings of Angeletos et al. (2018) and Chahrour and Ulbricht (2019).
Finally, we show that the mechanism of the model is consistent with many fea-
tures of the data. First, we find that the model is able to reproduce the empirical
impulse responses to both expectation and TFP shocks. As in the model, expecta-
tion shocks bring about a countercyclical movement of the labor wedge, while the
labor wedge increases after TFP improvements. Second, we show that the model
can replicate the reduced-form evidence on boom-bust cycles that motivated our
analyses. Unlike standard business cycle models, our theory can explain both the
hump in the spectral densities of macroeconomic and financial variables, and the
rising probability of a recession during an expansion.
Related literature. This paper lies at the intersection between the strand of the
finance literature that focuses on credit cycles and the broad macroeconomic liter-
ature that aims at understanding the sources of business cycles.
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The idea that the financial system is prone to generate economic instability through
endogenous credit booms traces back at least to Kindleberger (1978) and Minsky
(1975,1986). Minsky (1986) provides groundbreaking insights on the relation be-
tween the economic and the financial system. Of particular interest for this paper is
his distinction between “periods of tranquility,” defined as situations during which
the economy is not subject to disruptive changes, and “unstable times" during which
market forces lead to a rise of financial instability which culminates in “speculative
frenzies”. Through the lenses of our model and empirical evidence, we view such
“periods of tranquility” as moments during which technological changes are the ma-
jor contributor to economics fluctuations, whereas “unstable times" are character-
ized by economic fluctuations primarily driven by changes in market expectations.
More recently, the idea that an increase in credit associated with a decrease in
borrowing costs can be a powerful predictor of future economic crises has been
empirically tested and verified using both macro and micro level data. For example,
Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Jordà et al. (2013), using data on 14 developed
countries from 1870 to 2008, demonstrate that rapid credit expansions forecast
declines in real activity.1 Using data on the credit quality of corporate debt issuers,
Greenwood and Hanson (2013) find that a high share of risky loans tends to forecast
low corporate bond returns. Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017) show that crises are
preceded by a period of high credit to GDP growth and leverage, and low spread
and risk premium. We complement this literature by providing conditional evidence
1 Other examples include Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998),
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Gourinchas et al. (2001), Goldfajn and Valdes (2006), Borio and
Drehmann (2009), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Claessens et al. (2011), Gourinchas and Obstfeld
(2012), and Laeven and Valencia (2013).
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on the link between a credit boom and the ensuing recession. We show that positive
expectation shocks - but not TFP shocks - are systematically followed by a recession.
Our evidence on expectation shocks also relates to López-Salido et al. (2017) who
focus on credit market sentiment identified using credit spreads and find that high
credit market sentiments are a predictor of future negative output growth. We
complement their analysis by showing that sentiment shocks not only predict a
negative output growth but also prolonged periods during which the level of output
is below trend.
We relate to the literature that aims at rationalizing boom-bust phenomena. For
example, Boissay et al. (2016) rationalize boom-bust episodes in a model where
the increase in households’ savings during a boom exacerbates adverse selection
problems in the interbank market. In our model, the increase in savings brings
about a recession because it reflects an increase in firms’ debt which tightens fi-
nancial markets. A subset of this literature builds model of chaos and limit cycles.
Boldrin and Woodford (1990) survey the literature and analyze the conditions un-
der which limit cycles can emerge. In a recent paper, Beaudry et al. (2019) revisit
the reduced-form evidence on the spectral densities of a series of economic vari-
ables. They build a model of limit cycles where small exogenous shocks give rise to
perpetual economic cycles. While our model can also exhibit limit cycles for regions
of the parameter space that imply a sufficiently tight financial constraint, our aim
is rather to rationalize the fact that only a subset of shocks trigger oscillatory dy-
namics while other shocks do not. Gorton and Ordonez (2016) distinguish between
“good" and “bad" credit booms depending whether or not they end up in a crisis.
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They find that shocks in the trend of productivity are associated with “good" credit
booms, whereas “bad" booms are typically associated with a decline in productivity.
We differ from them in at least two aspects. First, we look at cycles at short and
medium-run frequencies while their focus is on booms that last ten years on aver-
age. Second, we emphasize that the shocks responsible for boom-bust episodes are
orthogonal to movements of TFP.
Furthermore, we relate to the class of models that generate self-fulfilling rational
expectations equilibria due to credit market amplification. Examples of this class
are Benhabib and Wen (2004), Benhabib and Wang (2013), Liu and Wang (2014),
and Azariadis et al. (2015). While their emphasis is on a single shock, our model
is built to capture the important different responses to fundamental and sunspot
shocks.
Lastly, our theoretical framework shares some similarities with models of stock
market bubbles as in Miao and Wang (2018), in that, debt limits depend upon firms’
market value and sentiment shocks can be interpreted as bubbles. However, models
of stock market bubbles formalize the burst of a bubble as an exogenous event. In
contrast, in our model sentiment shocks rationalize both the formation of a bubble
and its subsequent burst.
2.2 The cyclicality conundrum
Boom-bust cycles are a recurrent feature of the data. Yet, there is virtually no evi-
dence of boom-bust dynamics conditional on shocks. We refer to such incoherence
between unconditional and conditional evidence as the cyclicality conundrum. This
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section documents the conundrum by showing that (i) there is a systemic cyclical
component in the data and (ii) shocks to fundamentals do not impart economic
dynamics that can account for such systemic cyclicality.
2.2.1 Unconditional evidence of cycles
In a recent article, Beaudry et al. (2019) find that U.S. business cycles are charac-
terized by cyclical forces. In particular, they show that the spectral densities of a
number of economic aggregates exhibit a common local peak at periodicities of 32
to 50 quarters. The spectral density is a useful diagnostic tool of cyclicality for two
reasons.2 First, a peak in the spectral density signals the presence of oscillatory dy-
namics in the autocovariance function of the data. Second, it tells us whether these
oscillatory dynamics happen at business cycle frequencies or they reflect lower fre-
quency forces unrelated to business cycles.
Figure 2.1 reports the spectral density of a series of macroeconomic and financial
variables.3 We use quarterly data from 1967:q1 to 2018:q4 and detrend variables
using a band pass filter that removes fluctuations with periodicities longer than 100
quarters.4,5 Two patterns emerge. First, results point at the presence of a strong
common cyclical component. With the exception of utilization-adjusted TFP, all
variables exhibit a peak in the spectral density in the interval between 32 and 50
quarters. Furthermore, the fact that there are no notable differences in the shape of
2 The notion of cyclicality that we use is analogous to Beaudry et al. (2019), that is a series is cyclical
if its autocovariance function displays oscillations.
3 The spectral density is computed using the Schuster’s periodogram.
4 Because filtering the series could induce a spurious hump in the spectral density, we check that
results are robust to various detrending techniques and frequency bands.
5 The choice of the data sample does not affect the results. We start from 1967 as it is consistent with
the longest data sample available for the analyses carried in Section 2.4.
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the spectral density across variables, suggests the presence of an underlying mecha-
nism responsible for the cyclical patterns rather than idiosyncrasies in the variables
examined. Second, financial variables exhibit a more pronounced peak relative
to macroeconomic variables suggesting that the cyclical features of the data might
originate from shocks propagating through the financial sector, whereas shocks that
primarily hit the real sector of the economy generate less oscillatory dynamics.
Importantly, a hump-shaped spectral density is a finding inconsistent with the
predictions of standard business cycle models. In Figure ?? in appendix B.2 we run
a Monte Carlo simulation on the spectral density of output using a textbook Real
Business Cycle model and the New-Keynesian model by Smets and Wouters (2007).
We find that the spectral density of output from model simulated data is counter-
factually increasing in the periodicity.
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Figure 2.1: Unconditional spectral densities of quarterly U.S. signal systemic cycli-
cality
Note: Data from 1967:q1 to 2018:q4. TFP is utilization-adjusted total factor productivity. GDP is real
gross domestic product. Investment is real consumption of durables plus real gross private domestic
investment. Hours is hours of all persons in non-farm business sector. Change in debt is the flow of
nonfinancial business debt securities and loans. GZ Credit Spread is the measure of credit spread
described in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). Financial Conditions Index is provided by Chicago Fed.
BAA T-Bill Spread is the difference between the yield of BAA corporate bonds and the treasury note
at 10-year horizon. Series are detrended using a quadratic trend (circle-solid line), a filter that
excludes fluctuations of period greater than 100 (black line), or from 101 to 200 (dark grey lines).
The presence of a systemic cyclical component in the data implies that the proba-
bility that a recession occurs should increase after an expansion. To verify whether
this is true, we estimate a linear probability model and compute the probability
that the economy enters in a recessions after k quarters since the previous expan-
sion. We define expansions as periods in which real GDP growth is above the top
quintile for at least two consecutive quarters. Likewise, we construct a recession
indicator that takes value equal one if the real GDP growth falls into the bottom
quintile for at least two consecutive quarters. Figure 2.2 plots the probability that
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the economy will be in a recession in a two-quarter window around time t+k given
an expansion at time t. Results confirm the evidence of cyclicality described above.
The conditional probability of a recession increases after an expansion and peaks
approximately after two years. The picture also shows the prediction from data
simulated using standard business cycle models such as the one described in Smets
and Wouters (2007), the textbook Real Business Cycle model. In addition, we run
the same experiment using the incomplete information model of Blanchard et al.
(2013). All models predict that recessions are effectively unforecastable, in that
the probability of a recession quickly converges to its unconditional mean after an
expansion. To see this, we plot the results from simulating a random walk process
in levels and show that the results from all models considered are indistinguishable
from the predictions obtained after simulating a random walk for real GDP.

















Figure 2.2: Probability of a recession peaks two years after an expansion
Note: Probability of recession in a two-quarter window after k quarters since expansion. Confidence
intervals are 68%, 80%,and 90% (shaded areas) around the point estimate (solid black line).
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2.2.2 Conditional rejection of cycles
Ultimately, we are interested in understanding the sources of the oscillatory be-
haviour documented above. To this end, we ask whether technology shocks ac-
count for these empirical regularities. We use quarterly utilization-adjusted TFP
(Basu et al., 2006) and identify technology shocks as the innovation of detrended
TFP after regressing it on its own lags, lags of the first principal component of a
large dataset of aggregate economic variables and news shocks estimated following
Barsky and Sims (2011).6 We estimate impulse responses using the method of local
projections proposed by Jordà (2005). Specifically, we estimate the h-th coefficient
of the impulse response function by regressing each variable at time t + h on the
shock at time t.7 We choose to implement the method of local projections because
unlike vector autoregressions (VAR), it does not require to specify the lag structure
of the data generating process.
6 Results are robust to different detrending techniques, additional controls, and different number of
lags and principal components. See Appendix B.3 for results and additional details.
7 Details on local projections are in the Appendix B.5.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse responses and spectral densities of a TFP shock.
Note: Technology shocks are the innovation of detrended TFP after regressing it on its own lags, lags
of the first principal component of a large dataset of aggregate economic variables and news shocks
estimated as in Barsky and Sims (2011). Impulse responses (top panel) are estimated using local
projections method. Confidence intervals are computed using the block-bootstrap method described
in Kilian and Kim (2011). Conditional spectral densities (bottom panel) are computed from the
Fourier transform of the estimated MA.
The top panel of Figure 2.3 shows the impulse responses of real GDP, investment
and the change in nonfinancial corporate debt as a fraction of GDP, to a posi-
tive transitory technology shock. An unanticipated improvement of TFP leads to
a hump-shaped response of real GDP and investment, aggregate debt rises during
the initial build-up and decreases while the economy returns to its long run trend.
To verify whether these impulse responses can account for the spectral properties
of the data, we compute the spectral densities implied by the estimated coefficients
of the moving averages. The bottom panel of Figure 2.3 shows that the spectral
densities of real GDP and investment conditional to a TFP shock are monotonically
increasing over business cycle periodicities. This poses a challenge to TFP-based
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explanations of boom-bust cycles.
Conditional test for the presence of a local peak The lack of a local peak in
the spectral density of output, investment, and TFP observed in Figure 2.3 suggests
that technology shocks cannot account for spectral properties of the data shown in
Figure 2.1. To make the point, we construct a test for the presence of a significant
local peak in the spectral density conditional to a structural shock. The test proce-
dure echoes Canova (1996) and Reiter and Woitek (1999) who design a test for the
presence of a peak for the unconditional spectral density. Details of our procedure
are presented in the Appendix B.7. The idea is to test if the shape of the conditional
spectral density around a particular frequency range is not statistically different
from the spectral density implied by an autoregressive process of order one. More
specifically, define D1 the average estimated spectral density over a range around
34 quarters, and D2 the average estimated spectral density over a range around 45
quarters. The test statistic is the ratio D ≡ D1/D2. A value of D bigger than one
indicates the spectral density is decreasing in the range 34 to 45 quarters. The spec-
tral density associated to an AR(1) process, in contrast, is monotonically increasing
in the periodicity. Therefore we test the null hypothesis H0 : D = D∗ where D∗ is
the value implied by an AR(1) with persistent parameter estimated from the data,
against the alternative H1 : D > D∗. Results for the technology-implied spectral
density are reported in Table B.1. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of absence of
a local peak for GDP, investment, and TFP.
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Taken together our reduced form and conditional evidence points at the presence of
oscillatory properties of the data that do not appear to be captured by movements
in TFP. In the next section we build a model that helps us rationalizing the findings
and propose “pure" sentiment shock - defined as shifts in expectations unrelated to
fundamental - as a natural candidate to explain the spectral properties of the data.
In section 2.4 we construct novel empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis
and show that the model can reproduce the responses to sentiment and technology
shocks together with the unconditional spectral densities of the data.
2.3 A model of conditional cycles
In this section we show that a standard Real Business Cycle model augmented with
financial frictions can rationalize the cyclicality conundrum. Azariadis et al. (2015)
document that unsecured firm credit is procyclical whereas collateralized debt is
acyclical. Building on their findings, we assume a type of solvency constraint that
allows firms to borrow up to a fraction of their market value. Furthermore, we in-
troduce short and long term debt as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). This form of
financial friction combined with procyclical fluctuations of long-term debt generate
strong internal amplification and cyclical dynamics in response to serially uncor-
related shifts in expectations. For plausible parametrizations of the financial con-
straint, we find that the model displays dynamic multiplicity of equilibria due to
self-fulfilling changes in expectations (a.k.a sunspots). In this environment, waves
of optimism unrelated to present and future fundamentals, generate temporary ex-
pansions followed by recessions.
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Importantly, our model stands in stark contrast to the class of models of self-
fulfilling business cycle due to aggregate increasing returns to scale as described
in Benhabib and Farmer (1994).8 Amplification in the form of increasing returns
would strongly influence the transmission of technology shocks, thus, while these
models can generate endogenous oscillatory dynamics, they cannot simultaneously
account for the empirical evidence on technology shocks.
For expositional reasons, we present first a benchmark model featuring intertempo-
ral debt as the only state variable. In the next section we identify sentiment shocks
in the data and augment the model with capital and external consumption habit to
match empirical responses. We further validate model’s performance by showing
that it does a good job in matching the spectral properties of the data.
2.3.1 Firm sector





t . The variable zt is the stochastic level of productivity common to all firms,
nt is the labor input, kt is the capital input which we assume to be constant and
equal to one for now. Firms issue noncontingent bonds bt+1 at a price bt+1/Rt.
We assume that firms receive a tax advantage such that given the interest rate rt,
the effective gross interest rate for the firm is Rt = 1 + rt(1 − τ) where τ is the
tax benefit. Thus, firms are effectively more impatient than households so that if
financial markets are not too tight the equilibrium stock of debt will be positive. In
8 Examples in this class are Farmer and Guo (1994), Wen (1998), and Liu and Wang (2014).
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addition to the intertemporal debt, firms raise funds with an intraperiod loan, `t,
to finance working capital. Because revenues are realized at the end of the period,
working capital is required to cover the intraperiod cash flow mismatch. The loan
`t is paid at the end of the period with no interest.9
The timing of the events is the same as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Shocks
realize at the beginning of the period. Firms enter the period with outstanding
debt equal to bt and choose labor nt, the new intertemporal debt bt+1 and distribute
dividends dt. Since payments are made before producing, the intraperiod loan is
`t = wtnt + φ(dt) + bt − bt+1/Rt,
where φ(dt) = dt + κ(dt − d̄)2 includes a convex distribution cost of dividends
which captures documented evidence of preferences for dividend smoothing (Lint-
ner, 1956). The end of period firm’s budget constraint is
bt+1/Rt + F (zt, nt) = wtnt + φ(dt) + bt. (2.1)
It follows that firm’s revenues are equal to the intraperiod loan, that is `t = F (zt, nt).
Incentive constraint. When production is complete, firms decide whether or not
repay the intraperiod loan they owe to the household. Consistent with recent ev-
idence on the procyclicality of unsecured debt (see Azariadis et al., 2015), we as-
9 The assumption of two types of debt is made for analytical convenience. In particular the intratem-
poral debt can be replaced with cash that firms carry from the previous period. Cash would then be
used to finance working capital and pay part of dividends.
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sume that contract enforcement is imperfect so that firms have incentives to default.
If a firm defaults it can divert its end of period revenues yt ≡ F (zt, nt). However,
a defaulting firm can be caught with probability γ, in which case its assets will be
liquidated and the firms will cease to operate. If a firm is not caught, it continues
to retain access to credit in future periods.10
Formally, a firm defaults if
yt + (1− γ)Etmt,t+1Vt+1 > Etmt,t+1Vt+1,
where mt,t+1 is the households’ stochastic discount factor, and Vt+1 is the firm’s
future value defined as the net present value of future dividends.
Because shocks realize at the beginning of period, there is no intraperiod uncer-
tainty. Thus we can write the following incentive constraint that deters default in
equilibrium,
γEtmt,t+1Vt+1 ≥ yt. (2.2)
The left hand side of the constraint is equal to γ times firms’ market value and
decreases with the amount of intertemporal debt bt,t+1. Whereas the right hand
side is equal to the end-of-period revenues yt which are equal to firms’ intra-period
loan. Hence, the incentive constraint in eq. (2.2) is effectively limiting both types
of firms’ debt. Importantly, in deciding between short and long-term debt, firms
understand that an increase in bt+1 tightens their borrowing constraint as it limits
10 Assuming that in the case of being caught a firm would also loose its revenues does not quantitatively
alter our results.
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their future ability to distribute dividends, but they do not internalize the effects
that a change in production have on their market value through movements in the
discount factor mt,t+1. This type of externality will turn out to be crucial to generate
both amplification and boom-bust phenomena.









subject to (2.1) and (2.2).










= (1− θ) yt
nt
(2.5)
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the incentive constraint. Equation
(2.4) is the first order condition of new intertemporal debt bt+1, and captures the
fact that the marginal cost of debt increases with µtand with the effective firm’s
discount factor defined as the household’s discount factor, mt,t+1 times the expected
decrease in the cost of dividends. The first order condition of labor input (2.5)
shows that financial frictions introduce a time varying labor wedge. When debt
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limits are looser the labor wedge declines, that is µt decreases, so that firms borrow
more intra-period and the labor demand increases.
Furthermore, looser credit constraints also increase the intertemporal loan. To







− (1− θ)µtφ′(dt)− θ.
As credit market relaxes, that is µt decreases, for a given dividend to output ratio,
the intertemporal debt rises.
2.3.2 Households sector and general equilibrium
There is a continuum of homogeneous utility-maximizer households. Households
are the owners of firms. They hold equity shares and noncontingent bonds issued




+ α log(1− nt).
The household’s budget constraint is
ct + st+1pt +
bt+1
1 + rt
= wtnt + bt + st(dt + pt)− Tt (2.6)
where st is the equity shares and pt is the market price of shares. The government
finances the tax benefits to firms through lump-sum taxes equal to Tt = Bt+1/[1 +
rt(1 − τ)] − Bt+1/(1 + rt). The first order conditions with respect to nt,bt+1, and st














Given the aggregate states s, that are productivity z and aggregate bonds B we can
define the general equilibrium as follows:
Definition: A recursive competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of functions for
(i) households’ policies ch(s, b), nh(s, b) and bh(s, b); (ii) firms’ policies d(s, b), n(s, b),
and b(s, b); (iii) firms’ value V (s, b); (iv) aggregate prices w(s), r(s), and m(s′, s); (v)
law of motion for the aggregate states s′ = ψ(s). Such that: (i) household’s policies
satisfy conditions (2.7) and (2.8); (ii) firm’s policies are optimal and V (s, b) satisfies
the Bellman’s equation (2.3); (iii) the wage and the interest rate clear the labor and
bond markets; (iv) the law of motion ψ(s) is consistent with individual decisions and
stochastic processes for productivity.
2.3.3 Inspecting the mechanism
The key externality in the model is that firms do not fully internalize the effects of
their production decisions on their market value. In particular, while they under-
stand that a higher level of debt reduces their market value because it limits the
ability to distribute future dividends, they do not internalize the feedback loop be-
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tween output and their market value. Absent of adjustment cost of dividends, i.e.
κ = 0, credit market amplification depends upon the elasticity of firms’ production





γ(1− µ)(1− τ + τβ)2
[
(1− n)(1− θ)
(ω − 1)(1− n)(1− θ) + 1
]
≡ ξ,
where µ = τ(1− β)/γ(1− τ + τβ).
If credit market frictions are severe, that is the probability of being excluded
from financial market γ is low or the tax advantage on debt τ is high, firms are
more responsive to changes in their continuation value reflected by changes in the
stochastic discount factor. Sufficiently high values of ξ give rise to self-fulfilling
equilibria. Suppose lenders and borrowers are optimistic regarding firms’ market
value, this relaxes the financial constraint and implies an increase in the credit
supply. As a consequence, production and households’ labor income increase which
raise firms’ market value through an increase in the stochastic discount factor mt,t+1
validating the initial shift in expectations.
Formally, take a first order approximation around the steady state, aggregate








where ζ ≡ (ω − 1)(1− n)(1− θ) + 1.
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When ωξ > 1/2, current aggregate output is a convex function of future output
which is sufficient to generate indeterminacy.
Note that the impact of technology shocks on aggregate output is ambiguous.
By increasing end of period revenues, a positive technology shock raises firm’s in-
centives to divert funds thereby increasing the right-end-side of the incentive con-
straint in eq. (2.2). Whether firm’s market value increases more than firm’s revenue
depends upon firm’s willingness to distribute dividends. We find that for plausible
parametrizations, the Lagrange multiplier µt increases in response to a positive tech-
nology shock.
Thus financial constraints amplify shifts in expectations while they dampen the re-
sponse to technology shocks. Yet, why do boom-bust episodes occur? Theorem 1
below lists the necessary conditions under which boom-bust fluctuations may obtain
in response to perturbations from the economy’s steady state.
Theorem 1 Boom-bust phenomena obtain only if
i. The equilibrium is indeterminate.
ii. Adjustment costs are non zero, that is κ > 0.
Proof is relegated in Appendix B.8.
Condition i. states that if the credit market amplification channel is strong enough,
so that indeterminacy obtains, then the economy can also be subject to oscillatory
dynamics.11 The intuition is that after an initial expansion, firms have accumulated
11 This property is not specific to the environment described here. Gu et al. (2013) discuss the link
between indeterminacy and cycles in the context of financial frictions of different forms.
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large amount of debt which limits their ability to borrow and produce. As firms
decrease production they do not internalize the adverse effects on their market
value. The stronger are the effects of this externality the larger is the drop in current
production. The reason why adjustment cost of dividends is necessary to obtain
cycles is more subtle. Besides the static amplification mechanism described above,
the model displays dynamic substitutability between current and future production
generated by movements in firms’ net worth. An increase in new debt brings about
higher current production but it decreases future firms’ net worth which negatively
affects the subsequent level of production. Absent dividend adjustment costs, firms
with a high level of outstanding debt would finance production by decreasing the
amount of distributed dividends, therefore limiting the impact that changes of net
worth on their production decisions, thus preventing the large accumulation of debt
after the expansion to generate a recession.
2.3.4 Parametrization and theoretical impulse responses
The sunspot shock is defined as an i.i.d. expectation error of firm’s value that is not
correlated with fundamentals
V̂t − Et−1V̂t = ut
where ut = εs,t + ψzεz,t.
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The terms εs,t and εz,t are respectively the sunspot shock and the technology shock.12
The natural logarithm of technology is assumed to follow an AR(1) process as
ẑt = ρz,tẑt−1 + εz,t.
We calibrate the model to a quarterly frequency consistent with the frequency of the
data. We set β in order to match a 3% annual interest yield on bonds. Following
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) tax shield τ and capital’s share of income θ are set
equal to 0.35 and 0.36, respectively. With the aim of emphasizing the difference
between the two shocks, we set the inverse of households’ intertemporal elasticity
of substitution ω to 1.2, the probability of being caught in case of default γ to 0.1
and the degree of adjustment cost to dividends κ to 2.3. The parameter ρz governs
the persistence of the technology process and is set equal to 0.93 consistent with the
law of motion of detrended TFP estimated in the data. We assume the expectation
error ut and the technology shock to be uncorrelated, so that ψz is equal to zero.13
Figure 2.4 shows the theoretical impulse responses of the model to a sunspot
shock and to a technology shock. In response to the sunspot shock the economy
experiences an initial boom characterized by an increase output, consumption and
hours. The associated increase in debt has two effects. On the one hand, it reflects
12 Note that inserting the sunspot on output would not alter our results. It is easy to show that
V̂t − Et−1V̂t = ω(ŷt − Et−1ŷt).
13 Note that ψz equal zero implies a zero-impact response of output and firm’s value after a technology
shock. While this is an implausible restriction that will be relaxed in the quantitative exercise, it
allows to generate a starker difference between the dynamics induced by the two shocks.
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Figure 2.4: Model impulse responses to a technology shock and to sunspot shock
an increase in households’ savings which increases the supply of credit generating a
decrease in the real rate and an increase in firms’ market value. On the other hand,
larger outstanding debt hinders firms’ ability to pay current and future dividends
which deteriorates their market value. Which of these two forces prevails depends
upon the level of firms’ profitability. As production increases firms’ profitability
falls so that firms’ market value decreases, the financial constraint tightens and
output starts declining. During the contraction phase, households are less willing
to lend which results in an increase in the real rate, a decrease in firm’s value and
a further tightening of the financial market. This negative vicious circle reinforces
as households’ savings decline, ultimately bringing about a recession. Importantly,
even though agents know about the incoming recession their actions magnifies the
decline in output.
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A positive technology shock generates hump-shaped dynamics in all the main
macroeconomic variables. By increasing incentives to divert funds, a positive tech-
nology shock tightens the financial constraint which dampens the impact response
of output. Importantly, the response of debt and output is comparable to the ones
after a sunspot shock, suggesting that looking at measures of firms’ indebtedness
such as the debt to GDP ratio may not be the best predictor of a crisis.
Importantly, expectation-driven fluctuations arise also in an economy where fun-
damentals, that is technology, preferences, or government policies, do not change
and this is common knowledge. This distinguishes them from noise shocks aris-
ing from ex post erroneous beliefs on future changes of technology. Bearing this
distinction in mind, in the next section, we estimate expectation shocks unrelated
to fundamentals and to rational expectations of fundamentals. We find that these
shocks generate boom-bust dynamics consistent with the quantitative prediction of
an extended version of the model.
2.4 Identifying sunspot shocks using survey data
In this section we estimate the sunspot shock as a “pure" sentiment shock, that is
a shock that reflects a change in expectations disconnected from changes in ex-
pectations on future TFP and realizations of TFP. To this end, we use quarterly
one-year-ahead expectations on a number of key macroeconomic variables formed
by both professional forecasters and households. We proceed in three steps.
The Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Survey of Consumer Expectations
include expectation data on a number of variables, such as future real GDP growth,
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investment, and consumption. Our theory does not point at a particular variable,
rather expectation shocks should be reflected into a change of expectations common
across all variables in the surveys that capture information upon expected future
business conditions. Therefore, as a first step, we construct an expectation indicator
Ŝt from the first principal component of all the relevant available expectation data.
The sample includes seven quarterly variables from 1982:Q2 to 2018:Q4.
Second, we regress the indicator Ŝt on a battery of controls in order to capture
variations in expectations that are “extrinsic", that is, exogenous to fundamentals
and to changes in expectations on future fundamentals. Formally, let the process of
detrendend TFP be represented by the following news representation






where εkt−k is a news shock on TFP k-period ahead which is part of time t agents’
information set, and εzt is the surprise shock of technology. Let S
K
t be the indicator
that summarizes revision of agents expectations on the economic activity K-period
ahead. We assume that these revisions depend upon current technology shocks,
expectations on future technology, and expectation shocks. Specifically,








where expectations on future technology are a linear combination of news upon
technology up to K horizons. Hence, in order to identify extrinsic expectation
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shocks one needs to cleanse changes in expectations, proxied by Ŝt, from the re-
alized level of TFP and expectations about future TFP up to the horizon K. In other
words, we want the estimated expectation shock to satisfy two conditions: (i) the
estimated shock must be uncorrelated with future TFP realizations; (ii) the shock
has to be uncorrelated with noise shocks, defined as ex-post wrong beliefs on future
TFP. 14
We proxy expectations on future TFP with TFP news shocks identified as in Barsky
and Sims (2011). However, this controlling set may no be large enough to satisfy
the two conditions above. To overcome this issue we add two additional set of con-
trols. First, we control for future realizations of TFP so as to guarantee that the
estimated shock has no impact on future TFP. Second, as shown by Chahrour and
Jurado (2018), one can recover noise shocks by adding future news and realiza-
tions of TFP to the econometrician’s information set. Thus, we further control for
future realizations of the identified news shock. Specifically, expectation shocks are
estimated from the following equation:









where εBSt is the news shock estimated using the procedure in Barsky and Sims
(2011), and Xt is a vector of additional control variables, including past realizations
of TFP and news, other shocks to fundamentals such as monetary policy and fiscal
14 As shown by Beaudry and Portier (2004) noise shocks in the form of ex-post wrong beliefs on future
TFP can give rise to Pigouvian cycles and therefore are a competing candidate to the explanation
of the reduced form evidence presented in Section ??. However, we find that controlling for this
particular type of beliefs has small quantitative changes on the variance explained by the expectation
shock, suggesting that noise shocks play only a minor role in shaping expectations.
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shocks, and past values of the first two principal components from a large data
set of U.S. aggregate variables. Interestingly, even after controlling for virtually all
available sources of fundamental fluctuations, estimated expectation shocks explain
approximately half of the changes in the expectation indicator Ŝt.
In the last step, we estimate the impulse response to an expectation shock using
Local Projections as in Jordà (2005). Specifically, for each variable of interest Y ,








t−j + λjYt−j + PCt−jΓj
]
+ νt+h for h = 0, 1, . . . , H (2.11)
where θh is the response of Y to an expectation shock after h periods, and PC
is a vector including the first two principal component from a set of U.S. aggregate
variables. We use four lags, that is J = 4, in the baseline specification.
Figure 2.5 shows the responses of real GDP, real investment, and the change of
non-financial corporate debt divided by real GDP to a one standard deviation ex-
pectation shock. Real GDP, investment and debt flow exhibit significant oscillatory
dynamics. In particular, after a positive expectation shock, the economy enters an
expansion followed by a recession after about two years. Importantly, the condi-
tional spectral densities exhibit a peak associated to periodicities of 8 to 10 years,
in line with the reduced form evidence presented earlier. Table B.1 in Appendix B.7
reports the p-values for the test of a local peak in the spectral density implied by
expectation shocks. The null hypothesis of absence of a local peak is rejected for all
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variables, with the exception of TFP.






















Figure 2.5: Impulse responses and conditional spectral densities to an expectation
shock
Note: Expectation shocks are estimated as the innovations in St orthogonal to present, past, and
future realization of TFP and expectations on TFP. Impulse responses (top panel) are estimated using
local projections method. Confidence intervals are computed using the block-bootstrap method
described in Kilian and Kim (2011). Conditional spectral densities (bottom panel) are computed
from the Fourier transform of the estimated MA.
2.4.1 Robustness checks
In this section we show that the results in Figure 2.5 are robust to different de-
trending techniques, additional controls, and the expectation variables used to con-
struct the indicator St. Given that our endogenous variables are non-stationary, in
the baseline specification we detrend the variables using a Band-Pass filter which
excludes periodicities above 100 quarters. In order to argue that the oscillatory dy-
namics implied by an expectation shock is not specific to the detrending technique,
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in Figure 2.6 we show robustness checks where endogenous variables are detrended
using (i) first differences (and the cumulated), (ii) linear time trend, (iii) quadratic
time trend, and (iv) Hodrick-Prescott filter. Results are in line with the baseline
specification and most of the estimates lie between the confidence intervals of the
main specification.
























Figure 2.6: Impulse responses and conditional spectral densities to an expectation
shock
Note: Point estimates (continuous line) are from the baseline specification presented in Figure 2.5.
The figure shows the robustness of the point estimate to various detrending techniques.
Figure 2.7 reports results for four additional variations of the baseline specification.
First, we increase the number of lags and the number of principal components in
the regression equation of the expectation shock. Second, we control for the present
and the past of other shocks to fundamentals such as oil shocks, fiscal shocks, mil-
itary spending news shocks and monetary policy shocks. Third, we check whether
results are sensitive to the choice of the indicator for the revisions of expectations.
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Specifically, we use only revisions on one-year-ahead output growth from the SPF
and find results that are not significantly different from the baseline. Finally, we
check that results are robust to the number of lags and principal components used
in the LP.
























Figure 2.7: Impulse responses and conditional spectral densities to an expectation
shock
Note: Point estimates (continuous line) are from the baseline specification presented in Figure 2.5.
The figure shows the robustness of the point estimate to various controls (see text).
2.5 Model with capital and external consumption habit
In this section we augment the model with variable capital, investment-adjustment
costs and external consumption habit. The equilibrium equations of the extended
model are:
wtUc(ct, ct−1, nt) = −Un(ct, ct−1, nt) (2.12)
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Et[mt,t+1(Rt − τ)] = 1− τ (2.13)
wtnt + bt −
bt+1
Rt




Fn(zt, kt, nt) = wt (2.15)
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where yt = F (zt, kt, nt) = ztkθtn
1−θ
t and φ(dt) = dt + κ(dt − d̄)2. Moreover, the
stochastic discount factor ismt,t+1 ≡ β(Uc,t+1/Uc,t) and value of the firm is defined as




. Finally, Uc(ct, ct−1, nt) = (ct− ιct−1)−ω and Un(ct, ct−1, nt) =
−α(1− nt)−ω2.
2.5.1 Calibration and impulse response matching
Following Christiano et al. (2005) we divide the model parameters in two differ-
ent groups. The first group is calibrated using unconditional moments or results
from previous studies while the remaining parameters are estimated via impulse
response matching. In both cases, the model is calibrate at a quarterly frequency. In
the first group, the discount factor β, the capital share of income θ, and tax shield τ
have the same values presented in section 2.3. The multiplicative parameter which
governs the utility of leisure α is chosen such that the steady state value of n is
equal to 0.3. Parameters ς1 and ς2 (capital-adjustment costs) are set such that in the
steady state the depreciation rate is equal to δ = 0.025 and the steady state Tobin’s
q is equal to one. Parameter ψz, which captures the correlation between technology
shocks and the forecast error on firms’ value, is set in order to match the impact
of a 1% technology shock on real GDP. Moreover, the parameter γ, which governs
the tightness of the incentive constraint, is set in order to match an empirical av-
erage debt-to-output ratio of 3.36. Finally, κ is calibrated in order to have a model
standard deviation of equity payout over output equal to the empirical standard
deviation.
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The second group includes the vector of parameters Σ = (ρz, ω, ι, ν): the persis-
tence of technology process, ρz; the inverse of households’ intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, ω; the external consumption habit parameter, ι; the degree of capi-




where Ψ̂ denotes the empirical impulse responses of GDP, Consumption, hours
worked and TFP to both technology and expectation shocks, and Ψ(Σ) is the model-
implied counterpart of Ψ̂. Finally, V is a diagonal matrix which gives different
weights to the target estimates. Table 2.1 reports the parameter values of the model.
Parameter Interpretation Value Target
α Disutility of labor 8.785 Hours in steady state = 0.3
β Discount factor 0.99 Annual bond yield = 3%
τ Tax shield 0.35 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
θ Capital share 0.36 Standard
δ Capital depreciation 0.025 Standard
ς1 Capital adj. cost (1) δν Depreciation rate = δ
ς2 Capital adj. cost (2) δ − δ/(1− ν) Tobin’s q = 1
ψz Corr tech and exp error 0.24 Impact of tech. shock on GDP
γ IC parameter 0.12 b/Y = 3.36
κ Dividend cost 3.01 std(d/Y ) = 0.024
ρz Technology persistence 0.93
IRF matching estimation
ω CRRA consumption 1.25
ι Consumption habit 0.45
ν Capital adj. cost 0.55
Table 2.1: Model’s parameter values.
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2.5.2 Model performance
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 plot the theoretical impulse response of the model against their
empirical counterparts. The model does a good job in reproducing the empirical
impulses to both shocks. In particular, we estimate the model consistent measure
of labor wedge and find that the responses are in line with the predictions of the
model.
Figure 2.10 shows the empirical conditional spectral densities against their model
counterpart. The theoretical spectral densities implied by the model are within the
range of the confidence bands of the empirical ones.
Figure 2.8: Model vs empirical IRFs to an expectation shock
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Figure 2.9: Model vs empirical IRFs to a technology shock








































Figure 2.10: Model vs empirical spectral densities conditional on shocks
As a last validation exercise of the model, we simulate data and reproduce the
results on the probability of recession presented in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.11 shows
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that the model can replicate the empirical probability of recession conditional on a
previous expansion.


















Figure 2.11: The model explains the dynamics of the recession probability
Note: Probability of recession in a two-quarter window after k quarters since expansion. Confidence
intervals are 68%, 80%,and 90% (shaded areas) around the point estimate (solid black line).
2.6 Conclusions
We provide a simple synthesis of two major approaches to modeling business cycles.
Under the first approach business cycles are driven by exogenous shocks that push
the economy temporarily away from the long-run steady-state or balanced growth
path. The second approach proposes models in which the economy experiences
endogenous fluctuations even in the absence of fundamental shocks. However,
both types of models fail to provide a unified explanation of the unconditional and
conditional moments of the data. In the data, shocks to economic fundamentals
induce dynamics that are consistent with the first view. But unconditional moments
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and results from expectation shocks, suggest to write models consistent with the
inherent instability class. Taken together, our findings speak in favor of a theory
in which both views coexist. Thus, we provide a model that embeds a strong fi-
nancial amplification channel which generates boom-bust dynamics in response to
i.i.d. expectation shocks. Consistent with the data, the financial amplification chan-
nel barely contributes to the propagation of technology shocks which exhibit no
systematic relation between expansions and recessions. In sum, a sizeable part of
economic recessions is due to preceding expansions. More importantly, those ex-
pansions that are not generated by a change in fundamentals are more likely to end
in recessions. As a consequence, policy makers should intervene more decisively
during expectation-driven expansions than during fundamental-driven expansions.
Characterizing the optimal policy in light of our findings is part of our future en-
deavors.
Chapter 3
COVID-19 and Credit Constraints
3.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the economic effects of the COVID-19 outbreak and the
role played by financial frictions in the transmission of the associated shocks. We
take advantage of a unique survey of Italian firms’ expectations and plans taken
immediately before and immediately after the pandemic outbreak. This data allows
us to adopt an event study approach to analyze how firms’ revision in expectations
over a two-month window are affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Our analysis addresses three main research questions. First, we ask whether
credit constraints amplify the shocks associated with the outbreak and the associ-
ated government response on firms’ expected sales, orders, employment, and in-
vestment. Second, we analyze the resulting changes in firms’ pricing strategies and
discuss how they are affected by financial frictions. In both cases, we allow for
the shocks to have heterogeneous geographical and sectoral components, as well
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as a common component. Finally, we discuss the relative importance of supply and
demand shocks, as perceived by firms at the beginning of the crisis.
Our empirical investigation exploits a unique survey on firms’ expectations for
sales and orders as well as plans for prices, employment, and investment. We col-
lected this information between March 24 and April 7, 2020 — two weeks after
the implementation of the first lockdown policies that followed the explosion in the
number of cases and deaths. This survey covers firms in the manufacturing and
production service sectors and is a special supplement to the pre COVID-19 wave of
the Monitoraggio Economia e Territorio (MET) survey completed by mid-January,
2020 — one month before the official “case zero” in Italy.1 In addition to a broad
set of firms’ characteristics, the pre COVID-19 MET survey contains expectations on
sales and pricing strategies for the next year, together with questions on loan ap-
plications that we employ to construct firm-specific proxies of financial constraints.
Our matched dataset is composed of 7,800 firms for which we have full pre and post
COVID-19 information in a two-month interval around the pandemic outbreak. For
approximately 5,000 of them we also have complete balance-sheet information.
The availability and wealth of our dataset allow us to investigate how firms revise
their expectations and plans in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, and to provide
a novel perspective on the effects of the pandemic.
There are several reasons why the Italian experience is relevant and interesting.
First, Italy was the first Western country to be severely hit by the pandemic, which
1 The original dataset is fully representative of all size classes (including micro-sized companies),
geographic region, and two-digit levels in the manufacturing and production service sectors.
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was largely unanticipated. It was also the first country in the world to implement
a national lockdown policy. Second, there is significant geographical heterogeneity
in the severity of the COVID-19 outbreak with some provinces in the North being
hit the hardest. In addition, there is sectoral heterogeneity due to the differential
government restrictions on production that forced some firms to shut down while
other firms deemed essential stayed open throughout the entire pandemic. Third,
Italian firms are predominantly small and privately-held, thus a priori more likely to
be credit constrained. This feature makes the Italian industrial system a particularly
instructive setting to explore the role of financial frictions.
Our empirical strategy is based on the assumption that the revision in firms’ ex-
pectations between the two surveys is entirely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This
assumption is reasonable because the two surveys are taken within a short time in-
terval and no other significant event occurred during that period. For expected sales
and price plans the same questions were asked in both surveys so that we can cal-
culate the revision in expectations over approximately the same 12-month horizon.
For other variables such as orders, employment, and investment, we cannot exactly
control for the pre COVID-19 expectations, but we use sales anticipation to account
for firms’ outlook before the pandemic. Our aim is to investigate how post COVID-
19 expectations are affected by financing constraints, allowing for heterogeneous
geographical and sectoral components of the pandemic shocks and controlling for
pre COVID-19 expectations and a wide set of firm’s characteristics.
Our analysis delivers a number of important and novel results. At a descriptive
level, our survey data suggests that the COVID-19 outbreak induced a significant
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leftward shift of the distributions for expected sales and a rightward shift for price
plans. In absolute values, these changes are larger for firms that are financially
constrained, classified as non-essential, or located in provinces more severely hit by
the pandemic, as measured by the number of COVID-19 related deaths.
Motivated by this descriptive evidence we investigate econometrically the deter-
minants of firms’ expectations and plans in a multivariate framework. Our econo-
metric results show that financial frictions shape the effect of the COVID-19 out-
break on firms’ sales and orders expectations and on firms’ employment, invest-
ment, and price plans. Credit-constrained firms display a relatively more pessimistic
outlook for sales and orders, and plan to reduce employment and investment rel-
atively more than unconstrained firms. In other words, our results suggest that
financial frictions amplify the effects of the shocks generated by the COVID-19 pan-
demic. In addition, our evidence supports the view that credit-constrained firms
plan to increase prices relatively more (or to decrease prices relatively less) than
unconstrained firms. This result is consistent with a markup strategy by financially-
constrained firms aimed at boosting internal sources of funds even at the cost of
future losses of their customer base.
We also investigate the effect of geographical and sectoral components of the
shocks generated by the COVID-19 outbreak and the associated government re-
sponse. Our evidence shows that firms in areas that were more severely affected
by the COVID-19 epidemic display a significantly different reaction in terms of ex-
pectations and plans. Such firms are more pessimistic in terms of future sales and
orders, plan to decrease investment and employment, and to increase prices by
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more, relative to firms located in provinces with fewer deaths. In addition, our
evidence suggests that firms that were subject to more severe restrictions, because
deemed to be non-essential, have more pessimistic sales and order expectations,
and plan a larger decrease in both employment and investment.
Finally, we investigate whether the COVID-19 outbreak is affecting the markup
of Italian firms also for reasons other than the existence of financing constraints.
In the light of theories that emphasize collusive oligopoly considerations or varia-
tions in the number of firms, we explore two additional reasons for countercyclical
markups: sectoral concentration and sectoral firm dynamics.2 Sectoral concentra-
tion or measures of firms dynamics do not appear to significantly affect firms’ pric-
ing strategy on their own. Nevertheless, credit-constrained firms located in more
concentrated or more dynamic sectors plan to increase prices relatively more than
their credit-constrained counterpart located in less concentrated or less dynamic
sectors. We conclude that, while there is ample evidence of countercyclical markups
due to credit constraints consideration, other reasons for countercyclicality do not
play an important role in shaping the effect of the COVID-19 outbreak on prices.
As unconstrained firms represent the vast majority (80 percent) of our sample, an
increase in prices coupled with a fall in sales, orders, and investment is suggestive
of the supply component of the shocks generated by the pandemic being somewhat
larger than the demand component.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 3.2 we discuss the related liter-
ature. Section 3.3 describes the data sources. Section 3.4 provides some descriptive
2 See Section 3.5.4 for more details.
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evidence on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on sales and price expectations.
Section 3.5 presents the econometric results, while Section 3.6 concludes the paper.
3.2 COVID-19 outbreak: related literature
The COVID-19 outbreak generates complex and multifaceted supply and demand
shocks. On the supply side, the lockdown imposed on businesses obviously repre-
sents a very large, albeit temporary, adverse labor supply shock. The restrictions
imposed by the authorities on labor input mobility are also likely to increase firms’
costs or decrease the efficiency of labor if, for instance, teleworking is an imperfect
substitute for working on site. Moreover, the increased morbidity and mortality,
even independently from lockdown measures and restrictions on mobility, affects
labor supply negatively. Although the effect of morbidity and mortality, per se,
on the labor supply may be small, the fear and concerns generated by contagion
and deaths may lead to substantial reduction in labor supply because workers may
decide to report sick or take time off due to this fear. On the demand side, the
pandemic shock may affect consumption and saving decisions due for instance to
an increase in precautionary savings and a fall in consumption as a consequence
of the increase in uncertainty. Such increase can also lead to a postponement of
investment projects and, therefore, to a fall in investment demand. Moreover, the
disruption of supply in one sector can be felt as a demand shock for upstream firms
or a negative supply shocks for downstream firms.
Not surprisingly, the economic literature on the COVID-19 outbreak is multi-
faceted as well, with a rapid increase in the number of papers that analyze the
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economic consequences of the pandemic from a micro and macro perspective. Some
of the micro papers are based on firm- and household-level survey evidence.3 Other
papers rely on different data sources.4 With regard to the role of financial factors,
Acharya and Steffen (2020) show that during the COVID-19 pandemic the US stock
market had higher valuations for firms with access to liquidity through cash hold-
ings or credit lines. Ramelli and Wagner (2020) use US stock prices and corporate
conference calls to show that initially investors negatively priced internationally-
oriented firms. As the virus spread in Western countries, leverage and internal
liquidity emerged as more important value drivers. None of the papers above does
or can explore fully the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on expectations or plans
for quantities, factor demand, and prices, accounting also for financial frictions in
the transmission mechanism. Moreover, the availability of expectations just before
and just after the COVID-19 outbreak allows us to use the shortness of the window
to identify the economic effects of the pandemic. Furthermore, we are in a unique
3 See Bartik et al. (2020) for evidence on US small businesses’ conditions and decisions, Balleer et al.
(2020) on German firms’ price plans and the role of demand versus supply shocks, Buchheim et al.
(2020) on the effect of country-wide policy actions and local conditions on German firms’ outlook
and the uncertainty associated with it, and Baert et al. (2020) on Flemish employees’ teleworking.
See also Coibion et al. (2020) on US household labor-market experience and Briscese et al. (2020)
on Italian household compliance with government mandated restrictions. Brancati and Brancati
(2020) provide some evidence on the COVID-19 pandemic for innovative and international-oriented
companies on the same dataset.
4 Bekaert et al. (2020) rely on Survey of Professional Forecaster to disentangle aggregate demand
and supply shocks generated by the COVID-19 outbreak. In a similar vein, Brinca et al. (2020) use
sign restrictions in a structural VAR to identify the supply and demand component of the COVID-19
related shocks at a sectoral level. Andersen et al. (2020) use customer transactions from a Danish
bank to analyze individuals responses. Hassan et al. (2020) develop text-based measures of costs,
benefits, and risks for listed firms in a large number of countries. Baker et al. (2020) use news-paper
measures of the increase in uncertainty for the US, the UK, and other countries. Finally, Caggiano
et al. (2020) use a structural VAR to show how the effects of the COVID-19 induced uncertainty can
be amplified by worsening in financial frictions.
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position to account for firm-specific measures of financial frictions based on survey
information about loan applications.
Finally, a different set of contributions has enriched standard macro models with
features that capture the COVID-19 related shocks.5 Some of these papers have a
multi-sector and/or input-output structure, and allow for nominal wage rigidities
and financial constraints (Baqaee and Farhi, 2020b; Faria-e Castro, 2020; Guerrieri
et al., 2020; Woodford, 2020). Our empirical contribution also emphasizes the im-
portance of sectoral heterogeneity, due, for instance, to the classification of firms as
essential (non-essential), as well as the role of financial constraints in the transmis-
sion mechanism. In addition, we document the importance of spatial heterogeneity
in the intensity of the COVID-19 related shocks. Moreover, we provide firm-level
evidence on the relative importance of demand, cost, and markup shocks and de-
scribe the aggregate implications they give rise to. Our results can be compared
with those obtained in the calibrated models we have just mentioned. In the ag-
gregate, we document a slight increase in firms’ prices, together with a large fall in
sales. This result is consistent with the simulations in Baqaee and Farhi (2020b) that
allow for sectoral and aggregate shocks. More broadly, our findings are consistent
with those obtained in models that generate a large fall in output but a moderate
price response (e.g., Eichenbaum et al., 2020a).
More generally, our paper contributes to the overall debate on the role of capital
market imperfections in the amplification or mitigation of macroeconomic shocks
5 See also Baqaee and Farhi (2020a), Basu et al. (2020), Bigio et al. (2020), Bodenstein et al. (2020),
Eichenbaum et al. (2020a), Eichenbaum et al. (2020b), Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020),
Fornaro and Wolf (2020), Kaplan et al. (2020), Krueger et al. (2020), and McKibbin and Fernando
(2020).
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and on the sensitivity of different types of firms to such shocks. The idea behind
amplification is that when a shock occurs, the net worth of the firm (or the bank) is
impacted, leading to a change in the wedge between internal and external finance
and, hence, in investment and labor decisions. There has been a lively debate in
the context of DSGE models on whether amplification occurs or not.6 From an em-
pirical standpoint, there is firm-level evidence in favor of amplification of demand
shocks, such as monetary policy shocks, for firms that are more likely to be finan-
cially constrained. Moreover, there is evidence that such firms are more sensitive to
shocks to banks’ balance sheet and to uncertainty shocks. In this area the challenge
is the identification of truly unanticipated exogenous shocks.7 The COVID-19 event
represents an ideal laboratory because it generates shocks that are exogenous and
unanticipated, and this allows us to present new evidence on the role of financing
constraints in the transmission of non-monetary shocks. Our evidence suggests that
financing constraints enhance the effects of the shocks generated by the COVID-19
pandemic on factor demand and output decisions.
Moreover, the availability of price expectations/plans in our data is an opportu-
nity to investigate the effect of financial constraints on firms’ pricing strategies. Our
6 The seminal papers are Bernanke et al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The presence or
absence of amplification depends upon the nature of the shock itself, the nature of the financial
contract, and the parameterization of the model. See, for instance, Gertler and Karadi (2011),
Carlstrom et al. (2016), and Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2017).
7 The literature that bears directly or indirectly on this issue is too vast to review here. We just men-
tion the seminal contributions by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) using semi-aggregate data, Kashyap
et al. (1994) –although the original aim of the paper was to investigate the bank-lending channel–
using firm-level data. For evidence on the effects of shocks to the banking system during the finan-
cial crisis or the sovereign debt crisis, on different type of firms see Chodorow-Reich (2014) and
Balduzzi et al. (2018) among others. The importance of firms’ balance sheets in the transmission of
consumer demand shocks during the Great Recession is emphasized in Giroud and Mueller (2017).
For evidence on the effects of uncertainty shocks in presence of financing constraints see Gilchrist
et al. (2014) and Alfaro et al. (2018).
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findings that financially constrained firms expect to charge higher prices is consis-
tent with previous theoretical and empirical work on the price setting of constrained
firms.8 The basic logic is that in a downturn firms find it optimal to increase prices in
order to raise current liquidity, due to greater difficulties to access external finance,
instead of investing in building their customer base.
In addition to financing constraints, there can be other explantions for coun-
tercyclical markups. In the context of a collusive oligopoly model, for instance,
markups may be countercyclical because firms are less able to collude during booms:
when demand is high, the benefit from deviating by lowering prices increases and
the oligopoly must lower its markup in order to maintain discipline.9 Moreover,
when entry and exit is possible, changes in demand prociclically affect the number
of firms leading to a countercyclical change in the degree of competitiveness in a
sector. In periods of low demand, therefore, prices can be set higher relative to
marginal cost while the opposite is true in a period of high demand.10 Our evi-
dence for unconstrained firms does not provide support for countercyclical markup
movements due to a collusive oligopoly mechanism or the entry/exit of firms in
the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. More specifically, prices are not set to be
higher in highly concentrated sectors or in sectors characterized by greater churning
8 The seminal papers in the area are Gottfries (1991) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995). A recent
important contribution providing empirical evidence in support of this mechanism is Gilchrist et al.
(2017). Kim (2020), instead, provides evidence that firms affected by a negative financial shock
decrease prices in the short run in order to liquidate inventories and generate additional cash flow,
followed by a price increase in the medium run.
9 Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Rotemberg and Woodford (1991), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1993).
10 Chatterjee and Cooper (1989), Chatterjee et al. (1993), and Bilbiie et al. (2012). Bilbiie et al. (2012)
also allow for an elasticity of demand that is higher in downturns using Feenstra (2003).
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or mortality of firms. For credit-constrained companies there is, instead, evidence
that sectoral concentration and churning affect firms’ ability to set higher prices in
order to boost current liquidity.
3.3 Data sources and description
Our main source of data is a firm-level survey designed to explore the consequences
of the COVID-19 outbreak, combined with the 2019 wave of the MET survey on the
Italian industrial system.11 Unlike other surveys, MET provides information on ev-
ery size class including micro-sized companies with less than ten employees. The
survey is representative of the manufacturing sectors (60% of the sample) and the
production-service industry (40%), with a total coverage of 38 NACE Rev.2 3 digit
sectors.12 Coherently with the timing of the previous waves, the administration of
the 2019-survey ended in mid-January of the following year, right before the out-
break of the COVID-19 pandemic for Italy (the first reported case was on February
1, 2020). This unique characteristic makes the 2019-wave MET survey an essential
source of information providing a comprehensive snapshot of firms’ conditions just
before entering the COVID-19 outbreak.
The original questionnaire contains a wealth of information on firms’ perfor-
mances and strategies, including data on direct proxies for firms’ financial con-
11 MET, Monitoraggio Economia e Territorio, is a private research center surveying a large number of
Italian companies on a regular basis. It is one of the most comprehensive survey administrated in
a single European country, with an original sample comprising seven waves – 2008, 2009, 2011,
2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 – and roughly 25,000 observations in the cross section. The survey
follows a sampling scheme representative at the firm size, geographic region, and industry levels.
12 Production services sectors are: distributive trades, transportation and storage services, information
and communication services, administrative and support service activities.
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strains, bank-lending relationships, supply-chain internationalization, and R&D pro-
cesses. This information is supplemented with that contained in a second survey
specifically conceived to study the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and admin-
istrated to the entire sample of respondents of the original questionnaire. This
allows one to have information on both the pre and post COVID-19 expectations
and plans for each company. To avoid excessive variation in the information set of
the respondents, the timing of the survey was restricted in a 2-week window be-
tween March 24, and April 7, 2020. The administration started 13 days after the
generalized initial lockdown imposed by the Italian government (March 11, then
revised in March 22), so as to leave each firm enough time to update its beliefs and
plans. This post COVID-19 survey had a final response rate of 33%, which is sub-
stantial for such a small time window, with a final number of completed interviews
for about 7,800 companies. The distribution of respondents across macro-sectors,
geographical macro-regions, and size-classes is similar to the one in the original
survey (see Appendix B for details), but endogenous selection of the respondents is
possible. We will take care of this issue by employing ex post stratification weights
for the COVID-19 survey that are calibrated to reproduce the population aggregates
from the sample of respondents. However, in estimation we will experiment both
with weighted and unweighted data, and discuss any difference that may arise (see
Section 3.5).
The post COVID-19 survey is composed of three main blocks. The first one repli-
cates the original questions on expected changes in future sales and prices so to
have the exact correspondence needed to construct a revision in firms’ expectations
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around the COVID-19 pandemic. A second block of questions asks about firms’ ex-
pectations and plans following the Coronavirus outbreak on new orders, number of
workers employed, expenditure in tangible investments, expenditure in intangible
investments over the next 12 months, in addition to sales growth in the follow-
ing three and 12 months. These variables are effectively continuous.13 Finally, a
third block of questions directly asks about actual actions of the firms and about the
difficulties in accessing credit, following the COVID-19 outbreak.
A critical issue that needs to be discussed is whether firms’ expectations actually
reflect the dynamic of the underlying variables they refer to. While we cannot say
much on the validity of firms’ beliefs after the COVID-19 outbreak, we performed
a number of validation tests based on past waves of the MET survey. First of all,
we exploit the panel dimension of the original dataset (between 2008 and 2019)
and regress realized sales growth on the expectations held at the beginning of the
period, together with province, sector, and year dummies. We show that firms’
expectations are positively and significantly correlated with realized future sales,
with a sizable predictive power: the R-square increases from 0.039 to 0.210 when
they are included as regressors. Importantly, if we restrict the analysis only to the
sovereign debt crisis period firms’ expectations gain even more significance and the
incremental R-squared reaches 0.333 (as shown in Table B2 of Appendix B). As for
pricing plans, the lack of firm-level data on actual prices does not allow for a simi-
13 We use the word effectively because firms were asked to provide a numerical value for expected
changes below -5% or above +5%. For values within this range, they could simply indicate no
change, even though some firms still provided a numerical answer. Overall, only 20% of the compa-
nies in our dataset reported a value of zero and our results are not sensible to their exclusion from
the estimating sample.
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lar validation exercise. However, once we aggregate firm-level expectations for the
manufacturing sector (from the 2017-wave of the MET survey, closed in January
2018) we obtain an expected inflation rate of 1.39%, which is similar to the 1.1%
observed inflation for domestic manufacturing goods in 2018.14 Overall, this evi-
dence suggests that firms’ expectations are informative about the future dynamics
of the actual variables, and that this is especially true in times of crisis.
In completing the dataset we will use in our empirical work, we match the firm-
level surveys with 2018 official balance-sheet data (CRIF-Cribis D&B database) in
order to control for predetermined firm’s characteristics such as size and age. As a
result of this matching, the estimating sample was reduced by roughly 35%, result-
ing into a final size of about 5,000 firms.15
Finally, we gather data on the geographical diffusion of the pandemic from official
releases of the Italian Department of Civil Protection (Presidency of the Council of
Minister). This data allows us to explore the consequences of the heterogeneity
in the geographical diffusion of the COVID-19 outbreak.16 In the next subsections
we present details of the construction of our main measures of credit constraints,
geographical exposure to the pandemic, and sectoral heterogeneity associated with
the essential classification of companies. Further details on variable definitions
14 In aggregating firm-level data we employ sampling weights to reproduce the number of companies
in the population and weigh each observation for the level of sales (we will discuss the weight-
ing again in Section 3.4.1). See https://www.istat.it/it/files//2019/03/PPI_CPP_PPS_0219_IVtrim18.pdf 
for the Producer Price Index. Note that, because price expectation data is available only from the 
2017 wave, we cannot perform aggregate validation exercises for earlier periods.
15 To reduce the influence of outliers, balance-sheet variables are censored at the 1% and some obser-
vations are excluded because of measurement errors (negative or nil assets, negative or nil sales). 
16 Data available from https://github.com/pcm-dpc/covid-19.
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are contained in Table C.1, while summary statistics for the firm-level survey and
balance-sheet data are presented in Table C.2.
3.3.1 Credit constraints
In constructing our measure for credit constraints we exploit unique information
in the 2019 MET survey about bank loan applications. In particular, firms were
asked if they applied for a loan in the past year and about the resulting outcome.
In case of a loan application, firms were allowed to choose one of the following op-
tions: (i) the loan was granted at favorable conditions; (ii) the loan was granted at
slightly less favorable conditions; (iii) the loan was granted but at very unfavorable
conditions; (iv) the loan was denied. Moreover, in absence of a loan application,
the questionnaire asks firms whether they did not apply because: (v) there was
no need of external funds; or (vi) they knew the application would have been de-
nied. Exploiting all this information, we have classified as credit constrained those
firms that replied either (iii), (iv), or (vi) In other words, we regard a company to
be constrained by banks if the loan application was rejected, accepted but at sub-
stantially worse conditions, or if the firm did not apply because it expected to be
rejected. Overall, almost one fifth of the firms in our sample (18%) are classified as
constrained.
We will discuss in Section 3.5.2 the relationship between our credit constraint
proxy, firms’ balance sheet variables, and bank relationship variables, as well as
their respective role in explaining the transmission of the shocks associated with
COVID-19. We conclude that our variable contains information about credit fric-
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tions that includes but goes beyond balance sheet measures of firm’s riskiness and
creditworthiness, as well as conventional proxies for bank-firm relationships.
3.3.2 Geographical diffusion of the pandemic
In order to explore geographical heterogeneity in the effects of the COVID-19 out-
break, we gather data on the number of positive cases in each province (107 geo-
graphical levels) and on the cumulative deaths at the regional level (20 regions).
While both variables are measured with error, the number of deaths is likely to
be more precise.17 We develop a measure of local exposure by imputing the cu-
mulated number of regional deaths to each province within a region, using the
proportion of COVID-19 cases in each province. Notice that this measure captures
both the perceived and actual epidemiological severity of the COVID-19 outbreak at
a provincial level, as deaths and number of positive cases were at the center of the
attention of all media outlets. In constructing our measure, we employed data for
the day before the interview of each firm, but we also tested other timings with no
significant change in our results. We have experimented using different measures of
the geographical dimension of the severity of the COVID-19 outbreak and provide
a discussion of the results in Footnote 28.
17 Individuals who die due to the virus are previously admitted to the hospital and usually tested for
the virus. This implies that most of the hospital deaths related to the COVID-19 are recorded. The
number of deaths is subject to a downward bias because the government records a death for COVID-
19 only if the patient has been tested and that is not necessarily the case when the death occurs at
home or at a nursing home. However, since a large fraction of individuals who contract the virus
are asymptomatic or have only mild symptoms, they are generally not tested and not recorded as
positive cases. This means that the measurement error for the number of positive cases is likely to
be greater than the measurement error for the number of deaths.
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3.3.3 Essential vs. non-essential classification
Another dimension of heterogeneity in firms’ exposure to the COVID-19 shocks is
related to the regulatory restrictions on production imposed by the Italian govern-
ment. While firms operating in essential sectors could remain open throughout the
pandemic, companies in sectors that were considered non-essential were forced to
shut down. Essential and non-essential firms are defined using the same 6-digit
sectoral classification adopted by the Italian government in the decree of March 22.
Moreover, main suppliers to firms in essential sectors were also allowed to stay in
business and classified as essential. We can identify this additional set of companies
because we have information on whether a firm stayed open despite belonging to a
non-essential sector (from the COVID-19 survey). Overall, 59% of the firms in our
sample were classified as essential, while 41% of the firms were subject to a forced
closure during the lockdown period.
3.4 Descriptive evidence
This section presents some descriptive statistics for sales and domestic prices growth
expectations/plans for the matched (with balance-sheet data) sample of 5,000 firms
used in estimation. First, we report the pre and post COVID-19 unconditional dis-
tributions and discuss the aggregate implications of the outbreak. We then ana-
lyze how changes in expected sales and prices depend upon the financial status of
the company or the geographical and sectoral component of the shock. We also
describe the joint distribution of expected changes in sales and prices. This pre-
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liminary look at the data is meant to identify some potential factors driving the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on sales and prices, and it is a prologue to the
multivariate analysis in Section 3.5. Since we are interested in the effects of the
COVID-19 outbreak on the entire economy, the descriptive evidence presented in
this section employs post-stratification weights for the post COVID-19 survey that
are calibrated to reproduce the overall Italian industrial structure. These weights
may be only approximately correct for the 5,000 firms survey if there are further se-
lection issues generated by matching the survey data with the balance-sheet data.18
We will discuss this issue in Section 3.5 (see Footnote 26).
3.4.1 General consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak
We focus on sales’ expectations and price plans as we can rely on two identical ques-
tions contained in the original 2019 MET survey and repeated in the March 2020
survey. The first question asks about the expected sales growth over the next 12
months. Firms were allowed to give a categorical answer on the expected change:
i. very negative (less than -15%); ii. negative (between -15% and -5%); iii. stable
(between -5% and +5%); iv. positive (between 5% and 15%); and v. very posi-
tive (more than 15%). As for prices, firms were directly asked for the expected
(continuous) percentage change over the next 12 months.
The upper and bottom panels of Figure 3.1 present the distribution for pre and
post COVID-19 expected sales growth over the next year. The leftward shift of the
18 Unless specified otherwise, the picture from the unweighted sample is essentially in line with the one
presented. The similarity is even greater when calculating the weighted statistics using the 7,800
firms sample.
3.4. DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 121
distribution is quite evident, with about 80% of firms reporting either expectations
of a contraction (between -5% and -15%) or of a large contraction (less that -15%)
in sales. Before the COVID-19 outbreak, instead, 60% of firms expected sales to be
fairly stable, with about 20% of companies forecasting future increases. Figure 3.2
shows the same expected dynamics for (discretized) domestic prices. In this case,
we observe a rightward shift in the price distribution, with the unweighted mean
increasing from 1.1% to 7% in the most recent survey (see also Table C.2).19 If we
weight each answer by firms’ sales and by the sampling weights –that reproduce the
population of companies– we obtain, instead, a moderate aggregate upward revi-
sion in expected firms’ prices of thirteen basis points (from 2.48% to 2.61%). This
preliminary evidence suggests that while both the demand and supply components
of the shocks are playing an important role, the supply component is slightly more
important in the aggregate. This moderate price response is consistent with the
simulation results in Baqaee and Farhi (2020b) and Eichenbaum et al. (2020a). We
will return to these issues when discussing whether the price increase is due to a
rise in costs or to countercyclical markups.20
Note, however, that behind this aggregate figure there is a very heterogeneous
experience across individual firms. This heterogeneity extends to the correlation
between expected sales and price changes, as can be seen by calculating the joint
distribution of prices and sales changes. In the first panel of Table 3.1 we report the
19 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that we can reject the hypothesis of identical pre and post
distributions for expected sales and prices growth with a p-value approximately equal to zero. Some
care should be used in interpreting the result for sales because of the reduced accuracy of the test
with a categorical variable.
20 See Sections 3.4.2, 3.5.2, and 3.5.4.
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percentage of firms, over the entire sample, indicating price increases, stability, or
decreases conditional on the categorical expectations for sales. A plurality of firms
indicate that they expect a decrease in sales and an increase in prices (32.7%).
This represents almost half (44.9%) of the firms that expect sales to decrease. The
percentage of those indicating no price changes or negative price changes and a
fall in sales are smaller but still sizable: 24.7% and 15.4%, respectively (33.9% and
21.1% of the firms expecting a decrease in sales). This means that, whereas most
of the firms expect a decrease in sales (72.8%), the price response to the COVID-19
outbreak is heterogeneous. This suggests that the relative importance of demand
and supply shocks differs across types of firms. We will explore this heterogenity in
the descriptive statistics that will follow and in our econometric analysis.
Finally, Figure 3.3 shows the discretized distribution of sales expectations over
the next three months together with sales expectations over the next 12 months
calculated from the continuous measures of sales provided by the supplemental
post COVID-19 survey. The two distributions show that the COVID-19 shock is
associated with a fall in expected sales at all horizons. In addition, the expected
decrease in sales over the next three months (-23.9%) is larger that in the next
12 months (-19.3%). This implies that firms in our sample expect a steep initial
fall followed by a very slow recovery. We obtain the same qualitative results when
we use the expected fall in sales weighted with their initial level and with sample
weights (-15.5% and -10.2%, respectively). We conclude that over this time horizon
there is evidence of very asymmetric V-shaped expectations or a L-shaped rotated
few degrees counter-clock wise.
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3.4.2 Role of financial frictions
This subsection provides some preliminary evidence on how financial frictions af-
fect firms’ sales and price expectations in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak.
The upper panel of Figure 3.4 reports the post COVID-19 distributions for both
types of firms’ sales expectations. More than 60% of financially-constrained firms
expect sales to decrease by more than 15% versus around 45% of unconstrained
firms. The comparable histograms for domestic price plans is shown in the bottom
panel of Figure 3.4. Although visually it is not easy to detect a change, the average
increase in expected price for financially-constrained firms is 8.2%, while for finan-
cially unconstrained firms is only 6.8%.21 This represents prima facie evidence of
different pricing decisions depending upon the severity of financial frictions.22 This
picture is confirmed if we look at the joint distribution of expected sales and price
changes. The percentage of firms expecting price increases when sales are expected
to decrease is higher for credit-rationed firms: 42.5%, versus 32.7% for the entire
sample (see Table 3.1 Panel 2).
3.4.3 Geographical and sectoral heterogeneity
In this subsection we present some descriptive evidence on the geographical and
sectoral heterogeneity of the COVID-19 outbreak and on its effects. Figure 3.5 dis-
21 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that we can reject the hypothesis of identical revisions of
sales and price growth expectations between financially constrained and financially unconstrained
firms (p-value of less than 1%).
22 Note that the differences between credit and not credit-constrained firms are much smaller for pre
COVID-19 expectations. We do not report the figures for reason of space. A similar remark ap-
plies when we partition the sample by firms located in area with a high number of deaths and
essential/non-essential firms.
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plays the heterogeneity in the number of cumulative deaths across the Italy. While
some provinces in the North suffered from a large number of deaths, the pandemic
was significantly less severe in Central and Southern regions, although there is sub-
stantial variation also within these macro areas. In the top panel of Figure 3.6 we
exploit this geographical heterogeneity to further explore the effect of the COVID-
19 outbreak on expected sales growth, depending upon the level of exposure to the
pandemic. High exposure is defined as being located in a province in the top quar-
tile of the distribution of deaths. In high mortality areas, firms are more pessimistic
about sales than in provinces with lower exposure (53.4% vs. 47.2% expect a fall
in sales below 15%). Although we do not present the graph, prices are expected
to increase more in areas with high exposure to COVID-19: the average expected
change is 9.3% versus 6.2% in low exposure areas. Moreover, the percentage of
firms planning price increases when sales are expected to decrease is higher for
firms located in high COVID-19 death area: 41.5%, versus 32.7% for the entire
sample (see Table 3.1 Panel 4).
In the bottom panel of Figure 3.6 we report the post COVID-19 expectations of
future sales for essential and non-essential firms. Non-essential firms are on average
more pessimistic than essential companies: 52.7% of firms that shut down expect
a fall in sales greater than 15%, while only 38.6% of essential firms expect such a
large fall. As for prices, there is no evidence of a significant difference in the average
expected change for essential and non-essential companies.23 The percentage of
23 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggests that the revision in sales growth is significantly different for
essential versus non-essential firms, while it is not significantly different for the exposure to deaths.
The caveat of using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for categorical variables still applies. For the
3.4. DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 125
firms planning price increases when sales are expected to decrease is somewhat
higher for essential firms: 35.6%, compared to 32.7% in the entire sample (see
Table 3.1 Panel 7).
3.4.4 Firms’ actual response to the shock
Although the emphasis of the paper is on firms’ expectations and plans, it is also
interesting to briefly discuss the actions they have taken or were forced to take in
response to the COVID-19 outbreak.
Figure 3.7 shows the percentage of firms that: (i) adopted teleworking; (ii) tem-
porarily reduced employment or (iii) hours worked; were in (iv) complete or (v)
partial shutdown; (vi) applied for government programs. Firms were allowed to
choose up to three categories in the list. Importantly, almost 50% of the firms de-
cided to temporarily shut down (this is also a result of the restrictions imposed
by the government) while only a negligible fraction of them have been willing to
partially shut down. Note that we use the information on not shutting down in
non-essential sectors to finesse our definition of who is classified as an essential
firm. In addition, a large group of firms (30.9%) adopted teleworking, and more
firms opted for reducing the hours worked (21.4%) rather than reducing the level
of employment (12.1%). The more prevalent use of reductions in hours most likely
reflects the fact that firms would rather avoid separating permanently from their
employees. The use of teleworking by firms raises the issue of its efficiency relative
revision of prices across our geographical or sectoral partition, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the two distributions are identical.
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to on-site work. If the two modes are not perfect substitutes moving to teleworking
constitutes an adverse cost shock.
3.5 Econometric strategy and results
In our empirical work we take advantage of the availability of pre and post COVID-
19 expectations for sales and prices (at a one-year horizon) to model the revision in
firms’ expectations around the COVID-19 outbreak in Italy, that was largely unan-
ticipated. For other continuous variables, such as sales over the next three months,
orders, employment, and investment over the next 12 months, we do not have the
correspondent expectations formed before the COVID-19 episode. In this case, we
will use past expectations for sales to control for the pre COVID-19 information set.
Recall that the two surveys where taken only two months apart and, therefore, we
assume that they reflect expectations in the yearly growth rate over approximately
the same time horizon. The short length of the interval also motivates our assump-
tion that the pandemic is the dominant factor in determining firms’ expectation
revisions.
In specifying our estimating equation, we assume that the innovation in expec-
tations about marginal net returns generated by the shocks described above is the
sum of: a common component ηt; a component that is proportional to the log of
one plus the number of deaths at a provincial level, Deathsi,t; and a component that
reflects the essential or non-essential status of the firm, Essentiali,t. We assume that
the effect of these three components on a firm’s decisions depend upon whether or
not it was credit constrained at time t − 1, CCi,t−1. More specifically, our empirical
3.5. ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY AND RESULTS 127
estimation will be based on variants of the following model:
Ei(yi,t+1|post COVID-19)− Ei(yi,t+1|pre COVID-19) = α(CCi,t−1)ηt
+ β1(CCi,t−1)Deathsi,t + β2(CCi,t−1)Essentiali,t + γ′xi,t−1 + λs + λr + εi,t
(3.1)
where yi,t+1 represents the growth rate of sales, prices, orders, employment, in-
vestment in tangible assets, and investment in intangible assets of firm i between
periods t and t + 1; and Ei(yi,t+1|I) denotes the expectations formed by firm i on
yi,t+1 with information set I = {pre COVID-19, post COVID-19}.
In the model we also control for a set of firms’ characteristics and initial condi-
tions xi,t−1. We will start from a simple specification where xi,t−1 is composed of the
log of total assets (Sizei,t−1), log of one plus age (Agei,t−1), and of log of population
at the provincial level (Populationi,t−1). The inclusion of Populationi,t−1 is meant
to make certain that Deathsi,t does not simply capture the demographic size of the
province. In a robustness exercise we also include log provincial value added per
capita as a proxy for local productivity and the log number of blood donation per
capita as a proxy for social capital, and show that our results for Deathi,t are robust
to their inclusion (see the Online Appendix). We also include the pre COVID-19
expectations (Ei[yi,t+1|pre COVID-19]) to allow the cross-sectional difference in ex-
pectation revisions to be related to the initial outlook of the firm. Finally, in a richer
specification, we augment the model with a set of dummies indicating whether firm
i is importing (Importi,t−1), exporting (Exporti,t−1), part of a group (Groupi,t−1),
family run (Familyi,t−1), and investing in R&D (R&Di,t−1), as well as a continuous
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variable indicating the percentage of graduate employees (Graduatei,t−1).24 In all
specifications we also include 88 two-digit sector dummies, λs, and 20 region fixed
effects, λr, to account for several sources of sectoral and geographical heterogeneity.
Note that the inclusion of a rich set of industrial controls, together with some of the
firm-specific measures in xi,t−1 (especially size, age, R&D, and internationalization),
also capture most of the firms’ ability to substitute on-site work with telework.
The inclusion of these controls can be rationalized in two non-mutually-exclusive
ways: (a) there may be an additional component of the shock that varies with such
firms’ characteristics, or (b) the response to the common shocks depends upon such
characteristics. Conditional on xi,t−1 and the region (λr) and sector (λs) dummies,
we assume that the error term εi,t in Equation 3.1, that captures other unobserv-
able components generated by the COVID-19 pandemic, approximation errors, and
measurement errors, is uncorrelated with CCi,t−1, Deathsi,t, and Essentiali,t. Under
these assumptions, the coefficient on these variables can be estimated consistently.
We estimate our model both with the unweighted and the weighted sample, us-
ing the ex post stratification weights for the COVID-19 survey. We use the weighted
results as our benchmark throughout the main body of the paper, but present in
the Online Appendix the results from the unweighted sample and discuss in the
text any difference between the two. On the whole, the results are similar with
a limited number of exceptions. We focus on the weighted estimates for two rea-
sons. First, we want results to be as representative as possible of the effects of the
24 The subscript t− 1 indicates variables from 2018 balance-sheets (the last available) or from the pre
COVID-19 MET survey.
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COVID-19 outbreak on the overall Italian economy. Second, the weighting scheme
assuages concerns about causal inference due to the possible endogenous selection
of companies in the sample. The latter may be induced by the very administra-
tion of the COVID-19 survey that was concentrated in a short time window dur-
ing the lockdown. If firms that were less affected by the pandemic, such as those
in essential sectors or located in areas with lower deaths, had a higher probabil-
ity of being sampled and if this selection is correlated with the error terms, the
post-estimation weights may help achieving consistency of the estimates (see Solon
et al., 2015 for a discussion and further references).25 As we have noted before, the
post-stratification weights were calibrated to reproduce the aggregate population
starting from the full set of 7,800 firms interviewed in the COVID-19 survey. Be-
cause we focus on the subsample of 5,000 firms with complete balance-sheet data,
the weighted analysis may still not be perfectly representative of the manufacturing
and productive services sector.26
The structure of the section is as follows. In Sub-section 3.5.1 we present results
for a model where the effect of the geographical and sectoral components (Deathsi,t
and Essentiali,t, respectively) do not depend on initial financial conditions. This im-
25 The comparison of weighted and unweighted descriptive statistics in Table C.2 provides, indeed,
some evidence in favor of an oversampling of companies that were less exposed to the pandemic
shock. We also tested the need of sampling weights with the statistic proposed by DuMouchel
and Duncan (1983). The test speaks in favor of a weighted estimation because weights and their
interactions with the independent variables add significant explained variance to the overall model
(p-values are virtually zero).
26 A Probit model of the probability of appearing in the matched 5,000 sample, conditional on being
in the 7,800 firms sample, suggests that the number of deaths does not affect significantly such
probability, but being essential increases it, while being financially constrained decreases it. Some of
the controls, such as size, are also significant. This suggests that in the estimating sample, relative to
the 7,800 firms sample and conditional on the controls, we have firms that in same dimensions (for
instance, essential status and financial constraints) tend to be less severely affected by the pandemic.
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plies that β1 and β2 are assumed to be constant. In Sub-section 3.5.2 we further
explore the role of financing constraints during the COVID-19 outbreak, using this
baseline model. In Sub-section 3.5.3 we relax the assumption on β1 and β2 and test
whether the effects of Deathsi,t and Essentiali,t depend on pre COVID-19 credit con-
strains, CCi,t−1. Finally, in Sub-section 3.5.4 we add further interactions to discuss
additional evidence of the role of markup changes.
3.5.1 Results from the baseline model
The results presented in this section are based on estimates of the following model:
Ei(yi,t+1|post COVID-19) = δ Ei(yi,t+1|pre COVID-19) + α0 + α1CCi,t−1
+ β1Deathsi,t + β2Essentiali,t + γ̃′x̃i,t−1 + λs + λr + εi,t
(3.2)
Note that Equation 3.2 is a re-parameterization of Equation 3.1 in which we have
moved the pre COVID-19 expectations to the right-hand side. Its coefficient δ equals
one plus the element of γ associated with the pre COVID-19 expectations in Equa-
tion 3.1. Now, x̃i,t−1 denotes the firms’ characteristics excluding the Ei(yi,t+1|pre COVID-19).
In addition, the essential restriction imposed in this equation is that β1 and β2 do not
depend on firms being financially constrained. Moreover, for notational simplicity
we have subsumed ηt into α0 and α1.
The first two columns of Table 3.2 contain the results of OLS models for the
one-year ahead expected sales growth (numbered from one to five according to in-
creasing levels of optimism). Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates for ordered logit
models for the same variable, while in column 5 we employ the categorical revision
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in expectations as an alternative dependent variable (post-pre COVID-19).27 For
the first two models, we present both a narrow and wide set of control variables
x̃i,t−1, while, for the last models, we present results only with the wide set of con-
trols. In all specifications, the geographical component of the shocks generated by
the COVID-19 outbreak plays a significant role, as firms located in a province with
a higher number of deaths are affected more negatively than firms in areas with
lower exposure. Our interpretation is that the more severe effects are related both
to the innovation in the actual and perceived severity of the crisis, as reflected in the
reported number of deaths and positive cases.28 Moreover, the negative effect of the
COVID-19 event is significantly attenuated if the firm is classified as essential. This
result underlines the importance of the restrictive measures on production taken by
the Italian government in shaping the economic effect of the COVID-19 outbreak.
Importantly, firms that were credit constrained before the outbreak are signif-
icantly more pessimistic about their future sales. This is consistent with firms
27 In this case, we define nine order categories based on the number of steps the revision can take. For
instance, going from the expectation of a change in prices between minus/plus 5% to being very
pessimistic (less than -15%) is a two step negative change.
28 We have experimented with several measures of the geographical intensity of the COVID-19 out-
break, in addition to the log of the imputed number of deaths at the provincial level. For instance,
we have tested whether log deaths and log population have coefficients which are equal in absolute
value and with opposite signs, in which case we could enter the log mortality rate as the only re-
gressor. We cannot reject this restriction for expected sale growth, but we reject it for expected price
growth. For this reason we have decided to present the specification in which the restriction is not
imposed. Moreover, we have also replaced the reported number of deaths with the number of actual
deaths in excess of those that occurred in the same month over the past ten years, which may be a
better measure of the actual mortality associated with COVID-19. This variable, independently from
how it is entered, is never significant, suggesting that part of the effects of Deathsi,t reflects the fact
that the number of deaths and cases (which we used in imputing to the province level the regional
number of deaths) were the figures that received the greater attention in the media. See Table B3
in Appendix C.2 for detailed results. In addition, in the Online Appendix we report a set of results
using the log of one plus the number of reported provincial cases as opposed to Deathsi,t. Our basic
conclusions still hold but the coefficients are somewhat less precisely estimated than the ones using
Deathsi,t.
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decreasing employment and investment due to the financial frictions they face
and, hence, decreasing production. This could be also consistent with financially-
constrained firms expecting lower price growth, but we will show below that this is
not the case. All these results are robust to the choice of the set of control variables.
Given the categorical nature of the variables, it is not straightforward to make state-
ments about the size of the effects. We will do so later in Table 3.4 when we use
continuous variables.29
In the first four columns where the dependent variables are the expectations
formed after the outbreak the sign of the coefficient of the categorical variable
suggests that firms with more pessimistic (optimistic) pre COVID-19 expectations
are more (less) likely to be pessimistic about post COVID-19 expected sales. In the
fifth column the sign of past expectations is reversed –as one would expect– because
the dependent variable is the revision in expectations. As for the other controls,
larger firms hold more optimistic expectations about sales. Given size, however,
younger firms are more optimistic about the future. The latter result is possibly
linked to the higher dynamism and capability of adaptation of young companies.
Finally, export-oriented firms hold more pessimistic expectations, possibly because
of the global nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the protectionist and
other restrictive measures adopted by national governments.
In Table 3.3 we analyze the effect of the COVID-19 event on domestic price plans.
In terms of included regressors, this specification is similar to the one in Table 3.2,
29 As a robustness check, we also run a multinomial logit model and the overall message is very similar
to one obtained in the case of the ordered logit model. See Table B4 in Appendix C.2.
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with the exception of having included lagged expected price changes, as opposed to
lagged sales growth, as a control. Since price expectations are continuous, we only
estimate an OLS specification. Also in this case, deaths at the province level and
credit constraints play an important role for domestic prices: everything else equal,
prices tend to be higher in provinces with a higher death rate or for financially con-
strained firms. The positive coefficient on Deathsi,t is consistent with supply shocks
being more important relatively to demand shocks in the geographical component
of the COVID-19 generated shocks. We have also included the essential status of
the firm, but its coefficient is never significant. This is somewhat surprising because
one might have thought that essential firms faced a less unfavorable cost shocks
compared to the non-essential ones. Among the additional controls, size is the only
variable that matters for domestic prices, while other variables are statistically not
significant.
Quantitatively, as deaths are expressed in units of standard deviation, the results
imply that a one-standard deviation increase in the log of deaths (approximately
five deaths) raises price growth by approximately 2.5 percentage points. Moreover,
a credit-rationed firm will increase price growth between four and six additional
percentage points compared to its non-rationed counterpart. This result is consis-
tent with previous theoretical and empirical work with price setting of financially
constrained firms. The basic logic is that financially-constrained companies are
more likely to put a premium on liquidity as opposed to building up the customer
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base by charging lower prices (see the seminal papers by Gottfries, 1991 and Cheva-
lier and Scharfstein, 1995, and the recent contribution by Gilchrist et al., 2017).30
In the regression model is somewhat surprising that past price plans are not sig-
nificant. Since the price variable is continuous, we have also tried a specification
in which the dependent variable is the difference between the post and pre COVID-
19 price plans. Results are reported in column three of the table and the results
confirm the conclusions we have reached so far.
In order to explore in more details the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, we
now move to Table 3.4 where we present OLS estimates for the same specification
of Table 3.2, but using a wider set of dependent variables: expected sales at three
and 12 months, expected orders, as well as plans for employment, investment in
tangibles, and investment in intangibles. These variables allow us to make more
precise statements regarding the quantitative effect of the COVID-19 pandemic as
they are effectively continuous and expressed in percentage points changes with
respect to the pre COVID-19 situation.
Overall, the estimates broadly confirm the results discussed so far. The number
of COVID-19 deaths has a negative and significant effect on short-term and long-
term sales expectations, but has a sizable impact also on orders and employment.
Everything else equal, a one-standard deviation increase in the (log) number of
provincial deaths leads to a reduction in firms’ expected sales growth of additional
1.7 percentage points, both in the short and in the long run. Similarly, the essential
30 See also Asplund et al. (2005), de Almeida (2015), Kimura (2013), Lundin et al. (2009), and Mon-
tero and Urtasun (2014) for additional evidence supporting this mechanism. Kim (2020), instead,
provides evidence that firms facing an adverse financial shock reduce prices in the short run to
liquidate inventories and generate cash flow, followed by a price increase in the medium run.
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designation is associated with significantly less negative outcomes, with a reduction
in the expected fall in sales of approximately ten percentage points.
Most importantly, being credit constrained negatively and significantly affects all
the variables, with only the investment in tangibles being significant at the 10%
level. The effect of financial frictions is particularly important over the next three
months, with a fall in expected sales for credit-constrained firms that is 15% greater
than the one for unconstrained companies. This difference is somewhat reduced
over the 12-months horizon, although it is still quite sizable (8%). Note that the
inclusion of past sales expectations as a control is perfectly appropriate for sales
expectations at 12 months and approximately so for the other dependent variables.
In terms of the additional controls, the important role of size and, sometimes, age
for many of the dependent variables is confirmed. Finally, the coefficients of family
ownership, import, or export status are very rarely significant.
Our results are robust to several variations. First of all, unweighted analyses
broadly confirm our conclusions, with a few exceptions that is worth highlighting
(see the Online Appendix, Tables C1-C3). While the effect of Deathsi,t is still positive
and sizable for prices, the effects on the other dependent variables are insignificant
in this framework. Note, however, that Deathsi,t will play a role for expected sales
even in the unweighted sample when interacted with credit constraints, as we will
discuss in Section 3.5.3. Moreover, the negative effect of Essentiali,t becomes more
significant in the price equation. In addition, results are also robust to: (i) removing
from the dataset the firms that did not report an actual figure for the minus/plus
five percent categories of the effectively continuous variables, instead of imputing
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to them a value of zero; (ii) using a common information set on Deathsi,t for all
firms (i.e., the imputed provincial deaths in the day that preceded the start of the
survey); (iii) controlling for provincial measures of social capital (log number of
blood donations per capita) and productivity (log value added per capita); (iv)
defining essential nature of the firms based on the March 11, 2020 government
classification instead of March 22, 2020 classification; and (v) clustering at the
industry level as opposed to the province level. See the Online Appendix for detailed
results.
3.5.2 More evidence on financial constraints
In this section we provide additional evidence on the role of financial factors and
bank relationship in investment, employment, and output decisions, and on the
determinants of financing constraints.
In Table 3.5 we replace the pre COVID-19 credit constraint dummy with a set of
firm-level balance-sheet variables and survey information on the nature of the firm-
bank relationship. More specifically, we introduced the past share of liquid assets
(Liquidityi,t−1), cash flow (Cash Flowi,t−1), the ratio between fixed assets and to-
tal assets (Tangible Assetsi,t−1), leverage (Leveragei,t−1), and net accounts payable
(Trade Crediti,t−1). Moreover, we also include the number of lender banks (N of
Lender Banksi,t−1), the length of the relationship with the main bank (Lending Re-
lationship yearsi,t−1), and the distance from the latter (Distance Lender Banki,t−1).
Across all dependent variables, the strongest association is with the stock of liquid
assets: firms that entered the pandemic outbreak with greater liquidity tend to have
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more favorable expectations and plans. Its effect is significant for sales expectations
at three and 12 months, orders, and employment. Interestingly, the coefficient of
liquidity is larger for expectations at a three-month horizon, emphasizing firms’
need of financial slack in order to survive and deal with the COVID-19 shock in the
short run. Liquidity is only significant at the 10% level for investment in intangibles
and not significant for tangible investments. The role of liquidity as a buffer against
falls in net revenue is very relevant from a policy perspective, as it underscores the
importance of lending facilities that provide liquidity to firms.
As for the other regressors, their effects are mostly non-significant. One exception
is asset tangibility, for which there is a sizable and significant positive association
with sales expectations over the next 12 months, and of the length of lending rela-
tionship that is significantly and positively associated with sales expectations over
a three-month horizon. The coefficient on leverage is mostly non-significant at con-
ventional levels, with the exception of the equation for employment where it has
a positive sign. A possible explanation for this fact is that leverage may not only
capture financial fragility, but may also be an indicator of access to credit. Finally,
the variable Essentiali,t is significant at the 1% level across all the dependent vari-
ables, while Deathsi,t remains strongly significant for sales over the next three and
12 months and orders, but less so for employment.
If we include the financial variables together with our proxy for financing con-
straints (all of them are lagged), the latter remains largely significant in almost all
specifications, while the former is not, with the exception of asset tangibility (see
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the Online Appendix for detailed results).31 When we also include bank relation-
ship variables (in which case the sample diminishes because they are available only
for a subset of the firms) the same result holds. We conclude that our proxy for
credit constraints does not merely summarize firms’ financial variables, but it also
contains information that goes beyond firm’s riskiness and creditworthiness as re-
flected by their balance sheets and other observables, such as size and age, and
even proxies for bank-firm relationships.
In Table 3.6 we investigate the determinants of being credit constrained after
the pandemic outbreak using a linear probability model. The dependent variable
is a dummy that equals one if in the COVID-19 survey the firm mentions credit
constraints as one of the main adverse factors it faces. The regressors are lagged
firms’ financial variables, bank relationship variables, pre COVID-19 proxy for credit
constraints, and other controls. Again, having liquidity at the end of 2018 is neg-
atively associated with a probability of being financially constrained and so is cash
flow received during the year. In the more general specification, highly-leveraged
companies have a significantly larger probability of being credit rationed after the
pandemic, while the ability to obtain trade credit reduces the likelihood of being
constrained.32 There is also persistence in the credit-constrained status in the sense
that past credit constraints (measured from the 2019 MET survey) increase the
probability of being constrained in the COVID-19 crisis, while bank-relationship
31 Our proxy for financing constraints is significant only at the 10% level in the base equation for prices,
but it is significant at the 1% level for non-essential firms in the interacted model.
32 Giannetti et al. (2011) suggest that trade credit is a relatively cheap form of finance for many Italian
firms. Their findings also challenge the idea that the use of trade credit signals the inability to access
bank credit.
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variables do not appear to play an important role. The coefficient on Deathsi,t re-
mains strongly significant while the essential status does not seem to have an effect,
which is somewhat surprising.
Overall, our evidence highlights the critical role of liquidity either for the proba-
bility of being constrained or for firms’ expectation and plans. Our results are con-
sistent with the evidence in Acharya and Steffen (2020) who show that during the
COVID-19 pandemic the US stock market had a higher valuation for firms with ac-
cess to liquidity through cash holdings and credit lines. Our evidence is also in line
with Ramelli and Wagner (2020) who stress the role of leverage and internal liquid-
ity as important value drivers following the COVID-19 outbreak. Finally, our results
are consistent with the general message in Jeenas (2018) who highlights liquidity
as an important determinant of the transmission of monetary policy to firms’ invest-
ment decision: firms with more liquid assets decrease investment less in response
to a contractionary monetary policy shock. All these results provide support for the
policy prescription discussed in Draghi (2020) who emphasizes the importance of
providing liquidity facilities to firms in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic to
avoid a deep recession. They are also supportive of the policy actions by the Italian
government that provide a guarantee for lending by banks to domestic firms.
3.5.3 Model with interactions
We now explore a richer specification of our model that allows for interactions
between financing constraints, the local severity of the COVID-19 pandemic, and
the essential designation of the firm. Adding these interactions allows the effect
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of credit constraints to differ geographically, as captured by deaths at the provin-
cial level, or by sectors as captured by the essential dummy (or later by other sec-
tor characteristics such as concentration and firms’ entry and exit). The estimated
equation is now:
Ei(yi,t+1|post COVID-19) = δ Ei(yi,t+1|pre COVID-19) + α0 + α1CCi,t−1
+ β1,0Deathsi,t + β1,1CCi,t−1 × Deathsi,t + β2,0Essentiali,t + β2,1CCi,t−1 × Essentiali,t
+ γ̃′x̃i,t−1 + λr + λs + εi,t
(3.3)
In Tables 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 we reproduce the specifications of the models in Tables
3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 with additional interaction terms. For sales, prices, and expec-
tations about factor demand the coefficients of these interaction terms tend to be
mostly not significant, which justifies our choice to start from the simpler version of
the model. Our fundamental conclusions are largely confirmed. Nevertheless there
are some very interesting exceptions. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction
between credit constraints and essential is significant in the ordered logit model for
sales, and in the continuous model for investment in tangibles and intangibles. The
coefficient of the interaction term between credit constraints and deaths is signif-
icant for the expectation of sales over the next three months. There is, therefore,
evidence that financing constraints amplify also the geographical or sectoral com-
ponent of the shocks. As far as prices are concerned, the geographical dimension
of the pandemic does not appear to be important in determining the effect of credit
constraints, while being essential reduces the effect of credit constraints on prices.
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A possible explanation is that non-essential firms expect to be in worse financial
shape and plan to have higher prices in order to generate liquidity.
If we compare these results with unweighted estimates, our conclusions are again
mostly unchanged. Note that in this case Deathsi,t, when interacted with credit con-
straints, plays a role for expected sales over the three-month horizon. In addition,
in the price equation, the coefficient of credit constraints interacted with Deathsi,t
is now significant, while the impact of the interaction of credit constraints with
Essentiali,t is not significant (see the Online Appendix, Tables C4-C6).
3.5.4 More on markup changes and COVID-19
So far, we have emphasized the role of credit constraints in the transmission of
the shocks and showed that constrained firms reduce sales and factor demand and
increase prices more in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. As discussed
in Section 3.2, financing constraints is just one of the mechanisms that lead to a
countercyclical markup. Another explanation can be based on collusive oligopoly
models. In that case, markups may be countercyclical because firms are less likely
to collude during booms: when demand is high the benefit from deviating from
the collusive equilibrium increases, hence the latter can only be supported if prices
and markups are low (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986; Rotemberg and Woodford,
1991; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1993). More-
over, when entry and exit is possible, the markup may be countercyclical because
changes in the number of firms over the cycle affect the degree of competitive-
ness in a sector. Therefore, in periods of low demand prices may rise relatively
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to marginal cost, while the opposite can occur in a boom (Chatterjee and Cooper,
1989; Chatterjee et al., 1993; Bilbiie et al., 2012).
In order to assess whether these explanations for countercyclical markup are in
play in the aftermath of the COVID-19 episode, we conduct a set of empirical ex-
ercises. Since the collusive oligopoly story is likely to be more relevant for con-
centrated sectors, we ask whether the coefficient of the sector dummies are sig-
nificantly related to measures of concentration such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index in 2018 (HHI).33 We start by focusing on the second column of Table 3.8 and
document that the coefficients of the sector dummies are significantly different from
one another (the p-value of this hypothesis is virtually zero). We then regress the
estimates of the two-digit effects on the HHI index and show that industrial concen-
tration is not significantly associated with the coefficients of the sectoral dummies
(the t-statistic equals -0.34). Similarly, there is no significant relationship between
the coefficients of the sectoral dummies and the demographic characteristics of a
sector. For instance, when we use churning (defined as the sum of exits and new
entries in 2018 as a proportion of the initial number of firms) in this regression
its coefficient is not significant (the t-statistic equals 0.01).34 The same is true if
we employ the mortality rate, instead, as the relevant measure of firms’ dynamics
during the downturn generated by the COVID-19 crisis. Finally, we do not find any
effect even when we test the joint significance of HHI and churning (the p-value
33 Note that the main effect of the concentration index at the two-digit level is captured by the sector
dummies. The HHI index is computed at the two-digit level on the universe of firms with balance
sheets in 2018.
34 We computed two-digit demographic indices (churning and mortality rate) from the universe of
registered companies in the 2018 Infocamere database.
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of the f-test equals 0.939). Therefore our analysis provides no evidence in favor
of a direct effect of these two mechanisms on the markup in the aftermath of the
COVID-19 outbreak.
As an additional exercise, we ask whether concentration or firms’ dynamics affect
the role of financing constraints in firms’ pricing strategies. In Table 3.10 we explore
a richer specification of Equation 3.3 that allows also for the interaction of financing
constraints with concentration and churning in the sector in which the firm oper-
ates. We find that credit-constrained firms in more concentrated markets tend to
have relatively higher price increases compared to their credit-constrained coun-
terparts in less concentrated markets. This is probably because those firms find it
easier to increase prices to boost liquidity in markets where they have greater mar-
ket power. Analogously, credit-constrained firms in markets with more churning
plan to rise prices relatively more. A way to rationalize this result is that firms op-
erating in a sector with higher probability of exit discount the future more and are
more willing to lose a share of their customers in order to boost current liquidity.
As neither concentration nor firm churning explain the effect of the sector dum-
mies, it appears that increases in the markup for firms that are not financially con-
strained is not the reason for expected price increases following the COVID-19 pan-
demic. Note that this set of firms represent the vast majority in our sample (82%).
Since in the aggregate we observe a mild increase in inflation, taken together these
results suggest that the increase in cost is marginally more important than the de-
crease in demand. It is likely that the COVID-19 crisis generated a substantial in-
crease in cost through several channels, as well as a large fall in demand, leading to
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moderate price changes. This result is consistent with the calibrated macro models
such as Baqaee and Farhi (2020b) and Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) that generate a
large fall in output and a moderate response of prices. Our evidence is also largely
consistent with those obtained by Bekaert et al. (2020) and Brinca et al. (2020)
who show the importance of both supply and demand shocks in determining the
response to COVID-19 outbreak using structural VAR models.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the effects of the Coronavirus outbreak on Italian firms
using unique survey data on pre and post COVID-19 expectations and plans. The
anticipated negative economic effect of the pandemic is amply confirmed. The
COVID-19 event is associated with a decrease in expected sales (at all horizons),
orders, employment, and investment, and with a large fraction of firms expecting
to charge higher prices.
There is strong evidence pointing to the importance of financial frictions in am-
plifying the effects of the shocks associated with the COVID-19 outbreak: credit-
constrained firms hold more pessimistic expectations about future sales and orders,
and plan to reduce employment and investment more, relatively to unconstrained
firms. In addition, those firms expect to increase prices more than firms that suf-
fer less from financial frictions. The search for and availability of liquidity is a key
determinant of firms’ plans in the aftermath of the negative shocks associated with
the Coronavirus pandemic. Moreover, our evidence shows that firms in areas more
severely affected by the COVID-19 epidemic and considered non-essential display
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more pessimistic expectations and plans. Finally, it appears that expected increases
in markups following the COVID-19 epidemic for firms that are not financially con-
strained (the vast majority of firms) is not the reason why we observe an increase
in prices. Thus, the large fall in sales and in factor demand, together with the
moderate increase in prices that we have observed is likely to be the result of the
COVID-19 crisis generating negative supply shocks that are quantitatively slightly
more important than the negative demand shocks.
There is much more to learn about the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak on firms’
strategies and decisions. Its effect will be felt not only on quantity and prices but
also on the very organization of the firm and on the nature of its relationship with
other firms. One important topic worth investigation is the effect of the COVID-
19 pandemic on the supply chain and on its domestic and international structure.
Another is its effect on the firms’ pricing strategies in export markets. These topics
are part of our research agenda, but they are left for future analysis.
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Figure 3.2: Pre and post COVID-19 expected price growth
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Figure 3.4: Post COVID-19 expected sales and price growth by credit-constrained
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Figure 3.6: Post COVID-19 expected sales growth by Deaths and by Essential des-
ignation
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Figure 3.7: Measures adopted in response to COVID-19 outbreak
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Joint distribution of revision in expected sales and price growth
Entire sample
∆REi,t(Pg) < 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) = 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) > 0
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) < 0 15.4% 24.7% 32.7%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) = 0 5.97% 10.6% 7.02%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) > 0 0.57% 1.32% 1.58%
Credit constrained
∆REi,t(Pg) < 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) = 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) > 0
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) < 0 17.3% 15.6% 42.5%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) = 0 5.79% 9.13% 6.02%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) > 0 1.04% 2.03% 0.65%
Not credit constrained
∆REi,t(Pg) < 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) = 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) > 0
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) < 0 15.1% 26.4% 31.0%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) = 0 5.99% 10.9% 7.20%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) > 0 0.49% 1.19% 1.74%
Deaths >= 75th pctile
∆REi,t(Pg) < 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) = 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) > 0
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) < 0 13.6% 23.6% 41.5%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) = 0 4.28% 6.47% 5.23%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) > 0 0.34% 1.30% 3.58 %
Deaths < 75th pctile
∆REi,t(Pg) < 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) = 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) > 0
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) < 0 16.1% 25.2% 29.2%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) = 0 6.65% 12.3% 7.74%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) > 0 0.66% 1.33% 0.76%
Essential
∆REi,t(Pg) < 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) = 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) > 0
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) < 0 14.1% 24.7% 31.0%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) = 0 7.67% 12.4% 6.55%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) > 0 0.39% 1.75% 1.38%
Not essential
∆REi,t(Pg) < 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) = 0 ∆REi,t(Pg) > 0
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) < 0 17.5% 24.8% 35.6%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) = 0 3.22% 7.82% 7.78%
∆REi,t(Salesg1Y) > 0 0.87% 0.62% 1.91%
Notes: ∆R Ei,t(Salesg1Y) denotes the revision in pre and post COVID-19 expectations for sales
growth; ∆R Ei,t(Pg) denotes the revisions in pre and post COVID-19 expectations for firm-level
price growth. Both variables refer to the 12-month horizon forecast.
154 CHAPTER 3. COVID-19 AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS
Table 3.2: Baseline Model for Expected Sales Growth
Model OLS Ordered Logit
Dependent variable: Ei,t(Salesg1Y) Ei,t(Salesg1Y) Ei,t(Salesg1Y) Ei,t(Salesg1Y) ∆REi,t(Salesg1Y)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deaths -0.0484*** -0.0466*** -0.123** -0.122** -0.118**
[0.0180] [0.0177] [0.0551] [0.0554] [0.0524]
Essential 0.407*** 0.396*** 1.140*** 1.123*** 1.111***
[0.0508] [0.0535] [0.148] [0.160] [0.149]
Credit constrained -0.194** -0.187** -0.668** -0.667** -0.553**
[0.0834] [0.0774] [0.293] [0.273] [0.225]
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Very Negative -0.290** -0.306*** -1.051* -1.118* 4.661***
[0.117] [0.116] [0.603] [0.595] [0.391]
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Negative -0.356*** -0.353*** -1.173*** -1.155*** 1.553***
[0.0738] [0.0715] [0.273] [0.261] [0.187]
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Positive 0.0633 0.0720 0.176 0.206 -2.623***
[0.0670] [0.0714] [0.172] [0.190] [0.250]
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Very Positive 0.356** 0.371* 0.635 0.702 -5.018***
[0.178] [0.189] [0.412] [0.448] [0.619]
Size 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.332*** 0.345*** 0.348***
[0.0172] [0.0182] [0.0530] [0.0565] [0.0524]
Age -0.111*** -0.101*** -0.328*** -0.304*** -0.287***
[0.0330] [0.0317] [0.0967] [0.0942] [0.0962]
Population 0.0198 0.0188 0.0378 0.0296 0.0354
[0.0319] [0.0318] [0.0978] [0.0987] [0.0917]
Import -0.00289 0.0341 0.0109
[0.0651] [0.190] [0.188]
Export -0.210*** -0.634*** -0.640***
[0.0573] [0.169] [0.161]
Group 0.108 0.257 0.346
[0.107] [0.302] [0.311]
Family Firm -0.0941 -0.223 -0.228
[0.0649] [0.181] [0.187]
% Graduated Empl. -0.00117 -0.00356 -0.00358
[0.00103] [0.00299] [0.00302]
R&D 0.0710 0.195 0.180
[0.0653] [0.194] [0.180]
Region FE X X X X X
Industry (2 Digit) FE X X X X X
R-squared (Pseudo R2) 0.257 0.270 (0.145) (0.153) (0.244)
N obs. 5008 5008 5008 5008 5008
Notes: Ei,t(Salesg1Y) denotes the post COVID-19 expectations for sales growth over a 12-month
horizon. For the definition of the explanatory variables see Table C.1. Weighted OLS and ordered
logistic estimates. Standard error (in square brackets) clustered at the province level. *, **, ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Baseline Model for Expected Price Growth
Dependent variable: Ei,t(Pg) Ei,t(Pg) ∆REi,t(Pg)
(1) (2) (3)
Deaths 2.662*** 2.529*** 2.805***
[0.889] [0.815] [0.840]
Essential -1.813 -2.189 -2.578
[2.668] [2.485] [2.705]




Size -1.016*** -0.880** -1.030***
[0.345] [0.371] [0.363]
Age -0.833 -0.712 -0.350
[1.039] [1.110] [1.083]








Family Firm -0.303 -0.271
[1.130] [1.143]




Region FE X X X
Industry (2 Digit) FE X X X
R-squared 0.185 0.197 0.209
N obs. 4886 4886 4886
Notes: Ei,t(P g) denotes the post COVID-19 expectations for firm-level price over a 12-month hori-
zon. For the definition of the explanatory variables see Table C.1. Weighted OLS estimates. Standard
error (in square brackets) clustered at the province level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Baseline Model for Continuous Measures for Sales, Orders, Employment,
and Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ei,t(Salg3M) Ei,t(Salg1Y) Ei,t(Ordg) Ei,t(Empg) Ei,t(Tang) Ei,t(Intg)
Deaths -1.774*** -1.731*** -1.933*** -1.571** -1.554 -0.260
[0.614] [0.452] [0.481] [0.664] [1.250] [0.740]
Essential 10.45*** 8.900*** 6.733*** 4.495** 10.41*** 8.706***
[1.768] [1.586] [1.742] [1.741] [2.838] [2.325]
Credit constrained -14.86*** -7.856*** -10.17*** -7.830** -4.878* -5.556**
[3.600] [2.361] [2.746] [3.073] [2.586] [2.235]
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Very Negative -10.59* -15.22*** -13.56** -14.48*** -21.15*** -15.33**
[6.347] [5.376] [5.651] [5.251] [7.716] [7.350]
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Negative -3.365 -13.15*** -14.44*** -6.536** -12.49*** -10.32***
[5.477] [3.925] [3.994] [2.654] [3.646] [3.448]
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Positive 6.804 0.439 -2.762 -0.756 -7.633** -3.681
[4.479] [2.707] [2.817] [2.460] [2.962] [2.747]
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Very Positive 7.965* 1.571 -1.391 0.544 -3.839 -4.677
[4.600] [3.106] [3.097] [2.487] [3.064] [3.273]
Size 3.007*** 2.775*** 2.504*** 0.887*** 1.228* 0.892
[0.580] [0.573] [0.410] [0.324] [0.635] [0.632]
Age -1.724** -2.289** -2.727*** 0.245 -0.602 2.199
[0.861] [0.937] [0.971] [1.355] [1.033] [1.411]
Population -1.108 -0.971 -0.192 -1.431* -0.876 -1.443
[1.209] [1.228] [1.407] [0.858] [1.027] [0.987]
Import -3.535* -1.329 0.0889 -2.042 -2.620 -1.093
[2.083] [1.526] [1.717] [1.287] [2.511] [2.755]
Export -5.090*** -1.586 -1.596 0.439 -3.165 -2.180
[1.775] [1.541] [2.004] [1.217] [2.834] [2.243]
Group -0.0153 0.386 -2.613 1.389 1.960 2.374
[2.616] [2.616] [2.408] [1.405] [2.248] [2.143]
Family Firm -1.734 -2.492* -1.930 -1.007 -1.759 -0.800
[1.536] [1.303] [1.385] [1.341] [2.195] [2.130]
% Graduated Empl. 0.0446 -0.00703 0.000901 -0.0130 -0.0233 0.0451*
[0.0306] [0.0283] [0.0270] [0.0333] [0.0289] [0.0266]
R&D -0.0632 -0.201 -3.057* 2.852** -1.322 2.712
[1.756] [1.331] [1.745] [1.416] [2.506] [1.703]
Region FE X X X X X X
Industry (2 Digit) FE X X X X X X
R-squared 0.317 0.309 0.272 0.262 0.200 0.197
N obs. 5008 5007 5007 5007 5004 5003
Notes: Ei,t(Y ) denotes the post COVID-19 expectations for variable Y . Sal3Mg denotes expected
sales growth at a three-month horizon, Sal1Yg denotes expected sales growth at a 12-month horizon.
Ordg, Empg, Tang, and Intg denote the 12-month growth rate for orders, employment, investment in
tangible assets, and investment in intangible assets. For the definition of the explanatory variables
see Table C.1. Weighted OLS estimates. Standard error (in square brackets) clustered at the province
level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Financial Constraints and firms’ expectations and plans: using Firms’
Financial Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ei,t(Salg3M) Ei,t(Salg1Y) Ei,t(Ordg) Ei,t(Empg) Ei,t(Tang) Ei,t(Intg)
Deaths -1.623** -1.469** -2.080*** -1.800*** -1.266 0.297
[0.810] [0.619] [0.679] [0.656] [1.198] [0.870]
Essential 11.02*** 9.137*** 6.700*** 4.732*** 10.84*** 8.709***
[1.587] [1.648] [1.862] [1.598] [2.938] [2.521]
Liquidity 8.112*** 5.275** 8.010*** 5.804** 4.388 4.451*
[2.370] [2.329] [2.468] [2.901] [2.962] [2.473]
Cash Flow -7.683 0.373 1.673 11.19* -3.093 -3.710
[6.728] [4.740] [5.358] [5.982] [6.989] [7.455]
Tangible Assets 4.563 7.925** 5.229 -0.113 2.523 -0.384
[4.930] [3.369] [3.889] [4.547] [5.502] [4.472]
Leverage -0.0747 -0.0592 0.0805* 0.107** -0.0412 -0.000812
[0.0647] [0.0631] [0.0475] [0.0526] [0.0735] [0.0626]
N of Lender Banks -3.722 -1.380 -2.209 -2.393 -0.988 1.150
[2.811] [2.785] [2.830] [2.001] [3.236] [2.590]
Lending Relationship (Years) 3.321** 0.796 1.696 1.566 0.284 0.577
[1.478] [1.308] [1.695] [1.185] [1.592] [1.462]
Distance lender bank -0.162 0.742 -0.396 -0.0489 0.425 0.961
[0.692] [0.660] [0.654] [0.946] [0.857] [0.840]
Trade Credit -1.688 -5.250 1.852 3.452 0.313 -6.311
[5.213] [4.962] [5.109] [3.930] [5.831] [7.177]
Region FE X X X X X X
Industry (2 Digit) FE X X X X X X
Wide controls X X X X X X
R-squared 0.325 0.320 0.272 0.294 0.200 0.195
N obs. 4709 4708 4708 4708 4705 4704
Notes: For variable definition see Table 3.4. For the definition of the explanatory variables see Table
C.1. Weighted OLS estimates. Standard error (in square brackets) clustered at the province level. *,
**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Determinants of Post COVID-19 Financial Constraints
Dependent Variable: Credit constrained (Post COVID-19)
(1) (2) (3)
Deaths 0.0210 0.0206 0.0202
[0.0182] [0.0192] [0.0198]
Essential -0.0000649 0.00376 0.00881
[0.0450] [0.0437] [0.0408]
Liquidity -0.433*** -0.353*** -0.303***
[0.0979] [0.0890] [0.0938]
Cash Flow -0.151*** -0.152*** -0.143***
[0.0332] [0.0310] [0.0290]
Leverage 0.00164* 0.00142 0.00172**
[0.000916] [0.000864] [0.000789]
Trade Credit -0.213* -0.200* -0.245**
[0.112] [0.111] [0.109]
Tangible Assets -0.0770 -0.0690 -0.0930
[0.0854] [0.0881] [0.0872]
Size -0.0225 -0.0154 -0.0265
[0.0153] [0.0146] [0.0171]
Age 0.0227 0.0202 0.0221
[0.0254] [0.0249] [0.0228]
Group -0.0721 -0.0803 -0.0809
[0.0565] [0.0526] [0.0521]
Credit constrained 0.171*** 0.198***
[0.0535] [0.0562]
N of Lender Banks 0.105*
[0.0539]
Lending Relationship (Years) -0.0199
[0.0275]
Distance with lender bank 0.000422
[0.0169]
Region FE X X X
Industry (2 Digit) FE X X X
Lender Bank FE X X X
Wide controls X X X
Pseudo R-squared 0.144 0.170 0.182
N obs. 4693 4693 4613
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable representing whether or not the firm is finan-
cially constrained. Logit marginal effects for weighted sample. Standard error (in square brackets)
clustered at the province level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
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Table 3.7: Model with Interactions for Expected Sales Growth
Model OLS Ordered Logit
Dependent variable: Ei,t(Salesg1Y) Ei,t(Salesg1Y) Ei,t(Salesg1Y) Ei,t(Salesg1Y) ∆REi,t(Salesg1Y)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deaths -0.0587*** -0.0552** -0.144** -0.138** -0.146**
[0.0219] [0.0214] [0.0694] [0.0703] [0.0681]
Essential 0.385*** 0.374*** 1.041*** 1.023*** 1.050***
[0.0581] [0.0617] [0.163] [0.175] [0.170]
Credit constrained -0.347*** -0.327*** -1.448*** -1.391*** -0.956***
[0.0922] [0.0891] [0.343] [0.332] [0.226]
Constrained × Deaths 0.0818 0.0663 0.209 0.154 0.195
[0.0600] [0.0556] [0.211] [0.211] [0.177]
Constrained × Essential 0.155 0.153 0.925** 0.906** 0.434
[0.143] [0.140] [0.442] [0.441] [0.382]
Region FE X X X X X
Industry (2 Digit) FE X X X X X
Wide Controls X X X X X
R-squared (Pseudo R2) 0.259 0.272 (0.147) (0.155) (0.245)
N obs. 5008 5008 5008 5008 5008
Notes: Weighted OLS and ordered logistic estimates. Standard error (in square brackets) clustered at
the province level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.8: Model with Interactions for Expected Price Growth
Dependent variable: Ei,t(Pg) Ei,t(Pg) ∆REi,t(Pg)
(1) (2) (3)
Deaths 2.701*** 2.518*** 2.600***
[0.957] [0.863] [0.847]
Essential -0.980 -1.390 -1.727
[2.677] [2.456] [2.579]
Credit constrained 11.27** 10.37** 9.832*
[4.662] [4.861] [5.297]
Constrained × Deaths -0.718 -0.109 2.020
[1.693] [1.625] [1.512]




Region FE X X X
Industry (2 Digit) FE X X X
Wide Controls X X X
R-squared 0.192 0.202 0.216
N obs. 4886 4886 4886
Notes: Weighted OLS estimates. Standard error (in square brackets) clustered at the province level.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.9: Model with Interactions for Continuous Measures for Sales, Orders,
Employment, and Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ei,t(Salg3M) Ei,t(Salg1Y) Ei,t(Ordg) Ei,t(Empg) Ei,t(Tang) Ei,t(Intg)
Deaths -0.581 -1.744*** -1.765*** -1.448* -1.727 -0.227
[0.573] [0.544] [0.581] [0.809] [1.147] [0.696]
Essential 9.459*** 7.895*** 5.815*** 5.345*** 8.505*** 6.908***
[1.765] [1.613] [1.754] [1.737] [3.053] [2.454]
Credit constrained -10.67* -12.10*** -12.80** -3.471 -13.96** -12.75**
[5.424] [4.447] [4.972] [3.947] [6.428] [5.712]
Constrained × Deaths -8.954*** 0.240 -1.148 -1.056 1.593 0.00685
[2.987] [1.981] [2.268] [2.850] [2.761] [2.292]
Constrained × Essential 5.227 7.092 6.211 -6.153 13.67** 12.60**
[6.856] [5.389] [5.862] [5.386] [5.530] [5.272]
Region FE X X X X X X
Industry (2 Digit) FE X X X X X X
Wide Controls X X X X X X
R-squared 0.333 0.312 0.275 0.265 0.206 0.203
N obs. 5008 5007 5007 5007 5004 5003
Notes: Weighted OLS estimates. Standard error (in square brackets) clustered at the province level.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.10: Model with Additional Interactions for Expected Price Growth
Dependent variable: Ei,t(Pg) Ei,t(Pg) ∆REi,t(Pg)
(1) (2) (3)
Deaths 2.698*** 2.514*** 2.595***
[0.963] [0.870] [0.853]
Essential -0.850 -1.288 -1.617
[2.699] [2.464] [2.583]
Credit constrained -2.085 -3.848 -6.606
[5.201] [5.198] [6.670]
Constrained × Deaths -1.521 -0.880 1.461
[1.647] [1.608] [1.578]
Constrained × Essential -10.82** -9.944** -9.999*
[4.209] [4.383] [5.429]
Constrained × Concentration 3.483*** 3.347*** 3.033**
[0.991] [1.061] [1.165]




Region FE X X X
Industry (2 Digit) FE X X X
Wide Controls X X X
R-squared 0.202 0.213 0.226
N obs. 4877 4877 4877
Notes: Weighted OLS estimates. Standard error (in square brackets) clustered at the province level.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Appendix A
Financial and Uncertainty Shocks
A.1 Firm-level evidence
A.1.1 Supportive evidence
I now provide reduced-form cross-sectional evidence that supports the empirical
relevance of Proposition 1.1. Using Compustat data, I document how firms’ cash
management is differently affected by changes in firm-specific credit conditions and
changes in firm-specific uncertainty. Firm-specific credit conditions are proxied by
the Interest Ratei,t measured as the total interest and related expenses over total
liabilities. This ratio is an average interest rate paid by firm i at time t and is
aimed to capture possible changes in the cost of external finance. Firm-specific
Uncertaintyi,t is defined as the standard deviation of income before extraordinary
items over the past 16 quarters. As suggested by Han and Qiu (2007), this measure
is aimed to capture future expected cash flow risk at a firm level.
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With those two measures in hand, the objective is to estimate their relation with
firm-level corporate Cashi,t holdings measured as cash and short-term investments
over total assets. I estimate the following regression,
Cashi,t = α + βf Interest Ratei,t + βuUncertaintyi,t + γWWi,t + λi + λt + εi,t
where Wi,t is a vector of controls that contains the lagged values of Cashi,t−1 and the
log of total Assetsi,t−1. Wi,t also contains the log of Long-Term Debti,t and the Long-
Term Debt Ratioi,t (Long-Term Debti,t over Assetsi,t) to control for changes in the
duration of firm i’s liabilities, and Incomei,t before extraordinary items to control
for idiosyncratic first-moment real shocks. Finally, I also control for λi and λt which
represent firm fixed effects and time fixed effects, respectively. Residual εi,t is a
firm-level time-varying innovation assumed to be uncorrelated with Interest Ratei,t
and Uncertaintyi,t. See Appendix A.1 for details on data sources and construction.
The hypothesis to be tested is whether the sign of βf is significantly negative and
the sign of βu is significantly positive. Baseline results are presented in Table A.1.
The table shows strong evidence favoring the mechanism that a worsening in credit
conditions — a rise in Interest Ratei,t — is associated with a fall in corporate Cashi,t
holdings, while an increase in risk — a rise in Uncertaintyi,t — is related to an
increase in corporate Cashi,t. Results are robust using different sets of controls and
including utility and financial firms in the sample.
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Table A.1: Firm-level evidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Cashi,t Cashi,t Cashi,t Cashi,t Cashi,t Cashi,t
Interest Ratei,t -0.452*** -0.182*** -0.208*** -0.187*** -0.179*** -0.167***
(0.0440) (0.0517) (0.0605) (0.0611) (0.0556) (0.0539)
Uncertaintyi,t 0.0152*** 0.0150*** 0.0156*** 0.0131*** 0.0164*** 0.0206***
(0.00388) (0.00388) (0.00388) (0.00381) (0.00354) (0.00336)
Cashi,t−1 0.847*** 0.844*** 0.844*** 0.844*** 0.845*** 0.848***
(0.00422) (0.00431) (0.00432) (0.00432) (0.00396) (0.00383)
Assetsi,t−1 -0.0763*** 0.148*** 0.162*** 0.150*** 0.0725** 0.0770**
(0.0152) (0.0343) (0.0428) (0.0435) (0.0370) (0.0363)
Long-Term Debti,t -0.189*** -0.206*** -0.212*** -0.155*** -0.189***
(0.0242) (0.0354) (0.0353) (0.0304) (0.0300)
Long-term debt ratioi,t 0.156 0.206 -0.195 0.0465
(0.185) (0.184) (0.132) (0.128)
Incomei,t 0.0123*** 0.0117*** 0.0119***
(0.00324) (0.00294) (0.00269)
Firm fixed effects λi 3 3 3 3 3 3
Quarter fixed effects λt 3 3 3 3 3 3
Utility firms 7 7 7 7 3 3
Financial firms 7 7 7 7 7 3
Observations 62,014 62,014 62,014 62,014 75,213 82,725
Adj. R-squared 0.801 0.802 0.802 0.802 0.803 0.810
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors.
A.1.2 Data sources and other details
• Software: Stata 15.1 SE
• Data from Compustat (Wharton Reseach Data Service via Boston College af-
filiation) at a quarterly frequency. Data range 2004:Q1-2018Q4.
• Keep final reports, remove double observations and observations where to-
tal assets (atq), cash (chq), cash and short-term investment (cheq), interest
rate expenses (xintq), long-term debt (dlttq), or total liabilities (ltq) are non-
positive or missing.
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• Define corporate cash holdings over total assets Cashi,t as cash and short-term
investments (cheq) over total assets (atq) of firm i at time t. Definition is from
the literature.
• Define Interest ratei,t as total interest and related expense (xintq) over total
liabilities (ltq) of firm i at time t.
• Define Uncertaintyi,t as the standard deviation of income before extraordinary
items (ibq) over the past four years (16 quarters) of firm i at time t over 1000
(Han and Qiu, 2007).
• Define Assetsi,t as the log of total assets (atq) over 100; Long-Term Debti,t as
the log of long-term debt (dlttq) over 100; Long-Term Debt Ratioi,t as long-
term debt (dlttq) over total liabilities (ltq) over 100; Incomei,t as income be-
fore extraordinary items (ibq) over 1000.
• Run a series of distinct panel regressions with firm and time fixed effects
to detect outliers from the residuals of Cashi,t, Interest ratei,t, Uncertaintyi,t,
Assetsi,t, Long-Term Debti,t, Long-Term Debt Ratioi,t, and Incomei,t, cash and
short-term investment (cheq), and total liabilities (ltq). Remove observations
if the related residuals on at least one regression is below the 5th percentile
or above the 95th percentile.
• At this point, 62,014 observations are left.
• Run the regressions presented in Section A.1.1 using the package reghdfe
with robust standard errors.
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A.1.3 Comparison with existing firm-level evidence
Results presented above are consistent with a large set of existing firm-level evi-
dence that studies the relation between corporate cash with financial conditions or
uncertainty.
In the case of financial conditions, Keynes (1973) argued that the relevance of
holding cash is influenced by the extent to which firms have access to external
capital markets: if firms are financially constrained, a more liquid balance sheet al-
lows firms to undertake valuable projects when they arise. For example, Campello
et al. (2010) gather firm-level information using a survey of 1050 CFOs in the forth
quarter of 2008. Their approach provides the opportunity to directly ask managers
whether their decisions have been affected by the cost or availability of credit. They
find that firms that report themselves as being financially constrained systematically
planned to store less cash in order to use it as an internally generated source of fi-
nance. Specifically, corporate cash in those firms significantly decrease by 3% while
cash holdings in unconstrained firms remain unchanged. In addition, Lins et al.
(2010) use a 2005 survey of CFOs and ask whether firms opt for storing additional
non-operational cash. Among a different set of answers, CFOs state that cash re-
serves act as a buffer against future cash flow shortfalls and how much should be
stored depends on the interest rates and time needed to rise funds. Finally, Lins
et al. (2010) also show that non-operational aggregate cash holdings are positively
related to private credit-to-GDP, suggesting that when aggregate credit constraints
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are tight firms tend to draw down relatively more cash as a substitute for the lack
of external finance.
In the case of uncertainty, existing firm-level evidence suggests that firms hold
more cash in response to higher cash flow risks due to a precautionary motive. For
example, the empirical evidence by Opler et al. (1999) suggests that firms tend
to hold more liquid assets if their industry average cash flow volatility is higher.
Analogously to the results presented in Table A.1, Han and Qiu (2007), among
others, show that higher cash flow volatility is associated with an increase in the
stock of corporate cash holdings. Moreover, the empirical evidence presented by
Bates et al. (2009) suggests that the medium-run increase in cash ratios can largely
be explained by the change in firms’ characteristics. In particular, the evidence
is consistent with the view that the precautionary motive is a key determinant of
the demand for cash. Finally, Alfaro et al. (2018) use U.S. firm-level data to show
that firms accumulate cash reserves and short-term liquid instruments following an
uncertainty hike.
I interpret those results, together with the partial equilibrium model presented
in Section 1.2.1, as as robust support for my identifying assumption. In addition,
in Section 2.3, I will embed the partial equilibrium model in a New Keynesian
framework and show that the intuition and results are robust after controlling for
general equilibrium forces.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2





















where σ2i,j represents the covariance between variable i and variable j. After elimi-
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then A = CD can be rewritten as,
A =

c1,1γ1,1 c1,1γ1,2 · · ·
c2,1γ1,1 + c2,2γ2,1 c2,1γ1,2 + c2,2γ2,2 · · ·
c3,1γ1,1 + c3,2γ2,1 + c3,3γ3,1 c3,1γ1,2 + c3,2γ2,2 + c3,3γ3,2 · · ·
 (A.1)
where the first column represents the impact effect of the first and second shock on
financial conditions ft, measured uncertainty ut, and the cash holdings x
f
t , respec-
tively. The third column, which represents the impact responses of the endogenous
variables to other shocks, is omitted because, as discussed above, independent to
the identification of financial and uncertainty shocks.
Then, Problems 1.3 and 1.4 can be rewritten as follows
max
γ1,1,γ2,1,γ3,1
(1− δ)c1,1γ1,1 − δ[c3,1γ1,1 + c3,2γ2,1 + c3,3γ3,1]




(1− δ)[c2,1γ1,2 + c2,2γ2,2] + δ[c3,1γ1,2 + c3,2γ2,2 + c3,3γ3,2]
subject to (γ1,2)2 + (γ2,2)2 + (γ3,2)2 = 1.
where d∗1(δ) and d
∗
2(δ) are the respective solutions for financial and uncertainty
shocks that, for a given δ, are uniquely identified.
The first order conditions of Problem 1.3 are:
i. γ1,1 : (1− δ)c1,1 − δc3,1 = 2λγ∗1,1
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ii. γ2,1 : −δc3,2 = 2λγ∗2,1
iii. γ3,1 : −δc3,3 = 2λγ∗3,1




where λ1 is the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint.




3,1 = 0 where the impact effect on
financial conditions ft is σf which is the result of a Cholesky identification where ft
is placed on top. As a result, if δ = 0 then εft = i
f


























which delivers an impact effect on corporate cash xft of −σx. As a result, if δ = 1
then εut = −ixt which is the result of a Cholesky identification where x
f
t is placed on
top with opposite sign.
The first order conditions of Problem 1.4 are:
i. γ1,2 : (1− δ)c2,1 + δc3,1 = 2λγ∗1,2
ii. γ2,2 : (1− δ)c2,2 + δc3,2 = 2λγ∗2,2
iii. γ3,2 : δc3,3 = 2λγ∗3,2
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where λ2 is the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint.














where the impact effect on measured uncertainty ut is σu which is the result of a
Cholesky identification where ut is placed on top. As a result, if δ = 0 then εut = i
u
t .


























which delivers an impact effect on the liquidity ration xft of σx. As a result, if δ = 1
then εut = i
x
t which is the result of a Cholesky identification where x
f
t is placed on
top.
Now if δ = 0, then d∗1(δ = 0)








t ) > 0. While,
if δ = 1, then d∗1(δ = 1)




t ) = Corr(ixt ,−ixt ) = −1. Since
both d∗1(δ) and d
∗
2(δ) are continuous functional vectors in δ, it follows that also their
product d∗1(δ)
′d∗2(δ) is continuous in δ. This implies that d
∗
1(δ)
′d∗2(δ) must cross the
zero line at least once in the δ support [0, 1].
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A.3 Proposition 3
Proposition 3 If Cov(iut , i
f
t ) = σuσf then solution δ∗, d∗1, and d
∗
2 exists and is unique.
Proof. Notice that Cov(iut , i
f
t ) = σuσf directly implies that Corr(iut , i
f
t ) is equal to
one. This entails that the system is collapsing because the information to identify
impact matrix A provided by ut already includes all the information provided by
ft and viceversa. As a result, I will shrink the system to be bidimensional where
the first series of innovations i1t is equal to the innovations in both measured uncer-
tainty iut and financial conditions i
f
t with standard deviation σ1; while the second
series of innovations i2t is equal to the innovations in corporate cash i
x
t with standard
deviation σx. As before, I am interested in identifying the first two structural distur-
bances: financial shocks εFt and uncertainty shocks ε
U
t . Identifying assumptions are
the same: financial shocks εFt have a positive impact effect on i
1
t (first variable) and
a negative impact effect on i2t (second variable), while uncertainty shocks ε
U
t have
a positive impact effect on both reduced-form innovations i1t and i
2
t .















where, as before, CC ′ = Σ. Given orthogonal matrix D, impact matrix A is
A =
 c1,1γ1,1 c1,1γ1,2
c2,1γ1,1 + c2,2γ2,1 c2,1γ1,2 + c2,2γ2,2


























Although results remain perfectly symmetric, consider the case where the impact
responses to an uncertainty shock are represented by the first column of Matrix A,
and the impact responses to a financial shock are represented by the second column















s.t. 1 ≥ γ21,1 + γ22,1
and optimality conditions are





































2 − (γ∗2,1)2 = 1 (A.4)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint. The following results will be
useful to complete the proof:
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• Equation A.2 implies that
1. γ∗1,1 ≥ 0 for all δ ≥ 0 if σ21,2 ≥ 0.
2. It exists δ̄ such that γ∗1,1 ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ̄ if σ21,2 ≤ 0.
• Equation A.3 implies γ∗2,1 ≥ 0 for all δ ≥ 0.


















































































s.t. 1 ≥ γ21,2 + γ22,2
(A.5)
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and optimality conditions are









































)2 − (γ∗2,2)2] = 0 (A.8)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint. The following results will be
useful to complete the proof:
• Equation A.6 implies that
1. γ∗1,2 ≥ 0 for all δ ≥ 0 if σ21,2 ≤ 0.
2. It exists δ̄ such that γ∗1,2 ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ̄ if σ21,2 ≥ 0.
• Equation A.7 implies γ∗2,2 ≤ 0 for all δ ≥ 0.














A.3. PROPOSITION ?? 193























































Notice that there exist two possible cases to focus on: 1. δ ≤ δ̄ and 2. δ > δ̄. Proof
proceeds as follows: I show that case 1. has a unique solution and case 2. has no
solutions. In addition, since the problem is symmetric over d1 and d2 is irrelevant
whether I focus on σ1,2 ≥ 0 or σ1,2 ≤ 0. Proof holds symmetrically in either cases.
For simplicity I assume σ1,2 ≥ 0.








since γ∗1,1 = γ
∗






















2,2 is a continuous function of δ.
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are positive, and since
γ∗1,1
γ∗2,1
is decreasing in δ then it must be the case that γ∗1,1
is decreasing in δ and γ∗2,1 is increasing in δ. Since γ
∗






is increasing in δ then it must be the case that γ∗1,2 is
decreasing in δ and |γ∗2,2| is increasing in δ. As a result, we have (↓ γ∗1,1)(↓
γ∗1,2) − (↑ γ∗2,1)(↑ |γ∗2,2|) which implies that when δ ≤ δ̄, then γ∗1,1γ∗1,2 + γ∗2,1γ∗2,2
is monotonically decreasing in δ which implies that the solution in this area is
unique.






2,2 is never equal to zero. This happens because







2,2 < 0 ∀ δ > δ̄.
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A.4 Estimation on simulated data
In order to test the reliability of the econometric procedure presented in Section
1.3, I simulate data from the model presented in Section 2.3 and employ my econo-
metric strategy in order to recover unobservable financial and uncertainty shocks
from the observable endogenous variables. To be in line with the empirical applica-
tion presented in Section 1.4, I simulate 2000 series with 137 observations where
financial and uncertainty shocks are i.i.d. observations across shocks and over time
from a standard normal distribution.2 I assume the econometrician can only ob-
serve endogenous variables such as measured uncertainty ut, the credit spread as
a proxy for financial conditions ft and the liquidity ratio xt, and cannot observe
exogenous processes such as financial intermediaries’ fixed cost χt and variance
of technology shocks σt together with their underlying shocks. Following Jurado
et al. (2015), I define measured uncertainty as ut = Et{[yt − Et(yt)]2}. In addi-
tion, in order to capture an endogenous variable for financial conditions, I define
ft = 0.5āt + 0.5āt+1 +ϕt. Note that both variables display a positive impact effect to
financial and uncertainty shocks reproducing the simultaneity observed in the data.
For each simulation, I build a reduced-form VAR composed by measured uncer-
tainty ut, credit spread ft, corporate cash x
f
t , output yt, shadow values ξt/νt, in-
flation πt, total cash x̄t, and policy rate Rt. As suggested by the AIC, BIC and HQ
2 For simplicity, I do not simulate technology shocks because of the empirical observation that the
residuals of the excess bond premium by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) and of measured uncertainty
by Jurado et al. (2015) are already orthogonal to unanticipated technology shocks. In any case, if
technology shocks are simulated together with financial and uncertainty shocks, it will be sufficient
to control for the residuals in measured productivity before employing the econometric strategy
presented in Section 1.3.
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Figure A.1: Correlation between actual shocks εt and estimated shocks ε̂t
(a) Uncertainty shocks (b) Financial shocks
criteria I use one lag to obtain a (8 × 8) variance-covariance matrix Σ of reduced-
form innovations it. Finally, making the same assumptions shown in Matrix ?? and
remaining agnostic on the response of the remaining macro variables, I employ the
same econometric strategy presented in Definition 1. Figure A.1b shows the cor-
relation between actual financial shocks εFt and estimated ones ε̂
F
t and in most of
the cases the correlation is above 90% with an average of 96%. Similarly, Figure
A.1a shows the correlation between actual uncertainty shocks εUt and estimated
ones ε̂Ut and in most of the cases the correlation is above 90% with an average of
96% as well. At the same time, Figure A.2 shows the model-implied true responses
together with the estimated ones on simulated data for both financial and uncer-
tainty shocks. The econometric strategy does a good job in estimating the actual
responses to the two shocks since, in almost all the cases, the actual responses lie
within the confidence interval of the estimated ones.
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Figure A.2: Model-implied responses and estimated responses on simulated data
(a) Financial shocks
(b) Uncertainty shocks
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A.5 Comparison with sign restrictions
In Figure A.3, I compare the identification strategy presented in Section 1.3 with
sign restrictions. Using the same simulated data used to obtain Figure A.2, I imple-
ment the following algorithm. For each simulation s, draw Cs using the Cholesky
decomposition. Then, draw a random orthogonal matrix Q such that Q′Q is an
identity matrix. Generate candidate impact responses from CsQ and verify if they
satisfy the identifying assumptions. If the sign restrictions are not satisfied then
disregard Q, if the sign restrictions are satisfied then generate and store its related
impulse response functions. Repeat this procedure until N impulse responses are
stored and take the simple mean. Repeat this procedure for any simulation s and
obtain 2000 mean impulse responses. Derive median and confidence intervals.
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Note: “B20" stands for Brianti (2020) and refers to the identification strategy presented in Section
1.3. “Sign Restrictions" refers to the sign restriction identification scheme as described in the main
text.
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A.6 Aggregate data
Table A.2: Details on aggregate US data
Variable Source and Construction Transform
Credit spread: EBP
Excess bond premium by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012)




Macroeconomic uncertainty by Jurado et al. (2015)
available on Sydney Ludvigson’s website. Baseline spec-
ification: horizon is three months. Robustness checks:




Sum of (i) private foreign deposits (FDABSNNCB), (ii)
checkable deposits and currency (NCBCDCA), (iii) to-
tal time and saving deposits (TSDABSNNCB), and (iv)
money market mutual fund shares (MMFSABSNNCB);
over Total assets (TABSNNCB) by FRED
level
GDP Real gross domestic product (GDPC1) by FRED log
Consumption
Consumption of non-durables (RCONND) plus con-
sumption of services (RCONS) by Philadelphia Fed log
Investment
Gross domestic investment (GDPIC1) by FRED plus con-
sumption of durables (RCOND) by Philadelphia Fed log
Hours
Hours of all persons for the nonfarm business sector
(HOANBS) by FRED log
GDP deflator
Implicit price deflator of the gross domestic product
(GDPDEF) by FRED log
Real M2
M2 money stock (M2) over GDP deflator (GDPDEF) by
FRED log
FFR Effective federal funds rate (FEDFUNDS) by FRED level
Volatility Index (VIX)
Volatility Index VIX (VIXCLS) by FRED. Aggregation
method: average log
Credit spread: GZ
GZ credit spread by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012)




Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield Relative
to Yield on 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, Percent,




Financial uncertainty by Jurado et al. (2015) avail-
able on Sydney Ludvigson’s website. Horizon is three
months. Aggregation method: average
level
Measured uncertainty: RU3
Real uncertainty by Jurado et al. (2015) available on




Treasury (TSABSNNCB) for the nonfinancial corporate
business sector by FRED. Robustness check: add it to
baseline corporate liquidity
level
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A.7 Model’s derivations and details
A.7.1 Household cost minimization problem
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A.7.2 Household utility maximization problem































where τt represents a series of payments –not internalized by the household– that
firms and the fiscal authority transfer to the household such that ct = yt in ev-
ery period. In addition, notice that the budget constraint is in real terms because






























Moreover, it can be also proved that
p̃tqt = ct = yt
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The first equality holds because –invoking symmetry– we have that p̃t = sθt−1 and
sθt−1qt = ct. The second equality holds because it is assumed that the firm is com-
mitting to produce yi,t = ci,t regardless of ai,t.






























FOC for qt is,
q
−γq






FOC for nt is,
− χn
1− nt

























where πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt and mt+1 = β p̃t/p̃t+1 (qt+1/qt)−γq .

































A.7.3 Firm profit maximization problem
























































1 if di,t ≥ 0
1/(1− ϕt) if di,t < 0
where, in aggregate,














where āt is the value of idiosyncratic productivity ai,t such that di,t = 0:
ct − wtnt −
γp
2
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which, in aggregate, is
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where Eat [ξi,tai,t] = 1 + ϕt/(1− ϕt)[1− Φ(z̄t − σ)].
FOC for ci,t:
−Eat [κi,t] + Eat [ξi,t]pi,t − Eat [νi,t] + (1− ρ)Eat [λi,t] = 0
which is
Eat [νi,t] = E
a
t [ξi,t]pi,t − Eat [κi,t] + (1− ρ)Eat [λi,t]
which, in aggregate, is













− Eat [λi,t] + ρEat [mt+1λi,t+1] = 0
which is
Eat [λi,t] = ρE
a






which, in aggregate, is















































































































































































where xft = X
f










where g(x) = ζxx1−ι/(1 − ι) with ι ∈ (0, 1). We can isolate the real value of liquid













where xft is increasing in ζx (firm has more appetite for x
f
t ), Eat [ξt+1] (firm needs
more resources in future), and Rxt (interest on liquid assets pay better); and is
decreasing in ξt (firm needs more resources today) and Rt (the households wants
more resources from the firm today since they want to save in bonds as they pay
better).
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A.7.4 Derivation of the Phillips curve


















































+ η̃(ξ̂t − ν̂t)
where ∂xt is the differential of variable xt, x̂t = ∂xt/xss, πss is equal to one, mss is
equal to β, and η̃ = (ηνss)/(γpξss) > 0.
Appendix B
What are the Sources of boom-Bust
Cycles?
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Figure B.1: Unconditional spectral density of quarterly and seasonally adjusted
U.S. macroeconomic and financial variables from 1981 to 2018.
Note: All variables are stationarized using Band-Pass filter excluding periodicities above 100 quar-
ters. Confidence intervals are computed following the procedure described in Beaudry et al. (2019).
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B.1 Unconditional Spectral Density
B.2 Spectral density from model simulated data











Figure B.2: Mean unconditional spectral density of GDP
Note: Monte Carlo simulation using various standard models and our model (red line). Simulated
data are detrended using a band-pass filter that removes fluctuations at periodities greater than 100
quarters.
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B.3 Robustness checks on technology Shocks
Figure B.5 reports impulse responses together with conditional spectral densities
implied by a technology shock for the baseline specification presented in Figure 2.3
and a series of robustness checks. In particular, RC 1 and RC 2 are the first and the
second robustness check where variables are linearly and quadratically detrended,
respectively. RC 3 is the third robustness check where TFP is controlled using 8
lags of TFP, the first 2 principal components and news shocks. RC 4 is the last
robustness check where we use different number of lags and principal component
when we estimate LP impulse responses.




















Figure B.3: Impulse responses and conditional spectral densities implied by a tech-
nology shock.
Note: Point Estimates is the baseline specification presented in Figure 2.3. RC 1 and RC 2 are
the first and the second robustness check where variables are linearly and quadratically detrended,
respectively. RC 3 is the third robustness check where we add more controls when we estimate a
technology shock. RC 4 is the last robustness check where we use different number of lags and
principal component when we estimate LP impulse responses.
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B.4 Robustness checks on expectation shocks
Figure B.4: Impulse responses to an expectations shock.
Figure B.5: Impulse responses to an expectations shock starting in 1967.
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B.5 Local Projections
To estimate LP impulse responses we follow standard techniques as firstly intro-
duced by Jordà (2005). Given the stationary series yt and shock εt, impulse re-
sponses can be estimated as follows,




δjεt−j + λjyt−j + γjxt−j
]
+ νt+h for h = 0, 1, . . . , H (B.1)
where θh represents response of yt to shock εt at horizon h and xt are additional con-
trols which in our estimation represent principal components from a large dataset
of macroeconomic variables.
B.5.1 Inference
Following Kilian and Kim (2011) we estimate confidence interval using the block
bootstrap procedure. As emphasized by Kilian and Kim (2011), we opt for this
approach because the error term in the local projections regressions is most likely
serially correlated. The LP impulse response estimator for horizon h depends on the
tuple,
Th = [yt+h εt εt−1 . . . εt−J yt−1 . . . yt−I ] (B.2)
To preserve the correlation in the data, build the set of all Th tuples for h =
0, 1, . . . , H. For each tuple Th, employ the following procedure:
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1. Define g = T − l + 1 overlapping blocks of Th of length l.1
2. Draw with replacement from the blocks to form a new tuple T bh of length T .
3. Estimate θbh from T bh using LP estimator.
4. Repeat 1. to 3. B (≥ 2000) times and select confidence intervals.
B.6 Variance Decomposition
Variance decomposition is estimated following Gorodnichenko and Lee (2017). In
particular, we define the population share of variance explained by the future inno-







where V ar(εt) = σ2εt and θi are LP estimators. Moreover ft+h|t−1 can be estimated










γqxt−q + ft+h|t−1 (B.4)
where xt−q represents a vector of additional controls.
1 Notice that l = (T − I − J + 2) 13 is defined following Berkowitz, Birgean and Kilian (1999). Results
are not sensitive to alternative choices of l.
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Since the estimator vh does not guarantee estimates to be between 0 and 1, we











where νt+h is coming from the LP regression,






λiyt−i + νt+h. (B.6)
B.6.1 Inference
To estimate confidence intervals for ṽh, we directly use the non-parametric confi-

















and select confidence intervals.
B.7 Conditional Spectral Density and Cyclicality Test
Consider the case where stationary variable yt is explained by two shocks: ε1,t and








2 See Gorodnichenko and Lee (2017) for a detailed description.
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Since the estimated impulse responses cannot cover an infinite number of lags con-








Since we are interested in the conditional cyclicality implied by the two shocks, we




θk,hεk,t−h for k = 1, 2. (B.10)
where yk,t represents the realized value of yt only conditional on shock εk,t for k =
1, 2.
Conditional spectral densities are parametrically estimated by taking the Fourier















for k = 1, 2. (B.11)
where ω ∈ (0 π] represents frequencies, i =
√
−1, θk,h is the LP estimator, and σ2k is
a standard estimator for V ar(εk,t).3
3 Notice that for estimating sk(ω) we need to build a grid for ω ∈ (0 π]. Although results are not
sensitive to different grid size, in our main results grid is 0.001 in order to guarantee a precise
estimate to ten-year frequencies.
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B.7.1 Inference
Similarly to what we have done for the variance decomposition, to estimate confi-
dence intervals for sk(ω), we directly use the non-parametric confidence intervals















for k = 1, 2. (B.12)
and select confidence intervals.
B.7.2 Test
1. Filter each variable you want to test using a Band-Pass filter which excludes
frequencies below 2 and above 100.
2. Estimate the autoregressive parameter ρy implied by this stationary variable
using standard regression techniques.
3. Simulate - for each variable y - B (≥ 2000) AR(1) processes with persistence
parameter ρy fed with normally distributed random disturbances.4
4. For each simulated series estimate its disturbances, impulse response coeffi-
cients with LP estimator θh and conditional spectral density via sk(ω) where k
is the estimated innovation from each simulated AR(1) process.
4 This simulated series has the same length of the data used in the empirical section. Since our sample
start slightly after 1980 then we have about 150 observations.
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5. Following Canova (1998) and Beaudry et al. (2019) we test if the estimated
conditional spectral densities for shocks εt (ŝε(ω)) are indistinguishable from
the ones derived from the simulated AR(1) process (ŝa(ω)).
• Notice that H0 : D̂ε = D̂a and H1 : D̂ε > D̂a
• D̂k = ŝk(ω1)/ŝk(ω2)
• ω1 ∈ (π/40, π/28) and ω1 ∈ (π/72, π/48)
6. Test statistic is estimated as follows
• Define D̂bk = ŝbk(ω1)/ŝbk(ω2) as the simulation of D̂k from ŝbk.
• Estimate, for each b, ζ̂b = D̂bε − D̂ba as the difference between the simula-
tion for D̂bε and D̂
b
a.
• P-value is the number of ζ̂b > 0 over the total number of simulations B.
GDP Investment ∆Debt / GDP TFP
Expectation Shock 3.64% 4.82% 2.24% 28.4%
Technology Shock 28.52% 5.54% 0.1% 89.84%
Table B.1: P-values for the test of a local peak in the spectral density implied by
expectation shocks (first row) and technology shocks (second row).
B.8 Proof of Theorem 1
Cyclical dynamics obtain if at least two roots of the loglinearized deterministic
version of the model are stable, complex and conjugate. Under equilibrium de-
terminacy the model possess only one stable root, therefore the model does not
generate cyclical dyanmics. Indeterminacy of equilibria is associated with at least
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an additional stable root, thus allows for the existence of complex dynamics. The
loglinearized deterministic version of the model can be written as
 2κd τβω1−τ+τβ













1− τ + τβ
− γ 1− µ
1 + γµ
(




With no adjustment cost of dividends, that is κ equal to zero, the dynamics of
dividends is irrelevant for the evolution of yt implying that the two eigenvalues of
the system cannot be conjugate.
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B.9 Data
Table B.2: Details on aggregate US data
Variable Source and Construction Transform
TFP
Utilization-adjusted total factor productivity
(dtfp_util) by San Francisco Fed
Cumulated
GDP Real gross domestic product (GDPC1) by FRED Logarithmic
Investment
Gross domestic investment (GDPIC1) plus consump-
tion of durables (PCDGCC96) by FRED
Logarithmic
∆ Debt
Flow of debt securities and loans for the nonfinancial




Consumption of non-durables (PCNGC96) plus con-
sumption of services (PCESVC96) by FRED
Logarithmic
Hours








Measured of credit spread by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek
(2012) available on Simon Gilchrist’s website
Level
Financial Condition Index




Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yield rela-
tive to yield on 10-year treasury constant maturity
(BAA10Y) by FRED
Level
Note: Seasonally-adjusted transformation is the 7-term Henderson filter.
Following We define the after-tax model-consistent labor wedge Λ as the log dif-
ference between the MRS and MPL:
Λt = log(MPLt)− log(MRSt)
where
MRSt =
u3(ct, ct−1, 1− nt)
u1(ct, ct1 , 1− nt)





1 + T ct
1− T nt
and
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In order to empirically construct the labor wedge we use the same data by Zhang
(2018).
Appendix C
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C.1 Data Appendix
Table C.1: Variable definition and sources
Variable name Definition
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y)
Pre COVID-19 expected sales growth over the next 12 months (2019 MET survey). Ordinal variable
taking values: Very negative (below -15%), Negative (-15%,-5%), Constant [-5%,+5%], Positive
(+5%,+15%), Very positive (above 15%).
Ei,t(Salesg1Y)
Post COVID-19 expected sales growth over the next 12 months (COVID-19 survey). Ordinal vari-
able taking values: Very negative (below -15%), Negative (-15%,-5%), Constant [-5%,+5%], Pos-
itive (+5%,+15%), Very positive (above 15%).
Ei,t−1(Pg)
Pre COVID-19 plans on the change in domestic prices over the next 12 months (2019 MET survey).
Continuous variable.
Ei,t(Pg)
Post COVID-19 plans on the change in domestic prices over the next 12 months (COVID-19 survey).
Continuous variable.
Ei,t(Salg3M)
Post COVID-19 expected change in sales over the next 3 months (COVID-19 survey). Continuous
variable.
Ei,t(Salg1Y)
Post COVID-19 expected change in sales over the next 12 months (COVID-19 survey). Continuous
variable.
Ei,t(Ordg)
Post COVID-19 expected change in orders over the next 12 months (COVID-19 survey). Continuous
variable.
Ei,t(Empg)
Post COVID-19 adjustment plans on employment over the next 12 months (COVID-19 survey).
Continuous variable.
Ei,t(Tang)
Post COVID-19 adjustment plans on investment in tangibles over the next 12 months (COVID-19
survey). Continuous variable.
Ei,t(Intg)
Post COVID-19 adjustment plans on investment in tangibles over the next 12 months (COVID-19
survey). Continuous variable.
Credit constrained
Pre COVID-19 binary variable taking value of one if the firm i. did not applied for a bank loan
because it would have been denied, ii. applied for a loan and it was denied, or iii. applied for a
loan and it was accepted with unfavorable conditions; it takes zero otherwise (2019 MET survey).
Essential
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm i. is deemed to be essential in the 6-digit sec-
toral classification of of the Italian government’s decree for the lockdown or ii. is deemed to be
non-essential and declares to have not shut down during the lockdown; it takes zero otherwise.
(COVID-19 survey and Italian government’s decree of March 22).
No action
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm is not taking and not planning to take any action to
face the crisis; it takes zero otherwise (COVID-19 survey).
Teleworking
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm is employing or planning to employ teleworking to
face the crisis; it takes zero otherwise (COVID-19 survey).
Employment reduc-
tion
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm is reducing or planning to reduce employment to
face the crisis; it takes zero otherwise (COVID-19 survey).
Hours reduction
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm is reducing or planning to reduce the amount of
hours worked by its employees to face the crisis; it takes zero otherwise (COVID-19 survey).
Total shutdown
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm is shutting down or planning to shut down to face
the crisis; it takes zero otherwise (COVID-19 survey).
Partial shutdown
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm is (or planning to) partially shutting down some
production lines to face the crisis; it takes zero otherwise (COVID-19 survey).
Wage guarantee
funds
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm is applying or planning to apply to wage guarantee
funds to face the crisis; it takes zero otherwise (COVID-19 survey).
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Variable name Definition
Size Log of assets (2018 firm balance sheets, Crif-Cribis D&B).
Age Log of (1+) age of the firm (2019 MET survey).
Cases
Number of reported cumulative COVID-19 cases at the provincial level (https://github.com/pcm-
dpc/covid-19)
Deaths
Log of (1+) COVID-19 cumulative deaths at the provincial level (imputed from number of cases, 
https://github.com/pcm-dpc/covid-19 )
Population Log of population at a provincial level (ISTAT).
Import
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm is an importer; it takes zero otherwise (2019 MET
survey).
Export
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm is an exporter; it takes zero otherwise (2019 MET
survey).
Group
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm is part of a corporate group; it takes zero otherwise
(2019 MET survey).
Family firm




Percentage of graduated employment in the firm, continuous variable (2019 MET survey).
R&D
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm performs activity of Research and Development; it
takes zero otherwise (2019 MET survey).
Liquidity Liquid assets to total assets ratio (2018 firm balance sheets, Crif-Cribis D&B).
Cash flow Cash flow to total assets ratio (2018 firm balance sheets, Crif-Cribis D&B).
Tangible assets Tangible assets to total assets ratio (2018 firm balance sheets, Crif-Cribis D&B).
Leverage Total debt to equity ratio (2018 firm balance sheets, Crif-Cribis D&B).
N. of Lender Banks Number of banks the firm is borrowing from as of January 2020 (2019 MET survey).
Lending relation-
ship (years)
Duration of the relationship with the lender bank as of January 2020 (2019 MET survey). For
firms borrowing from multiple banks (roughly 30% of the sample) this measure is computed as
the equally-weighted average across the outstanding relationships.
Distance lender-
bank
Distance in log-Km between the firm and the headquarter of the lender bank (2019 MET survey).
For firms borrowing from multiple banks (roughly 30% of the sample) this measure is computed
as the equally-weighted average across the outstanding relationships.
Trade credit
Net accounts payable (accounts payable net of accounts receivable) to total assets ratio (2018 firm
balance sheets, Crif-Cribis D&B).
Credit constrained
(post COVID-19)
Binary variable taking value of one if the firm expects credit constraints to be a potential issue after
the COVID-19 pandemic; it takes zero otherwise (COVID-19 survey).
Concentration
two-digit sectoral Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (entire population of 2018 Italian balance sheets,
Crif-Cribis D&B).
Churning
Number of exiting firms plus number of entering firms over the number of existing firms in 2018
at the two-digit sectoral level (official Italian registry data, Infocamere).
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Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics
Raw Sample Weighted Sample
Variable Type Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Stdev Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Stdev
Ei,t(Salesg1Y): Very Negative Categ. 0.440 – – – – 0.489 – – – –
Ei,t(Salesg1Y): Negative Categ. 0.323 – – – – 0.309 – – – –
Ei,t(Salesg1Y): Constant Categ. 0.197 – – – – 0.178 – – – –
Ei,t(Salesg1Y): Positive Categ. 0.025 – – – – 0.016 – – – –
Ei,t(Salesg1Y): Very Positive Categ. 0.008 – – – – 0.006 – – – –
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Very Negative Categ. 0.047 – – – – 0.059 – – – –
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Negative Categ. 0.134 – – – – 0.143 – – – –
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Constant Categ. 0.581 – – – – 0.625 – – – –
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Positive Categ. 0.208 – – – – 0.151 – – – –
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Very Positive Categ. 0.031 – – – – 0.021 – – – –
Ei,t(Pg) Cont. 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.147 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.183
Ei,t−1(Pg) Cont. 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.068 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.061
Ei,t(Salg3M) Cont. -0.226 -0.300 -0.150 0.000 0.265 -0.239 -0.400 -0.150 0.000 0.294
Ei,t(Salg1Y) Cont. -0.169 -0.250 -0.100 0.000 0.208 -0.193 -0.300 -0.100 0.000 0.234
Ei,t(Ordg) Cont. -0.156 -0.220 -0.100 0.000 0.221 -0.174 -0.300 -0.100 0.000 0.244
Ei,t(Empg) Cont. -0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.191 -0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.236
Ei,t(Tang) Cont. -0.139 -0.100 0.000 0.000 0.307 -0.146 -0.100 0.000 0.000 0.322
Ei,t(Intg) Cont. -0.121 -0.060 0.000 0.000 0.293 -0.131 -0.060 0.000 0.000 0.312
Credit constrained Categ. 0.163 – – – – 0.178 – – – –
Credit constrained (post) Categ. 0.354 – – – – 0.372 – – – –
Deaths Cont. 4.143 3.018 4.114 5.046 1.552 4.207 3.077 4.162 5.046 1.639
Cases Cont. 6.687 5.793 6.729 7.488 1.291 6.732 5.823 6.738 7.525 1.361
Population Cont. 13.39 12.79 13.35 13.92 1.190 13.62 12.94 13.69 14.63 1.232
Essential Categ. 0.595 – – – – 0.540 – – – –
Size Cont. 14.73 13.54 14.61 15.78 1.745 13.55 12.32 13.43 14.56 1.672
Age Cont. 3.010 2.639 3.178 3.555 0.823 2.936 2.565 3.044 3.466 0.778
Export Categ. 0.299 – – – – 0.146 – – – –
Import Categ. 0.246 – – – – 0.119 – – – –
R&D Categ. 0.241 – – – – 0.154 – – – –
Group Categ. 0.125 – – – – 0.068 – – – –
% graduated empl. Cont. 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.117 0.220 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.315
Family firm Categ. 0.707 – – – – 0.769 – – – –
Leverage Cont. 0.667 0.506 0.704 0.855 0.234 0.643 0.446 0.675 0.866 0.262
Liquidity Cont. 0.127 0.014 0.066 0.183 0.158 0.154 0.009 0.072 0.213 0.205
Tangible ass. Cont. 0.211 0.037 0.143 0.329 0.207 0.197 0.014 0.079 0.313 0.241
Trade credit Cont. -0.111 -0.222 -0.048 0.000 0.147 -0.087 -0.149 0.000 0.000 0.141
N banks Cont. 1.008 0.693 1.098 1.386 0.468 0.833 0.693 0.693 1.098 0.355
Length bank rel. Cont. 0.597 0.251 0.470 0.775 0.535 0.484 0.251 0.415 0.604 0.479
Distance bank Cont. 5.424 5.024 5.669 6.236 1.218 5.248 4.787 5.606 6.276 1.456
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C.2 Other Results







1-9 Employees 51.1% 48.1%
10-49 Employees 33.0% 34.8%
50-249 Employees 12.8% 12.5%






Notes: Share of firms in the sample by macro-industry, size class, and macro-geographical region.
Column 1 shows the composition of the COVID-19 survey while Column 2 reports the composition
of the original 2019 MET survey.
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Table B2: Validation for expected sales growth
Dependent Variable: Realized sales growth (categorical)
Panel A: full sample 2008–2019
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Very Negative -7.102*** -6.495*** -2.678***
[0.0877] [0.131] [0.0375]
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Negative -2.240*** -1.572*** -1.059***
[0.0569] [0.0820] [0.0216]
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Positive 2.569*** 1.986*** 1.344***
[0.0436] [0.0639] [0.0170]
Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y): Very Positive 7.028*** 5.537*** 3.038***
[0.110] [0.167] [0.0470]
Time FE X X X X X X
Province FE X X X X X X
Industry (2 Digit) FE X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Estimator OLS Within Ordered Logit
R-squared (Pseudo R2) 0.039 0.210 0.034 0.140 (0.017) (0.105)
N obs. 91540 91540 91540 91540 91540 91540
Panel B: sovereign-debt crisis only (2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ei,t−1(Sales1Y): Very Negative -10.56*** – -4.457***
[0.164] – [0.0985]
Ei,t−1(Sales1Y): Negative -2.009*** – -1.240***
[0.128] – [0.0602]
Ei,t−1(Sales1Y): Positive 2.698*** – 1.735***
[0.110] – [0.0542]
Ei,t−1(Sales1Y): Very Positive 5.590*** – 3.331***
[0.404] – [0.231]
Province FE X X X X X X
Industry (2 Digit) FE X X X X X X
Estimator OLS – Ordered Logit
R-squared (Pseudo R2) 0.012 0.345 – – (0.005) (0.155)
N obs. 14760 14760 – – 14760 14760
Notes: the dependent variable is the realized categorical growth rate of sales. The explanatory
variable is the expectations of future sales growth at the one-year horizon formed the previous pe-
riod (Ei,t−1(Salesg1Y)). Both variables are categorical and take a value from one to five if the firm
reported expected or realized sales growth to be: i. very negative (less than -15%); ii. negative (be-
tween -15% and -5%); iii. stable (between -5% and +5%); iv. positive (between 5% and 15%); and
v. very positive (more than 15%). The estimator varies across columns: weighted OLS in columns 1
and 2, within estimator with firm and time fixed effects in columns 3 and 4, and weighted ordered
logit (estimates) in columns 5 and 6. Standard errors (in square brackets) clustered at the province
level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. In panel A
we report the results for the entire sample (combination of all the waves of the MET survey), while
panel B presents results for the sovereign debt crisis only (expectations formed at the end of 2011
for 2012).
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Table B3: Alternative measures of geographical exposure to COVID-19
Dependent variable: Ei,t(Salesg1Y)

























ln(Population) 0.0375 -0.0114 0.0218 0.0361
[0.0321] [0.0327] [0.0348] [0.0400]
R-squared 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.209 0.212 0.212 0.211 0.213
N obs. 5008 5008 5008 5008 5105 5105 5105 5105
Dependent variable: Ei,t(Pg)

























ln(Population) 0.779 3.474*** 0.650 1.095
[0.559] [1.186] [0.606] [0.802]
R-squared 0.173 0.173 0.151 0.139 0.169 0.169 0.167 0.167
N obs. 4991 4991 4991 4991 5088 5088 5088 5088
Notes: Weighted OLS estimates. Standard errors (in square brackets) clustered at the province level.
All regressions include narrow controls as well as region and industry (2 Digit) fixed effects. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
232 APPENDIX C. COVID-19 AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS
Table B4: Baseline Sales: multinomial logit
Ei,t(Salesg1Y) Category: Very Negative Negative Constant Positive Very Positive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deaths 0.0239* -0.00692 -0.0171 0.00146 -0.00133
[0.0143] [0.0153] [0.0115] [0.00147] [0.00172]
Essential -0.206*** 0.0880** 0.102*** 0.0219*** -0.00640
[0.0320] [0.0342] [0.0279] [0.00579] [0.00483]
Credit constrained 0.133** -0.0784 -0.0525 -0.00575 0.00318
[0.0551] [0.0521] [0.0509] [0.00427] [0.00387]
Region FE X




Notes: Multinomial logit (marginal effects) for weighted sample. Standard errors (in square brack-
ets) clustered at the province level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.
